I meet so many people who ask for my take on the Jacob Zuma saga that I went back to look at what I have actually written on the subject.

This is a hazardous thing for any columnist to do, given that we often “don’t get it”. But I think I have been fairly consistent on this one. From the beginning I have argued that there is no legal solution to this matter. A conviction could lead to internecine violence, while acquittal could mean having a president who rules over a divided populace. It would not be the first time a political solution was found to a legal problem in the name of social order.

But the state was determined to press ahead with the legal solution, notwithstanding Bulelani Ngcuka’s reservations about the difficulties of a successful prosecution. I thought the president acted hastily in dismissing Zuma from his cabinet: “In the midst of congratulations about the president’s decisiveness, I have asked myself whether he should not have waited until Zuma had been charged before firing him” (Mbeki’s actions give conspiracy theorists plenty to chew on, June 23 2005).

Zuma was indeed immediately charged, but a year later the state does not seem to know whether it’s coming or going on this matter. In many ways Zuma is justified in saying, “I was dismissed as deputy president of the Republic of SA as a result of two charges brought against me; the very charges the prosecution now say they are not in a position to go to trial on.”

It did not help matters when Mbeki appointed Bulelani Ngcuka’s wife to take Zuma’s place as deputy president. In the same column I wrote: “The president has made matters worse by appointing Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka. Again he will most likely get all the kudos from business elites. But Mbeki has also started a feeding frenzy for conspiracy theorists.”

Zuma is now threatening to bring the president into the matter by arguing that the very letter forestalling investigation of the arms deal, which is at the heart of the state’s case, was actually written by the president. It will be interesting to see how the president wangles himself out of that one. There is no question that this is a mess of monumental proportions.

But why did the two sides eschew a political solution? In another column I argued it was “knowledge of the very powerful role Zuma could play that makes a political solution unlikely, and a temptation to punish him through the legal process irresistible” (Zuma debacle shows ANC needs to learn from Freedom Charter, June 30 2005). Zuma called the state’s bluff.

For me the reason was simple: “If Zuma does not settle for the political solution and is found not guilty, he would become the most powerful man in this country, a seductive embodiment of injustice to the masses” (June 23 2005).

And indeed there could be no greater show of Zuma’s power and self-confidence than to bring out, as he did on Monday, ANC secretary-general Kgalema Motlanthe, South African Communist Party general secretary Blade Nzimande and Congress of South African Trade Unions’ secretary-general Zwelinzima Vavi in a rally attended by thousands.

In short, Zuma’s political gamble seems to be paying off, with his eyes firmly on the presidency. The very idea of democracy means we must live with and even be governed by those we disapprove of, or as I put it: “Some say that even if he were to win the case, his reputation would be so tarnished that he would not be fit for the presidency. The trouble with democracy is that even if it were unwise to elect Zuma as president on those grounds, the way our system works is that the elite must live with electoral outcomes they don’t like” (June 23 2005). But I also posed the following question to Zuma and his supporters: “How effective would he be as president of a divided country and a divided ANC?” (June 30 2005).

In the end, the question is not whether Zuma is entitled to be president if he is acquitted by the courts and elected by the populace. The question is whether it would be prudent for him to pursue such a path, given how polarised the country has become over his potential candidacy.

Zuma could still have the last laugh by becoming the power broker in the leadership race. Interestingly, such an outcome could become the basis for structural changes to our political system. The party could elect its own leadership at its congresses, which in this case could be Zuma, and the populace could elect representatives to a constituent assembly. The assembly would then elect the government leader and president.

I will continue with this line of investigation in next week’s column.

Dr Mangcu is visiting scholar, Public Intellectual Life Project, Wits University. He is also a nonresident WEB DuBois fellow at Harvard University.

With acknowledgement to Xolela Mangcu and Business Day.