Upwardly Mobile Chopper Put to the Test |
Publication | Cape Argus |
Date |
2005-10-28 |
Reporter |
Helmoed Romer Heitman |
Web Link |
Military exercises by the SANDF have proved the remarkable mobility of the Rooivalk combat helicopter.
Two Rooivalks deployed 600km from their base at Bloemfontein to a tactical air base at Upington, where they refuelled. They then flew 360km to Springbok, where they refuelled from 200-litre drums.
From Springbok they flew 100km through misty skies to rendezvous with an SA Navy task group off Port Nolloth, which had to land a force to take control of the port. The troops were landed by Oryx helicopters from the support ship SAS Drakensberg, with the Rooivalk team providing protection and support. Once the landing area was secure, the Rooivalks refuelled, again from drums, and returned to Springbok.
From Springbok the helicopters flew 360km to Upington, where they carried out an air defence suppression strike against the radar protecting an "enemy" air base. After that, they refuelled and flew home to Bloemfontein.
To sum up: they self-deployed over nearly 1 000km to a forward refuelling point, flew 100km to support a landing operation, and then launched an attack against a target 360km away from the refuelling point. All with no more than a small support team at the tactical air base, and a few truckloads of fuel drums, and with no need for a runway. That is mobility in any soldier's language.
The Oryx medium transport helicopter of the SA Air Force offers similar mobility, giving the SAAf an immensely flexible instrument in its Oryx-Rooivalk team. That team has the capability to deploy troops and cargo over long distances to precisely where they are needed, and to protect them en route and on the ground. All without needing an airfield or even a rudimentary runway. Also, both helicopters have been designed for operations under the "hot and high" conditions that exist in much of Africa.
The importance of this capability lies in its application to Africa where any force will be small in relation to its theatre of operations. It will have to deploy and manoeuvre over considerable distances, and be able quickly to focus combat power at any key point in the theatre.
The value of transport and combat helicopters has been repeatedly proved in peace support operations. It is not difficult to imagine how useful an Oryx or Rooivalk team could be in the DRC or Darfur, where a very small African Union force has to monitor an area roughly the size of France.
Combat helicopters are particularly suited to such operations. They respond faster than ground forces, have more "persistence" than fixed wing aircraft, and their long-range sights and stabilised gun turrets enable them to stand off at a safe distance.
The Oryx-Rooivalk team gives South Africa an immensely flexible capability for employment over the full spectrum of missions, from combat through peacekeeping to disaster relief.
That capability will be enhanced once the SAAF brings the Airbus A-400 transport aircraft into service. The A-400 will enable the air force to deploy and supply its helicopters over strategic distances without having partially to dismantle them. Proposed landing ships will be able to serve as offshore bases, allowing helicopters to be deployed to any point along the coast with a secure base offshore.
Taking the example of the Port Nolloth operation, the SAAF's helicopters will then be able to reach anywhere within 1 000km of a friendly airport or the coast.
That capability will be a valuable "force multiplier" not just for the SANDF, but for all of the African Union security forces.
There is just one small problem: the Rooivalk force of 12 aircraft is too small. Deploy three or four to Darfur, and three or four to Burundi, and there are not enough left with which to train properly, let alone to hold in reserve.
The original plan called for a force of 36 operational aircraft, but the budget cuts of the 1990s forced that down to the present 12. Given South Africa's major and growing regional security role, that decision should be reviewed.
The alternatives are to struggle along and hope that we do not drop the ball when juggling deployments - or to buy foreign aircraft. Neither makes any sense.
With acknowledgements to Helmoed Romer Heitman and the Cape Argus.