It's time to get back to basics on the arms deal. Threatening to get lost in controversy is the fact that SA needs a modern military capability, whatever the substance of allegations of corruption, offset overstatements and other malfeasance.

Remember the Botswana Defence Force's (BDF's) armoured car breakdown during the Lesotho intervention two years ago? Or, a decade earlier, the SA Air Force's startled discovery in the skies over Angola of advanced Mig fighters it assumed were limited to Europe?

As Angolan jets flew rings around the SAAF, Armscor scrambled to procure missile technology to put Pretoria back in the fight. As Maseru burned and SA troops battled to restore stability, BDF mechanics laboured to get their vehicles out of Mafikeng.

In September 1998 the BDF breakdown was an embarrassment. Next time, it could mean defeat particularly tragic if the international mandate is peace.

What the Southern African Development Community intervention taught was not to underestimate the region's armies. SA's casualties in Lesotho also resulted from arrogance the belief that 600 SA National Defence Force troops could restore stability because the other side would not fight. It is an arrogance shared by those who believe current SANDF equipment levels are so superior they can dominate any peace or stability mission in the region.

If restoring order in Lesotho with minimal casualties required a much bigger show of force, what might it take when those planning a coup or destabilising the region have years of battle experience in Mozambique, Angola or the Democratic Republic of Congo?

Hold on. We are a peaceful nation with friends everywhere. Combat readiness was the issue in the past. But how can it be today? Besides, nobody really questions the need for new jets, helicopters, submarines and corvettes.

Or do they? The critics just want to be sure the acquisition process was free of shake-downs, that the trade and investment offsets will flourish, and that SA's balance of payments will emerge unscathed. So they say.

Sceptics sense more than meets the eye. A lingering pacifism perhaps, which, deep down, really does believe this is about boats versus butter? Hawks versus housing? Or clean water, clinics, and schools instead of Gripens?

Whatever the protestations of those leading the charge on the corruption and countertrade front, the dividing line to condemning the whole acquisition is invisible to the broad public. That, arguably, is precisely what those opposed to the rearmament programme as a matter of principle want.

The hope is that criticism of aspects of the arms package will accumulate to become a questioning of the entire package.

Theirs is still a benign world in which nobody wishes SA any ill. A world in which the country's status as a regional power derives solely from its moral standing, never from an ability to project power in the interests of realpolitik, regional peace, and investor confidence.

So why is government so reticent about defending the package on strategic grounds? Has anybody heard of the defence review lately? Does anybody remember its strategic analysis of SA's role in Africa and the world, or its proposals, accepted by cabinet and Parliament, for a smaller, better equipped defence force?

Until Defence Minister Mosiuoa Lekota's recent press meetings, nothing was heard from the government on the subject since the days of Joe Modise and Ronnie Kasrils. An empty stage has allowed those keen to sow doubt one command performance after another.

Perhaps the reluctance to talk Turkey on defence is understandable. Or, more precisely, Zimbabwe, Congo, Angola, or the world's powers.

Why alarm skittish neighbours by publicly discussing air superiority as a key factor in diplomatic leverage when regional stability is at stake? Why remind those with harbours that submarines are the cheapest way to prevent gun runners entering port because they are invisible and smugglers don't know where they are?

Why draw attention to the vulnerability to naval blockade of SA's export-import gateway, Durban? The US, German, French, British, Indian and other navies which have exercised there in recent years know what they would do if push came to shove. So why rub their political masters' noses in it while we are still all good friends?

Better to discuss strategies for peace interventions, weapons interdiction, or national defence behind closed doors. Keep a low profile while gradually facing up to the fact in public that we are the big guys on the block, with the responsibilities for stability that implies.

In the meantime, the package's other strategic messages have reached their intended recipients. The Germans know a large order for ships and submarines is also about ensuring their long-term political and industrial engagement. Same for the UK, Sweden and Italy whose aircraft contracts create links and obligations which will be of mutual long-term benefit.

And France and the US? They initially got nothing, a knuckle rap for breaching the arms embargo against apartheid and for playing hardball with the new SA's Armscor. But keeping them out and angry is not in SA's long-term interest. So France's Thomson CSF got the lucrative subcontract for the corvette combat suites. And Boeing sold its 737-800s to SAA. A juicy and suitably civilian deal.

Corruption there may have been, though no hard evidence has yet seen the light of day. Problems there may be with some of the offsets, though it is early days yet for judging whether promises made will be kept. Dealing with the currency challenges inherent in a deal of this magnitude may still show what deal-making skill was present and what lacking when the contracts were signed.

As to the need for the armaments, it is worth remembering the Outeniqua. In May 1997, the ailing Mobutu Sese Seko was driven up the ramp of the SA navy's biggest ship for talks with Laurent Kabila, who landed on its helicopter deck.

All of this in Pointe Noire, Republic of Congo. The talks which ensured a peaceful transition in Zaire took place on an African ship. The regional power had contributed to an African solution to an African problem.

Looking around today, it seems likely it may have to do so again. The government should explain this to the people more forcefully and more frequently.  

With acknowledgement to Business Day.