Nonmilitary methods cost-effective and offer SA security based on co-operation

Recent articles have attempted to defend SA's arms deal. Some centre on arguments that SA has to lead the charge for southern African political stability, that this is likely to include military intervention and that the arms deal is thus necessary and appropriate.

Others argue that SA is located in a politically very unstable region, that the future is quite uncertain, and that the arms deal is part of the continuing process of maintaining our military capabilities.

These arguments are based on either highly questionable or out ofdate thinking.

Firstly, the case for the arms deal, as Adam Habib (Taking a different view of maligned arms deal, November 30) admits, has never been publicly made. This is because the case is incredibly weak.

Consider the Defence Review. In an early chapter, it notes that SA faces no military threat and that the real security issues are poverty, unemployment and the like. We could now add about 250000 AIDS-related deaths a year. Yet, later in the review, there are lists of military hardware deemed necessary for the SA National Defence Force (SANDF).

One of these lists is very similar to the arms package on order. My guess is the military were amazed that the cabinet accepted what was essentially a wish list.

Imagine if someone suggested spending tens of billions on 100 state-of-the-art hospitals, with almost no other use, in the very unlikely event a specific disease might hit SA. They would be scoffed at. But how does the arms deal differ?

There is no point buying equipment for which there is no need. Other nations may be able to afford to buy prestige and status (of a kind) this way. We cannot. It is interesting to note that New Zealand recently opted, after carefully reviewing defence needs, to do away with its fighter aircraft capability.

I suspect an objective review of our defence needs would reach the same conclusion. We are one of the most secure countries in the world in terms of foreign invasion. The two civil wars within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are nowhere near SA. Also, we already well and truly outgun the other 13 SADC states combined, even before the arms package.

Secondly, take the point that the real role of the military is not to defend ourselves but to intervene elsewhere in Africa. I suspect that this is indeed important to our decision makers we seem intent on becoming the Yankees of Africa although it would be politically incorrect to state it. Such interventions are not, by the way, listed as a core function of the SANDF.

But does the fact that we are relatively strong give us any right to intervene elsewhere? To make unilateral decisions like the arms deal simply confirms our reputation as a regional bully.

Thirdly, if we insist on having a more powerful military in order to intervene elsewhere in Africa, is the equipment on order appropriate? Helmoed-Röömer Heitman (Answering critics of SA weapons procurement, December 4) argues the orders are relevant to defence needs.

The most likely uses of our military in this sense would be to defend our borders against spillovers from a civil war elsewhere and to act as peacekeepers, if invited by some other country.

This would involve mobile, welltrained ground troops, with helicopter support. They would not require jet fighters, submarines or patrol corvettes. The package we have ordered would be suitable only if some foreign nation tried to invade SA using land, air and sea forces.

Fourthly, our insistence on a strong military is based on out-ofdate thinking.

The world has changed since the end of the Second World War. Invasions of one country by another are rare, although low-level civil wars are not uncommon. The real security issues are not military but those related to poverty, unemployment and the like.

When disputes do occur, the military is a very costly, ineffective way of dealing with them. Consider four of the major international wars fought in the past two decades the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88, the UKArgentine war over the Falklands (1982) and US-led actions against Iraq over Kuwait (1991) and in Kosovo (1999). The first ended in a stalemate after 500000 military deaths.

Military victories were won in the other three but peace is preserved only by maintaining large and very costly military forces in each region.

It is time to turn seriously to alternative, nonmilitary ways of dealing with disputes, both within and between countries. Habib lists political and diplomatic mechanisms and alliances, trade concessions, economic sanctions and aid.

I would add activities at all levels of society from student exchanges to co-operation with respect to shared resources such as water which entail befriending the neighbours. Many noncore military functions could be privatised or demilitarised. Let us deliberately and openly reduce our military and at the same time beef up security by befriending our neighbours, both within and outside our country.

We might do this partly because we know friends find nonviolent ways of handling disputes. More importantly, deep down we know the use of force, or the threat to use it, is wrong and ends up hurting the losers and corrupting the winners.

SA is an example of how massive social change can be achieved largely without using violence. Let us build on this by demilitarising our society. Cancelling the arms deal, in whole or in part, would be a wonderful start to this new but highly appropriate way of thinking.

Harris is Professor of Economics at the University of Natal.