The investigation of government's multibillion-rand arms procurement programme has thrust the role of Parliament into the media spotlight. At the centre of the drama was Parliament's standing committee on public accounts (Scopa), which oversees government expenditure. A protracted series of events left it sharply divided along party-political lines.

Things seem to have come full circle, with Inkatha Freedom Party chairman Gavin Woods resigning. But what does his departure mean and what lessons can be learnt for the future?

There is a tradition that the committee chairman's post is offered to an opposition party member. The new chairman will need to bring Scopa back on track and restore its tradition of nonpartisanship. The challenge will be for Parliament to view oversight as broadly as possible.

Commendably, Parliament has already begun to look at issues of oversight and accountability via its joint subcommittee on oversight and accountability. It has commissioned a report drafted by a team headed by University of Cape Town legal academic Hugh Corder.

The report acknowledges usefully that a strong party system presents problems for MPs in separating party political role and parliamentary roles.

Effective oversight extends beyond being a task for an overeager opposition and is, as the Corder report suggests, more about opposition parties constantly seeking to "trip up" the ruling party, which results in the ruling party deeming any exercise of oversight a criticism.

The crucial question is one of process how do we prevent Scopa from once again becoming divided along party political lines in future?

The arms deal has been instructive, but surely there will be other instances where there will be differences about the way Scopa is to exercise its oversight role?

So if we accept party political differences will be an impediment to effective and constructive oversight, how can Scopa be insulated from the damaging effects of party political pressure and how can one ensure that MPs and the executive meet their constitutional obligations in this regard?

The latter question could be more difficult to answer, as it will take a heady combination not only of thinking broadly about oversight but combining it with the political will to implement the constitutional notions of transparency and accountability.

Oversight needs to be looked at beyond the scrutiny of legislation. There may be comfort in recalling that established democracies such as the UK have been grappling with very similar issues. Some suggestions offered at various times could be a useful place to begin thinking creatively of Scopa's role. These include :

• One maintains the custom of a chairman from the nonruling party;

• Scopa members could be paid a higher salary, which would encourage members to forge a career path in the committee and not use membership as a way to further political careers;

• Special protection be afforded to Scopa members that they cannot be removed from the committee by the party hierarchy other than under exceptional circumstances;

• A more contentious suggestion has been a call for the inclusion of non MPs on Scopa;

• On voting, the majority party representation within Scopa could be limited to a 50% threshold; and

• Increased research resources.

Parliament now has the opportunity to re-examine not only the notion of oversight but also the role of Scopa. Ironically, Woods might, by his resignation, have provided the space for such debate about the role Scopa can play in future.

February is the Governance Researcher with the Political Information & Monitoring Service at Idasa.