The right to know, should you be able to call it in plain language, is written in the constitution's Bill of Rights. This means that everyone in South Africa has the right to access information.

It applies firstly to information at the state's disposal and is in accordance with the outspoken commitment of the first democratic government to transparency, openness and accountability.

It is in sharp contrast with the previous regime where the state jealously watched over its secrets and the public had no way of obtaining information which the state had kept from them.

But the constitution also provides for access to information which any other person other than the state possesses and which someone might need to protect any of his or her other constitutional rights. This is the so-called horizontal provision and South Africa is the only country with legislation which provides for the release of information by the public sector.

Until early this year it has all been pretty words in the constitution. But the constitution also determines that access to information must be ruled by a special act. Obedience was given to this when the Act to the Promotion of Access to Information was approved in February 2000. However, it was only put in motion in March this year.

And now, not even nine months later, the benefits of the act are becoming apparent in that people can insist on information with the law book in hand. But just as clearly, manifests the many shortcomings. From discussions with experts and the experience of those who already utilised the act, it clearly appears that the act by no means signifies that all information will always be made available to everyone.

This act has limitations and restrictions. This is clear from heading, content and fine print.

It is a very complicated act, written in particularly difficult legal terminology something which is being held against the act by users, legal practitioners and consultants, seeing that transparency and openness is indeed the constitutional ideal which the act aims to execute. Forebodings are being made about vagueness and ambiguity that can be abused to allude the act and which will eventually pave the way to court. But not everyone has the money for expensive court cases to try and enforce the act.

The act determines that anyone can request any information. Whether such a request will be granted, is however another story. The act prescribes elaborate procedures for the procurement of information. It contains many definitions which according to legal practitioners are open to various interpretations and which can be used to withhold information. Once again, it is being complained, the court will have to give finality every time.

Until March next year organisations will have sixty days to respond to a request for information, thereafter it will be reduced to thirty days. Even the thirty-day period is regarded by many as hopelessly too long where urgent information is required. This can lead to delayed actions.

But it is especially the long lists of exceptions on when information may or must be withheld which clearly indicates that not everyone will shortly know everything that they want to know.

As such, there are the list of incidents where information officers (that must be appointed by all departments and public institutions) are obliged to refuse information. This includes the "unreasonable disclosure" of personal information of a third party, including a deceased person. (The question is, say critics, who will decide what "unreasonable" comprises of in this case?)

This also includes certain information in the possession of the Receiver of Revenue; information which in accordance with the Disciplinary Procedure Act may not be made available; privileged information which forms part of a legal process and information on research which is done on behalf of a third party.

To make things more complicated, there are again a few exceptions to this list.

One thereof is the "substantial trespassing" of a law. And nobody indicates what will be regarded as substantial.

A second, even longer list provides for grounds on which an information officer can refuse according to his discretion.

As such, for example, he can refuse requested information if he is of the opinion that it will endanger the security of a building; it will prevent an investigation into legal offenses; it will jeopardise the security of the country; or if the information contains trade secrets of the state or a computer program on which the state has copyright.

Cabinet minutes stay confidential as well as information on an ordinary tribunal "which is established in accordance with a country's law" and certain information on an individual member of parliament or a provincial legislator.

And, oh yes, information which is requested simply to create annoyance, can also be refused.

How will be decided on the degree of annoyance, is quite unclear.

Before the act was drawn up, there were many concerns over possible clashes with another constitutional law : the right to privacy. Where does an individual or a company's right to privacy stop, where does another's right to know start?

As far as can be established, the act does not make provision for the procurement of information of individuals, but indeed on private institutions and the latter can naturally include these companies' information on individuals.

But the act clearly stipulates that information on third parties may not be provided without the third party being informed thereof. The third party has 21 days to refuse or agree that information about him or her may be disclosed.

The third party can also be a company or another public institution.

Hiccups are also foreseen here.

The act determines that people are entitled to the registers of private organisations if it is necessary for the protection of "any rights". Critics complain it is far too vague and foresee quarrels as to which rights are in question. Court judgements lately indicate that "any rights" are far wider that the human rights in the constitution.

Mr David Porogo, spokesperson for Justice, says that companies are compelled to disclose information on their directors, company structures, subsidiaries and balance sheets.

They don't however have to disclose information about for example product compilations and the chemical formulas of products. They cannot be compelled to disclose their marketing strategies or any information that can give their competitors an advantage.

For the individual who is concerned that the act can be used to make his personal information freely available to anyone who asks for it, Porogo has a word of reassurance : private companies can only disclose personal information on someone if the person concerned gives permission.

Medical histories kept by a clinic, a medical doctor, an employee or a hospital, may for example not be made available without the permission of the patient.

With acknowledgement to Eugene Gunning and Rapport.