Let us not assume the worst. In all likelihood, the decision by government to spend R6,4bn buying a European transport aircraft for the air force is a sound one. The A400M, which is not yet in production, is probably the ideal machine with which to continue SA's widening peacekeeping and humanitarian role in Africa after the current fleet of Hercules C130 aircraft can no longer fly. What is more, SA will participate in its manufacture. That is some consolation, we suppose, for the fact that our R6,4bn is going to buy only nine of the aeroplanes. That is some R700m each.

So how does a good decision go bad? When it is made by politicians in secret, is when. At no stage was the order for the transport aircraft ever discussed in public and at no stage was it ever put out to tender. The public place to discuss the order would have been Parliament and its committees. The moral, ethical and indeed prudent requirement to put an order of this magnitude out to tender is so obvious in a democracy that the secrecy surrounding the deal seems obscene.

Why? The ministers involved in the deal may have had their fingers burned by the publicity surrounding the strategic arms package. Alec Erwin is still a key player, though this time from public enterprises and not trade and industry. Trevor Manuel will have to sign the cheques again. President Thabo Mbeki will again have had the final say. The only thing absent from the stage is Schabir Shaik demanding monthly payments from the Alliance Française for French lessons for Deputy President Jacob Zuma.

By deliberately ignoring convention, the ministers involved have, not for the first time, demonstrated the real arrogance that comes with prolonged periods in office and in power. They are unaccountable in any meaningful way, just as they have never had to account for their roles in the lying and cheating that went into closing the strategic arms package. Nice work, if you can get it, and if anyone complains they'll be accused of being aloof from the masses.

Over time, though, these chickens come home to roost. The seeds of political destruction, without exception in global political history, are sown through secret spending.

Of course, what makes the way the decision was made of even greater concern is the passion now of the defence. SA will be part of a huge manufacturing effort along with Airbus partners, we are told. Skills and technology will be transferred. Teams of South Africans are already designing the aircraft.

Left unsaid is the fact that much of the R6,4bn is an indirect subsidy to Denel, which is failing as a business, and will now get some subcontracting work on the project. Is SA prepared to pay the price for an industrial strategy that puts the state in the boardroom? It won't stop with R2bn or R3bn for Denel.

The deal has Erwin's fingerprints all over it. He thinks, eats and sleeps big industry. He promised huge offset benefits for the last arms deal, and the fact that precious few have come to fruition has not stopped much of the same rhetoric now.

But why can't we simply sell off Denel (assuming it is worth buying) or even give it away, and buy cheaper aircraft that might do the job just as well? One A400M will cost 25% more than a Eurofighter, the most expensive warplane ever built in Europe. A new version of the Hercules, the C130J, may not have all the attributes being claimed for the A400M but it is less than half the price and will be bought by many of the countries who make up the Airbus consortium in the first place.

Let's see now. We renationalised SAA and promptly paid out R6bn to cover its hedging losses. Another R2bn-odd for Denel makes the price of deciding to dump privatisation quite frightening. Between them, SAA and Denel employ about 20000 people. Their jobs have been secured at R400000 each. It is, surely, taking job creation a little too far.

With acknowledgement to the Business Day.