Excellent Connections |
Publication | Der Spiegel |
Date |
2006-07-03 |
Reporter |
Georg Bonisch, Markus Dettmer |
English Translation
("This is an unauthorised
English translation of an article in German that appeared in Der Spiegel on
2006-07-03.
The Arms Deal VPO takes fulls responsibility for the publishing hereof and
at the same time acknowledges the
intellectual property of Der Spiegel as embodied in the original article.")
The office of the public prosecutor in Düsseldorf is investigating an arms
deal with South Africa involving a German shipbuilding consortium. It is
possible that a 30 million Mark bribe may be involved.
When the deal was signed and sealed, the shipyard Blohm+Voss in Hamburg
issued a press release: "This is one of the biggest
international successes for German naval shipyard."
On this day, the 3rd of December 1999, the government of South Africa
signed the contract for the purchase of four Corvettes, a medium-sized warship.
For the approximately 700 million Mark, the European-South African Corvette
consortium ESACC, which on the German side consists of, besides Blohm+Voss,
Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft (HDW) and Thyssen Rheinstahl Technik, were to
deliver four ships of the type MEKO A 200 to the South African navy,
Not enough: On the same day the South African
government also ordered three submarines from the German GSC-consortium of HDW,
the Thyssen subsidiary Nordseewerke and MAN Ferrostall - contract value
approximately 1,6 billion Mark.
For several years the European bidders had vied for the contract, the heads of
government of Great Britain, France and Spain lobbied their companies in South
Africa. Already in March 1995 the previous Chancellor Helmut Kohl asked the
South African president Nelson Mandela in a letter to seriously consider the
German bid
It was therefore no wonder that Blohm+Voss celebrated the closing of the deal
and itself. "For us this is the culmination of a five years negotiation period,
during which time we have formed excellent ties with South
African industry as well as with the responsible government officials."
It is however possible that not only "the excellent ties" contributed to the
success, but also a lot of money. The German public prosecutor's suspect that
in the Corvette deal alone, more than 30 million Mark in bribes may have flowed
in the direction of South Africa. The have secretly been investigating the
suspicion of tax evasion and bribery for a long time.
ThyssenKrupp is convinced that "the suspicion of improper payment of commissions
will not be confirmed in the course of further investigations".
In a combined operation on the 19th of June detectives searched the head offices
of Blohm+Voss in Hamburg, HDW in Kiel, Thyssen Rheinstahl Technik and a resident
project management company in Düsseldorf. They carted away of documentation by
the box load, which currently were then evaluated by the public auditors,
forensic specialists from the provincial state office for criminal investigation
of Nordrheinwestfalen and the tax authorities of Düsseldorf . MAN Ferrostaal
confirmed that the investigators seized documents in Essen "in connection with
investigations into another company".
The arms deal with South Africa is only the beginning, it could turn out to be
one of the biggest affairs in recent years with internal and external political
implications, which cannot currently be determined. And it could possible solve
a puzzle in recent German political history - namely the question of what is
behind the mysterious payments amounting to millions,
which the FDP big shot Jürgen Möllemann, who died
in 2003, received from Lichtenstein and Monaco.
The investigators know that in the sale of the Corvettes so-called NE's: Under
the acronym NE ("necessary expenses") payments of
bribes by German companies in foreign countries were set off against tax
liability, until this practice became illegal under German law. However, they
still don't know for sure who authorized them.
The exact point of departure of the investigations cannot be determined. They
are not founded on a single suspicion but on various processes, which played out
independently of one another and over several years. It is still a complicated
puzzle, which stems from the delayed consequences of the tank affair of the Kohl
government, through the allegations against Möllemann and a court case in France
involving suspicious transfers of players for the premier league club, Olympia
Marseilles.
In the sale of "Fuchs" wheeled tanks to Saudi Arabia in 1991, Thyssen set off
220 million Mark of "necessary expenses" against taxes, a portion of the bribe
went via a Panamanian post box company which the investigators credit to a
Möllemann-supporter - the businessman from Düsseldorf Rolf Wegner.
When the story came to the boil at about the turn of the century, forensic tax
investigators audited the other Thyssen subsidiaries. The are said to have
discovered, that the company also included such payments
for the Corvette deal in the financial statements. Already in the year
2001, the public prosecutor in Düsseldorf received a letter from South Africa,
which contained the allegation, which has not been proved to date, that a top
South African politician received a multi million amount via Switzerland for his
involvement in the deal during 1999.
During the investigations into an insolvency fraud, which had nothing to do with
the arms deal, the investigators are said to have come across
strange payments by Thyssen by chance.
In the end a legal advice from Monaco in June of 2005 showed the investigators
that in there a suspicion of money laundering against Wegener was being
investigated in the small state.
Not only that: It was discovered that Wegener received a million from not only
Thyssen but also from Ferrostaal. Wegener's defence: He was after all an
"export consultant" for Thyssen and "Möllemann worked for him as a consultant".
The knowledge of the transfers obviously originates from documents, which were
acquired in the course of the football affair. Wegener's Cologne lawyer
Christian Richter said that his client had decided "not to comment" because the
relationship between him and Möllemann was constantly being mystified.
The story of the Corvette deal begins in April 1994 with the victory of Mandela
and the end of apartheid. Although the country, after years of embargoes, was
short of just about everything, the military succeeded in its wish to acquire
four Corvettes for its ailing navy - for the defence of the 2 800 kilometre long
coastline.
The German consortium was amongst the bidders for the contract, but at the end
of December 1994 appeared to be out of the running. At that point in time the
South Africans announced that the shortlist of suppliers had been reduced from
five to two - Great Britain and Spain.
The decision did not hold for more than four weeks. On his trip to Germany in
January 1995 the former Mandela representative and current President Thabo Mbeki
surprisingly announced to foreign minister Klaus Kinkel
and the members of the German consortium that "the race was still open".
It still took two years before the Germans got their second chance. Instead of
ordering four Corvettes the South African government decided to equip its
complete armed forces with new submarines, helicopters and aeroplanes, divided
into five lots. In a complicated process it was requested that all the European
companies hand in their bids.
The intention was made palatable for the population by a promise by the state
that each supplier must involve South African companies and invest in the
country. At the end of 1999 there was an economic miracle
*1: South Africa bought 10 billion Mark of weapons in Europe, the
companies promising investments to the value of 30 billion Mark as a trade-off.
Although very little of the trade-off investment has been
realised to date, the arms deal has for years has been
sinking into a morass of corruption. At the centre
stands the South African partners of the ESACC-consortium,
African Defence Systems (ADS) the French arms dealer
Thales and a South African
group of companies with close political ties. In the past year the ADS
CEO Schabir Shaik - whose brother was the chief buyer for
the South African army in the deal - has been handed a sentence of 15
years for corruption and other criminal offences, he is currently on appeal.
The deal with the ships begs further questions. Already in 2001 an investigation
report of the anti-corruption authorities, the court and the prosecutor general
in South Africa came to the conclusion that the German shipbuilding consortium
should not even have survived the first round of bidding. There were
several specifications, which the Germans did not fulfil -
and they still received the contract in the end.
Why Germany? Did the 30 million play a roll? In
South Africa the investigations are not over by a long
shot. During this month a high level politician must go to court - Jacob
Zuma, until a year ago the Deputy President. The prosecutors are accusing him of
bribery: He is to have obstructed the investigations into the arms deal - for
1,2 million Rand.