The most interesting page of the 400 pages of the arms report is Page 22.

It lists the corruption allegations that are at heart of the arms deal controversy. Only six of the eight have been fully investigated the others are still outstanding.

The governments claim that it has been vindicated is, in the light of these, premature. Some of the allegations relate to a top official in the Department of Defence, others to a senior member of the previous Cabinet.

Among the vaguely stated allegations still being investigated are these:

Whether Chippy Shaik, the Head of Acquisitions in the Department of Defence, is guilty of anything criminal as a result of his conflict of interest. Shaiks brother, Shabir, won several subcontracts.

So far the report has found that Shaik did not recuse himself when his brothers bids were discussed. That, according to Defence Minister Mosiuoa Lekota, is not an offence;

Whether Shaik personally told bidders that they would have to come to an arrangement with certain South African companies, including his brothers, if their bids were to succeed;

Whether former Defence Minister Joe Modise, during whose term the deal was negotiated, is a shareholder and chairman of Conlog, one of the companies that benefited from the deal;

Whether anyone in the government received any kickback in the purchase of the fightertrainer planes, which resulted in the government overlooking one bidder the Italian company Aermacchi and choosing British Aerospaces Hawk, each of which costs R3-million more than the Italian aircraft;

Whether a company owned by close associates of Modise, former Umkhonto weSizwe General Lambert Moloi and his sonin-law Tshepo Molai, called FBS, which won a subcontract, was anything more than an empty shell. The company later merged with Conlog; and

Whether various roleplayers hold shares through nominees in companies that benefited.

These allegations are the claims that are at the heart of the question of corruption hanging over the arms deal. Bulelani Ngcuka, the National Director of Public Prosecutions, is still investigating. By arresting Shabir Shaik on Friday he showed, at least, that he is serious about taking his investigation into the Shaik family further. But to nail down most of the allegations would require a conspirator from the inside, said Ngcuka something he does not yet have.

We have to get more evidence. We have not yet arrived at that stage. But we have found that in some of the allegations there is some form of substantiation, he said.

These investigations could go on for years, said Ngcuka. After that, he will either be able to prosecute or will have to close his case.

So the report released on Thursday although it will be the final report to Parliament is really just a work in progress. That is the first problem with the governments claim of exoneration.

The second lies in the content of the report. The findings so far, rather than being of a minor procedural nature, are actually quite damning. But the Auditor-General, Shauket Fakie, usually known for his stern disapproval of procedural contraventions, is surprisingly soft in his recommendations.

We really tried to focus on what actually happened. The recommendations were just an add-on ... In addition, the final recommendations should be the work of the parliamentary committees, he said.

The first big procedural deviation came in the establishment of a Cabinet subcommittee as a clearing-house for the arms deal.

There are strictly prescribed, highly detailed procedures for the procurement of arms, starting with the arm of service determining its needs and ending in a top-level committee consisting of the minister of defence, the chief of the SANDF and the head of Armscor.

This body is then supposed to make a recommendation to the Cabinet.

But, in this case, the Cabinet constituted a subcommittee to make the final decision.

It was this committee that decided that instead of buying the much cheaper Italian fightertrainer (which the air force had rated best from a military point of view) it would go for the more expensive Hawk.

Shaik also happened to sit on this Cabinet committee and is described in the report as being its secretary.

In the report, Fakie says this about the Cabinet subcommittee: Although unusual in terms of normal procurement practice, this decision was neither unlawful nor irregular. As the ultimate decision-maker, [the] Cabinet was entitled to select the preferred bidder, taking into account the recommendations of the evaluating bodies as well as other factors, such as strategic considerations.

Fakie says the main reason for the unusual procedure was because the procurement was so big. Delegating it to a committee to examine the details was good business practice.

It is this prerogative of the Cabinet that it can override elaborate tender procedures for strategic reasons that has made it possible for Ngcuka to pronounce the Hawk contract clean, even though he has not yet established whether a kickback was made or not.

Ngcuka says the aircrafts merits were not the deciding factor. It is not the only issue. You also have to consider, who do you want to be your defence partner the Italians or the British? Given the history of this country, [the] Cabinet chose the British.

Fakie identified many other departures from procedure. In the main contracts these include:

The contracts to buy light utility helicopters the purchase of which was deferred were concluded before various key documents had been finalised. But, Fakie says, no evidence was found of any improper influence;

Modise initialled the submarine contract before the affordability study was complete because he wanted it done before he left office. But says, Fakie, it would appear that the initialling ... did not constitute a final agreement;

There were also many problems with the way that a Department of Trade and Industry official, Vanan Pillay, the beneficiary of a discounted car, scored the industrial participation projects. Weaknesses were also identified in the internal controls of the department.

Fakies recommendation is that sound procurement practices be implemented; and

The winning bidder for the corvettes the German Frigate Consortium should have been disqualified in the second round of bidding because it failed to meet the criteria. Instead, it was allowed to supply information after the offers had been submitted. Fakie recommended that in future this should not be allowed even if a process has to be started afresh.

In defence of his weak recommendations, Fakie says: It was important to bring the errors to the publics attention. The crux is that the internal checking arrangements are not as good as they should be. But overall, looking at the errors, we asked: would another bidder have been selected? We found the answer to be no.

There were also problems with some of the subcontracts. Although the Minister of Trade and Industry, Alec Erwin, has insisted that the government had no part in influencing whom prime contractors chose as subcontractors, the report says that the Department of Defence and Armscor nominated certain subcontractors ... to ensure compliance with technical standards. This did not preclude the main contractor from selecting a different subcontractor. The problems with the subcontractors include:

The companies in which Shabir Shaik has an interest ADS and the Thomson Group. Chippy Shaik did not recuse himself from the meetings;

One local bidder that lost out in a bid that Shaiks company won was CI, on which the SA Navy has already spent R20million. The report says: It is not clear when and by whom the decision was taken not to award the contract to CI. However, it is clear that such a decision was taken and that it was taken, generically speaking, by the state.

The last area of focus in the report is the cost of the deal to the state, over which there has been much wrangling. The report concludes that although the price of the deal on the day it was signed was R30.3-billion, the Cabinet was later made aware that this did not include all the costs.

Interest payments and rand fluctuations (the dollar was assumed to be R6.25) had not been included. In fact, the cost was underestimated by 49%. But, says Fakie: Ultimately, the decision as to what the country can and cannot afford is one of political choice.

Although the recommendations are weak, the report will give Parliament plenty to pick over.

It is not true that the government has been exonerated.

Shaik is a top official, although he is not the government itself.

Furthermore, the report gives the strong impression that Modise has been cleared. But, in fact, he has been cleared only of one specific allegation buying shares in Conlog with money from a bribe. Although he is not mentioned again by name, other allegations on Page 22 allude to his business interests.

However, although top officials are still under investigation, there must be some sympathy for the Cabinets attempt to prove itself exonerated.

The government has been the victim of plenty of malice since allegations surfaced. Many wild claims were made and the opponents of the deal peaceniks and losing bidders alike did not play clean.

Says Ngcuka: The impression was created that this government is a bunch of kleptomaniacs and that is not the case ... There are reasons for all the decisions and nothing was done clandestinely.

Substantial good will come out of the report.

Procurement procedures will be tightened and regulations are on the way to insist that Cabinet ministers have a cooling off period before going into business in realms where they have huge influence.

But it is not yet possible to conclude that the deal is clean. It is also not much comfort to accept Fakies promise that next time it will be done better.