Will the public hearings into the arms deal help nail the wrongdoers, or will they be a futile public relations exercise, asks Carol Paton

When the top guns of the SA Air Force sat down to deliberate on the  purchase of a new fighter-trainer - a warplane used mostly to train pilots to fly a bigger version of the real thing - they chose an Italian plane, the Aeromacchi .

Through months of deliberation during 1998 and successive committees that make up the military's acquisition process, the Aeromacchi, flown in 13 African countries, came tops.

But when the decision moved into the hands of politicians, the Aeromacchi lost the day. Instead, British Aerospace's Hawk - a bigger and older warplane nearing the end of its technically useful life - was chosen, at double the price. 

The public debate on the inquiry into the R43-billion arms deal has been dominated by some heated sideshows: the story of Tony Yengeni's three Mercs, the antics of PAC loudmouth Patricia de Lille and the behind-the-scenes manipulations to ensure that Judge Willem Heath did not end up wearing an investigator's hat.

The big questions, however, remain unanswered. Why, for instance, did Cabinet choose the Hawk at such great expense to taxpayers?

Yengeni and the 20 or so others who have received luxury cars should certainly be brought to book but there are far bigger fish to fry if there is to be a credible investigation.

But catching the "bigger fish" is proving difficult. While some might have been careless in accepting flashy cars, others were clearly not - using complex financial arrangements which investigators fear may even be as good as legal.

The hearings, which are set to begin tomorrow but may be immediately postponed, have been conceived by the Joint Investigating Team to restore public faith after a series of public relations disasters. The style will be "inquisitorial" rather than adversarial. But, in the absence of the cross-questioning of a courtroom, it is difficult to see why witnesses would voluntarily say anything more than they already have just because they are under oath.

"It would nice if we could see people spilling their guts, but I don't think it will happen," says Gavin Woods, the IFP MP who drove the call for an investigation. "I think we will come away with the same concerns and same suspicions." De Lille has been even more dismissive. "I won't be part of that sideshow," she has said.

A couple of likely witnesses are known to have said they will not testify for fear of endangering themselves.

Idasa, a lobby group, has been monitoring the government's handling of the inquiry and has gone as far as soliciting legal opinion on the implications of public hearings. It cites fears that the hearings could compromise the criminal investigation. In an in-depth report, Idasa warns that "the public hearings may well cause certain facts to be publicised prior to a proper investigation. This could have the effect of preparing someone against whom there is incriminating evidence of the case against them."

The first of the big questions will be whether it can be proved that the prime contracts were predetermined. There is plenty of reason for suspicion. The R43-billion package included nine advanced Gripen fighter aircraft, 12 Hawks, four patrol corvettes, 30 light utility helicopters and three submarines.

The case of the Hawk could be the one most difficult to explain. Military sources are emphatic that "the air force never, ever chose the Hawk".

After the air force had completed its procedures, the matter was referred to the Arms Acquisition Council, chaired by the then Minister of Defence, Joe Modise. Chippy Shaik, the Defence Department's head of acquisitions, acted as secretary.

Modise, in turn, decided to refer the matter to a specially convened Cabinet subcommittee. At the same time, he asked Shaik to redo the submission on the Hawk - only this time leaving out the price.

The subcommittee chose the Hawk. Cabinet ministers have, on several occasions since then, explained their decision.

 "Once the correct decision was taken to buy the advanced Gripen fighter aircraft, the decision about a trainer had to take this into account . . . The simple fact is that it is not feasible, for our purposes, to graduate from an Aeromacchi trainer, no matter how good it was or its price, to the Gripen," said a statement released in January by ministers including Trade and Industry's Alec Erwin, Defence's Mosiuoa Lekota and Finance's Trevor Manuel.

This argument, made on the basis of technical capability, was not even considered to be an issue by the air force.

But there is an even greater motivation for an in-depth investigation into the Hawk preference. Six months before being named the preferred supplier, British Aerospace sponsored numerous overseas trips for Cabinet ministers, MPs and government officials and donated R5-million to the ANC's MK Veterans Military Association.

In addition, rumours abound of alleged business links, whether legal or not, between Modise and British Aerospace.

Certainly, the Hawk contract has received the most attention from the Auditor-General, Shauket Fakie, Parliament's standing committee on public accounts and the media. But aspects of other prime contracts could be questioned too.

For instance, a local company originally selected to provide combat suites for the four corvettes found itself elbowed out after the company coordinating the deal doubled its prices. The coordinating company was African Defence Systems, of which Shaik's brother, Shabir, is a director.

The contract eventually went to a consortium which included the German manufacturer Thyssen and Thomson CSF, at the time the sole owner of African Defence Systems.

The investigators and public hearings will next need to answer allegations on the subcontracts. With each purchase, the prime contractors negotiated separate deals with mainly local suppliers to complete parts of the whole.

African Defence Systems was appointed to coordinate local involvement in the arms deal since black economic empowerment had to be a factor in awarding the contracts. Foreign companies were thus required to form partnerships with local companies.

In allegations of wrongdoing around the subcontracts, the names African Defence Systems and Futuristic Business Solutions crop up again and again.

The two companies have close links with Shaik and Modise. They are also now linked to one another. Shortly after the deal, Futuristic Business Systems bought 20% of African Defence Systems. The directors of Futuristic Business Systems include a close associate of Modise, former defence force general Lambert Moloi and his son-in-law Tsepo Molai.

In the case of the purchase of the helicopters, Bell Helicopters was assured it would get the deal if a satisfactory arrangement was made with Futuristic Business Solutions.

Bell balked at the suggestion, given Futuristic Business Solutions's lack of infrastructure, and the contract went to Agusta, an Italian company which signed a preliminary deal with Futuristic Business Solutions.

Agusta's helicopters cost R3-million more each than Bell's. 

The Idasa report identifies other areas begging questions. These include:

Chippy Shaik's failure to declare his conflicts of interest before the bidding began;

 The cost of the deal and whether Cabinet honestly reflected its economic risks. Although an affordability report warned of the dangers of exchange and interest rate movements, the government said the negative impact would be neutralised by the "off-sets"; and The off-sets themselves, which are the intended benefits for SA from the deal. The main contractors were required to commit to investing in both industrial and defence projects. In the light of international experience, however, there is much scepticism about whether off-sets materialise.

It will be difficult for Modise and Chippy Shaik, at least, to escape a grilling. Sources close to the investigation believe the latter could face criminal charges.

For those members of the public, who want to see heads roll, such a conclusion would be very encouraging. But a more cynical view of the investigation would be equally appropriate.

Although one (former) Cabinet minister, Modise, may face the rap, the investigation has been carefully circumscribed through skilful political management. Certain areas are off-limits - the most obvious of these being the "big picture".

Over the past year there has been constant talk of the links between the arms deal and several other procurement deals that are to have a  major impact on the South African economy. For instance, many of the key figures who benefited from the arms deal - Moloi, Molai, Shabir Shaik and Johannesburg chartered accountant Ian Pierce - are also key players in CellC, the consortium that won the third cellular licence . But possible links between these transactions will not be probed.

The national director of Public Prosecutions, Bulelani Ngcuka, and Public Protector Selby Baqwa seem to hope that they will prove their bona fides to the South African people through the public hearings. But, if the hearings do not deliver, this is likely to backfire.

In the end, Ngcuka and Baqwa must answer one central question with confidence: Did taxpayers pay a whole lot more than they should have for arms, simply to swell the bank balances of an unscrupulous few?

It's up to Ngcuka and Baqwa to prove their bona fides or leave the impression that they have succumbed to political pressure.