Amid the political turmoil associated with the investigation into the financial affairs of Deputy President Jacob Zuma by the Scorpions, another potentially divisive issue is starting to percolate in the public mind: the still inchoate thought that President Thabo Mbeki might be pondering the option of standing for a third term.

The two events are not necessarily unrelated. The elimination of Zuma as a potential candidate to succeed Mbeki before he completes his anticipated second term in 2009 would certainly make it easier for the president to actively contemplate a third term and, perhaps more important, for individuals in his entourage to encourage him to do so.

If substantiated, the accusation that Zuma solicited a protection fee from the French armaments company, Thales, undoubtedly has the power to destroy him politically.

A member of the ANC national executive committee goes a step further. He thinks it is not impossible that inner circle hacks, realising that their hold on power depends on prolonging Mbeki's occupancy of the presidential office, might relish the thought of Zuma's political demise.

Zuma's financial adviser, Schabir Shaik, takes it a stage beyond that. He thinks Zuma is already being targeted by ANC careerists. While Shaik's assertion may be self-serving, it is not necessarily devoid of all truth.

The idea of intrigue swirling around disruptively in the African National Congress is not absurd. Think of the publicly voiced accusation in April 2001 by former Safety and Security Minister Steve Tshwete that the three prominent ANC-linked moguls Cyril Ramaphosa, Tokyo Sexwale and Mathews Phosa were conspiring to overthrow Mbeki.

Think, too, of Mbeki's confirmation on the same night of the existence of a suspected conspiracy against him and its implication that Mbeki gave Tshwete the go-ahead to name the alleged conspirators.

The accusation - which Tshwete later admitted was without substance - might well have been a conspiracy against the trio of men, one calculated to pre-empt any plans that they might have had of returning to the political arena that they had left to pursue business careers after suffering defeat in successive political battles against Mbeki within the ANC.

The stand taken by Mbeki on the Zuma saga since it surged to the fore is conspicuously lacking in support for his deputy. There is not even a hint of confidence in the moral integrity of his deputy.

From one perspective it might be interpreted as necessary neutrality. From another, however, it might be taken to convey cool insouciance, if not cold indifference.

Viewed through the prism of the vigorous defence of Zuma by the presidency nearly four years ago, Mbeki's stance invites the deduction that he is either in possession of new information about his deputy or that he is has changed his mind for different as yet unidentified reasons.

One unkind line of thought, expressed over private dinner tables though not from public political platforms, is that the unidentified reasons may include contingency planning for a third term and the early elimination of Zuma as a possible contender for the presidential office.

For the record, a presidency statement on September 9, 1999 rejects insinuations that Zuma is involved in shady arms deals and expresses confidence in his moral and financial probity. It helps to explain why Zuma was chosen to head the government-sponsored moral regeneration programme.

Fast forward to April 2001, shortly before Tshwete's conspiracy announcement. Zuma has the centre stage. He praises Mbeki's prowess as a leader, speaks of an attempt by unknown malefactors to isolate Mbeki by sowing mistrust between him and loyal comrades, and declares his unqualified support for him as president of the ANC and South Africa.

The statement is interpreted as a signal that Zuma will not challenge Mbeki for the leadership of the ANC, and thus of the country, at the ANC 2002 national conference. The declaration is puzzling as there has never been any question of Zuma seeking to restrict Mbeki's occupation of the presidential office to one term.

But the statement which may have been a bid by Zuma to reassure Mbeki he was not party to the triumvirate of moguls allegedly conspiring against him is now history. The ANC has long since begun to gear up for its third successive general election victory next year and Mbeki is assured of a second presidential term, having been unanimously re-elected as ANC president in December.

The constitutional prohibition against seeking a third term of office means, theoretically at least, that Zuma is no longer bound by his 2001 declaration and that he is free to start presenting himself as a prospective presidential candidate in 2009 without being disloyal to Mbeki. The only proviso is his ability to answer the charges against him and prove his innocence.

Fast forward again to July 18, 2003. Nelson Mandela is celebrating his 85th birthday. For no apparent reason he addresses the question of whether Mbeki will seek a third term, a move that is bound to incite intense controversy because of its profound political and constitutional implications.

Not the Mbeki I know, Mandela declares. He could not do that.

He will not change the constitution in order to benefit himself.

That is the last thing he would do. Whether I'm alive or gone, he will respect the constitution.

The motivation for Mandela's remarks provokes conjecture.

One explanation is that he is merely trying to reassure powerful international political and financial barons that any concerns they may have on that score are ill founded.

There is, however, another not necessarily contradictory exegesis.

His praise for Mbeki as a scrupulous constitutional democrat may be a stratagem to pre-empt and nullify any temptations Mbeki may have about seeking a third term. To put it differently, he may have been trying to impose a moral straitjacket on Mbeki.

There is an apparent precedent. Rewind to the ANC's 50th national conference in 1997. Mandela is speaking.

He warns that leaders who take office without an election contest (as Mbeki did when he was chosen as ANC president) might surround themselves with sycophants and abuse their power to settle scores with their detractors. But he assures the delegates that Mbeki is not that kind of man.

Thus, while there are too many ifs and buts in the events described above for any one interpretation of them to be set in stone, there are reasons to conclude that Mandela might have felt compelled to subtly warn Mbeki off the third term option.

With acknowledgements to Patrick Laurence and the Cape Times.