BAE's Web of Influence in South Africa |
Publication | Mail and Guardian |
Date |
2007-01-12 |
Reporter |
Sam Sole, Nic Dawes![]() |
Web Link |
Allegations of dirty money and influence-buying at the heart of South Africa's multibillion-rand arms deal have emerged from a British investigation of BAE Systems, the defence conglomerate that secured a R30-billion South African order for Hawk jet trainers and Gripen fighters.
Known as "Styles" because of his
fast-lane lifestyle, Hlongwane is said, by several sources in the defence and
political sectors, to be a sharp lawyer and a tactical businessman. He returned
to the country in the early Nineties and played a key role at the Kempton Park
discussions in the sub-group on defence. They credit him as being the power
behind former defence minister Joe Modise. Hlongwane was Modise's adviser.
However, at least one source who knew BAE agent Richard Charter says
Hlongwane was advising Charter and BAE at the same time. Hlongwane ended his
term as adviser when Modise stepped down as minister of defence in 1999, but by
that time he had been appointed a director of Denel, at the time a potential
acquisition target for BAE.
"Fana was batting for BAE," said one official
of the Department of Trade and Industry (DRI). "We started a dialogue around the
restructuring of Denel late 1997, early 1998. Hlongwane intervened to stop the
analysis. We were told that BAE didn't want DTI doing an analysis on the
aerospace industry."
BAE had apparently come to an understanding with
Modise about the future of Denel, and Hlongwane, one senior Denel source
claimed, used his relationship at the time with public enterprises minister
Stella Sigcau's daughter to keep his hand on the Denel rudder. "In the
background was Joe Modise," the source claimed. "Fana Hlongwane was his man and
Hlongwane was linked to BAE."
When Jeff Radebe took over at the
Department of Public Enterprises, a new team found BAE's conditions to bail out
Denel impossibly onerous and rejected the deal.
Hlongwane clearly
impressed some BAE executives. Following the conclusion of the arms deal he was
appointed as southern-hemisphere president of a Swiss company called Wingate
Capital, led at the time by Allan MacDonald, a former director of BAE for Africa
and Asia.
It was MacDonald who, together with Richard Charter, had
helped drive through the Hawk-Gripen deal in South Africa, before leaving BAE in
1999. Despite repeated attempts, Hlongwane could not be contacted for
comment.
Basil Hersov
Hersov was slightly evasive this week
when questioned by the M&G about his relationship with BAE. He
claimed not to recognise the company FTNSA Consulting, which allegedly received
R77-million.
After some prodding he admitted to having had an early
representative arrangement with BAE in South Africa, which he claimed was later
"stolen" by the late Richard Charter of Osprey Aerospace.
He confirmed
having been paid out a sum by BAE in recognition of that agreement, but claimed
the figure of R77-million was too high. He said the payment was properly
disclosed to the authorities, including the South African Reserve
Bank.
Hersov was certainly influential. He was the founder of the
Airborne Trust, chaired by Charter, which concluded a memorandum of
understanding with the MK Military Veterans' Association in March 1998, shortly
before BAE was selected to supply Hawk and Gripen aircraft.
BAE pledged
to donate R4,5-million to the trust to fund a project to train and reintegrate
ex-combatants from MK, but the project went nowhere and Hersov admitted only a
few hundred thousand rands had been disbursed.
Hersov declined to answer
further questions about his role in support of BAE, citing another
engagement.
The late Richard Charter
Charter's Osprey group was
the declared agent of BAE on the South African deal, but BAE would never reveal
how much had been paid to Osprey in particular or on commissions in
general.
According to the SFO, Osprey was paid R27-million, but other
investigations have suggested that it was just one payment
in a pattern of overt commission payments run through a Swiss legal
office.
The SFO investigation suggests Charter was also the beneficiary
of Huderfield Enterprises, which got R350-million,
but one of the executors of Charter's estate, Brian Eaton, denied that
Huderfield belonged to Charter or the estate. He appeared to be familiar with
the name, however, and evaded questions about what he
knew of Huderfield
Charter served as the chairperson of BAE Systems
South Africa, established in 1997, as well as the chair of the Airborne Trust,
whose patron was Modise.
