No one has ever accused Trade and Industry Minister Alec Erwin of lacking enthusiasm for the arms procurement package of which he was, especially on the offset side, a prime architect. It could fairly be said that the offsets constituted a critical part of the broad industrial strategy he has sought to develop for SA since his appointment to the portfolio six years ago.

It would be a relief to report here that SA could have Erwin's offsets without having to have the arms as well. That, somehow, the companies making the offsets investments had suddenly seen the wisdom of investing in this country without the inducement of a massive weapons order. But, alas.

Nevertheless, the offsets programme, and all the indecision that characterises it, may hold important lessons for Erwin and his cabinet colleagues.

For if the offset ideas and programmes are as subject to change and redirection as seems evident on some large projects like Coega why does the same logic not apply to the arms deal? The quantity of weapons and the reasons for buying them seem magically safe from any degree of reconsideration or alteration, other than that the price rises at the rand falls.

Surely it is not unreasonable, as the world changes, for a defence requirement to be constantly updated? And with the second and third tranches of the SA arms deal confirmed by Erwin and Defence Minister Mosiuoa Lekota earlier this week, why was no effort made to restate the requirement they are supposed to fulfil? Heavens, a constant and public defence review might even prove we need more than we are buying!

Lekota was less than convincing on Monday when he joined Erwin to explain to the nation why the cabinet had decided to forgo the option to reduce the number of aircraft on order.

Of course, SA cannot afford to be complacent about the state of the SA National Defence Force. It is impossible to take seriously those vocal lobby groups that seem to argue an adequately equipped defence force is an unnecessary luxury for the country.

Business Day has expressed reservations about the arms package, but these have tended to be founded on the evidence of illicit enrichment that some contracts have entailed.

It would, though, be wildly irresponsible of a newspaper such as this to blindly support the acquisition of quantities of sophisticated jet fighter, submarines and surface ships in the face of a serious fall in the value of the rand, without demanding that these expenditures are constantly justified. A good deal it was, we were told a few years ago. Is it still, at nearly twice the price?

Let us be clear. Business Day supported the arms purchases when it was announced, and it still does. We believe the subcontracting process was dirty, and the official probe into it was very poor. We think the witch-hunting is deeply insulting to the taxpaying public.

But, mostly we cannot understand or support the arrogance with which government refuses to entertain the notion that the cost of this project has become a serious problem. Ministers stonewall and berate critics on the cost issue, and demean themselves in the process.

It is their attitude, their refusal to even discuss the obvious cost implications, that will cost them public support for the deal in the long term, and they will have no-one to blame but themselves.

Business Day's dilemma is where to draw our own line in the sand on the cost of this deal. It is becoming a strain to hold to our original line on the arms deal.

Only by constant, open and humble debate on the issue can government hope to see it through.

With acknowledgement to Business Day.