The continuing saga of the Defence Procurement Package has been so clouded by sensation that we face the danger of missing the essence.

It is to be expected that immediate detail on contents of charge sheets should generate much excitement and speculation. There is nothing inherently wrong with this. Our democracy will be the richer and our nation the wiser when we emerge from this experience.

But excitement about the trees should not lead us astray in the woods. In recent days, one-member parties have crept out of the bushes to proclaim: "I told you so."

Others are even seeking to bring the Heath Special Investigating Unit back from the dead: if the knight in shining armour had been there, "the mess" would have been avoided.

Lest we forget, the need to re-equip our Defence Force was agreed upon by most parties in parliament, in line with the Defence Review. The question whether we need modern defence equipment is no longer up for debate, except among those who oppose armies and arms as a matter of principle.

When questions were posed about the procurement process, the government asserted that, in areas of its core responsibility, that is agreements with primary contractors, it was certain that maximum care had been taken to prevent unsavoury influence.

The inter-ministerial structure that processed this matter, chaired by the then deputy president Thabo Mbeki, sought to be as rigorous as possible and to ensure the best principles of procurement - technical, security, strategic and otherwise - were observed in reaching the final decision.

This much was the finding of the three investigation units, the public protector, the auditor-general and the national directorate of public prosecutions, after a thorough review.

This much was the conclusion of the various parliamentary committees and parliament itself on examining the investigators' report.

There has of course been much to-ing and fro-ing on drafts of drafts of the report in an attempt to insinuate shoddiness, undue influence and other wrongdoing.

But each time a seemingly exciting story about these kinds of issues comes to the fore, it is as quickly repudiated.

From time to time, we are subjected to a din of outrage about "new discoveries of corruption", as was the case recently with British Aerospace and its agents and commissions - also effectively repudiated. Except that in most instances, the nature of reporting and analysis in the media is such that an artificially-generated foul stench is left to linger.

In essence, what most commentators seem to ignore is that the report of the investigators explicitly stated that there were outstanding matters that required criminal investigation. These related to some secondary contracts, entered into between the primary contractors and their chosen suppliers, with minimal government involvement.

The Scorpions' investigations are not a negation of the main finding of the three investigators about the ethical conduct of the inter-ministerial committee. These investigations are a logical extension of the work that the three institutions had done.

So yes, let's debate the detail of these cases; but let's not conflate this detail with issues of policy about re-equipping the SANDF, or the conduct of formal government structures that took decisions on the primary contracts.

In none of the cases dealt with thus far has there been any suggestion of actual influence by anyone on the decisions taken by the government.

This is because there was no possibility of such influence. Without prejudging any case, be it in relation to Tony Yengeni or Schabir Shaik and Deputy President Jacob Zuma (then MEC for economic affairs in KwaZulu-Natal), none of the individuals identified were close to, or had any role to play in, the selection of the primary contractors. And no one, except the judges, jurors and executioners who air their views through the media, has dared suggest this.

Of course the charges against Shaik and the manner in which the public prosecutors have handled the matters pertaining to the deputy president would intrigue all of us. They have made their statement and legal experts are better able to explain its implications. But the deputy president has also stated quite firmly that he would prefer that, if there were any prima facie evidence against him, this should be aired in court so he can clear his name.

So the logical conclusion that we lay-persons can come to, is that there is no serious evidence; and the deputy president should not be unduly prejudiced in public discourse.

With regard to allegations of gifts and issues of their declaration as is required by parliament and cabinet, the fact of the gifts themselves will need to be established through the court process; and if there were such gifts, parliament will have to assess whether there were omissions in both the open register as well as the confidential one (which the investigators did not examine).

Now, should the deputy president resign or should President Thabo Mbeki take action, as some have suggested?

This is clearly a profound matter of culture and trust. Culture in the sense that if government allowed a precedent to be set, whereby an allegation against senior leaders leads to their resignation, then we would allow spanners to be thrown anyhow, anytime into government works, and ironically undermine the very principle of good governance. And trust in that, even mere respect for an individual in the deputy president's position, should guide us to take him at his word.

This is the attitude of the government, in part based on confidence that was so central to survival and success in the conduct of struggle; but also premised on that critical principle of human rights: assumption of innocence until proven otherwise.

If we all approached the issues this way, perhaps it would be easier for us to see the molehills for what they are, and not confuse them for uKhahlamba (the Drakensberg)!

Netshitenzhe is head of government communications.

With acknowledgements to Joel Netshitenzhe and the Cape Times.