What's Behind the Arms Deal? |
Publication | Die Burger |
Date | 2001-04-25 |
Reporter | Adrian Lackey |
Web Link | www.news24.co.za |
Cape Town - The South
African media and public should be asking certain questions over the current
government arms deals if they don't want to see the same bad mistakes of the
Information scandal being repeated, said Noseweek editor Martin Welz on
Wednesday.
Speaking at the Cape Town Press Club, Welz said,
while the media and public delighted in stories over Connie Mulder and Eschel
Rhoodie and a R60 million scandal in the 1970s, they failed to see the real
issue.
This issue was: given that the R60 million used
for spreading information had come from the defence budget, how much more money
had there been in this budget, and for what ends had it been used? But those
questions were never asked.
Welz claimed the focus on the Information scandal
had enabled the government of the time to spend at least R60 billion on arms for
the defence force - a huge contributing factor to South Africa's current debt
burden.
In addition, the attention the Info scandal
attracted resulted in a transfer of power from the caucuses and the police force
under John Vorster to the securocrats and the defence force under PW Botha, with
consequences that are now history.
Welz claims that the current arms procurement
transaction should be approached with the same question: what are the reasons
behind it, since the size of the deal is not justified by South Africa's present
requirements.
Because of this he had made a list of the people
involved in the respective phases of the transaction. This is where the
organograms originated which had so enraged former president Nelson Mandela that
he relinquished his role as patron of the Heath unit, Welz said.
Attempts to exclude Judge Willem Heath from the
probe had been immediately successful after that event.
Welz claimed there were really only three reasons
for South Africa to procure arms: someone was on the point of attacking the
country; South Africa planned to invade another country; or the defence force
needed to maintain its equipment since when it deteriorated, repairs were
complicated and very expensive.
With the first option being highly unlikely, Welz
claimed it was incumbent on President Thabo Mbeki to state whether "he
wanted to be a Napoleon". Otherwise, maintaining the defence force seemed
the most likely possibility.
If this proved to be the case, Welz said, one
could ask the question why such huge amounts of money were required, while also
taking into account recent statements by Laurie Nathan, executive director of
the Centre for Conflict Solutions and also a member of the Cameron Commission
which initially probed the arms trade.
Nathan recently said that two of the commission's
recommendations had been that the defence budget should not be increased, and
that arms deals should be approved by Parliament. Nothing came of these
recommendations.
Other questions that needed to be asked, Welz
noted, included the role of motor manufacturer Daimler Chrysler in the arms
issue, and the ANC's and other leading politicians' interests in the events,
particularly the role of Chippy Shaik, procurement chief for the defence
ministry.
Welz asked why
President Thabo Mbeki had rejected the purchase of Spanish ships, which would
have been adequate for local purposes, while opting for German frigates, at
three times the price, and being far too sophisticated for local requirements.
With
acknowledgment to Adrian Lackey, Die Burger and News24.