Charter had a long-standing relationship with
the old South African Defence Force, supplying parachutes and other equipment.
He also had an interest in SA Airlink, which was sold after his
death.
Following the BAE deal he built a luxury private farm on the
Orange River, complete with golf course.
Charter's widow, Janet, who has
taken over as a director of most of his companies, did not answer a message left
on her cellphone.
One source said Hlongwane was an adviser to Charter,
from before 1998, but that the two had fallen out when Hlongwane muscled in on
the sale of Airbus aircraft to South African Airways. Before his death, Charter
denied having any business relationship with Hlongwane.
John
Bredenkamp and Jules Pelissier
Jules Pelissier, an ex-Rhodesian
special-branch police officer, has long been considered Bredenkamp's right-hand
man in the arms-sales business.
Bredenkamp made his fortune trading
tobacco and sanctions-busting out of the old Rhodesia, and moved into
international arms broking, allegedly making lucrative business out of the
Iran-Iraq war.
Bredenkamp's United Kingdom premises were raided by the
SFO last year in a move apparently linked to its BAE investigation.
When
the M&G phoned Bredenkamp's Breco head office in the UK this week and
asked for Pelissier, his secretary was about to put us through to him when she
asked who was calling. Suddenly, Pelissier was not
available.
Bredenkamp's spokesperson, Costa Parfitis, said his boss
denied having anything whatsoever to do with the South African arms deal as far
as BAE was concerned. He said he had "availed himself" to the SFO and had
nothing to hide.
However Bredenkamp -- and Pelissier -- have also long
been associated with the company Aviation Consultancy Services, which is an
agent for a number of aircraft manufacturers around the world, including
BAE.
One well-placed source told the M&G that ACS was the
declared agent for Augusta during the South African deal. Augusta was selected
to supply light helicopters to the South African National Defence Force.
David Clark
Clark, based in Neuchâtel, Switzerland, is clearly
a money man and may well be a front for someone else. He refused to comment on
the SFO claims. A Briton, he appears as a director in three South African
companies: Bluebay Capital, Chesnomprop and Elm Investments.
Joe
Modise
Modise, who died of cancer in 2001, is very much the ghost at the
arms-deal banquet, and the web of sleaze allegations surrounding his conduct has
never been adequately cleaned up. The former Umkhonto weSizwe commander was
minister of defence from 1994 to 1999, and played a central role in the
policy-making and procurement processes of the arms deal.
He has
consistently been accused of improperly influencing the decision to buy BAE
Systems' Hawk trainer aircraft instead of the cheaper Aermacchi jets preferred
by technical assessors. He personally intervened to eliminate price as a
criterion, moving the Hawk to the top of the list.
While still minister
of defence he acquired shares in Conlog, an electronics company that stood to
benefit substantially from "offset" contracts that suppliers like BAE were
required to enter into in terms of the arms deal.
The report of the
joint investigating team to Parliament described his conduct as "extremely
unfortunate", but cleared him of corruption.
The M&G
subsequently reported that two members of his extended family were directors of
a company called Futuristic Business Solutions (FBS), which concluded a
R1,2-million deal with warship supplier Thyssen to influence purchase decisions
in the arms deal while Modise was still minister.
Before Modise's death,
Scorpions investigators made considerable progress in probing the Conlog deal as
well as Modise and Hlongwane's involvement in the arms deal more
generally.
After Modise died, Scorpions boss Bulelani Ngcuka allegedly
backed off the investigation, a decision some in the National Prosecuting
Authority acknowledge has helped create the impression that Zuma is being
unfairly treated. At the time of his death, Modise's closest associates were a
group of white arms-company executives drawn from the greasy brotherhood of the
sanctions-busting era -- a strange legacy for a man claimed as a hero of the
liberation struggle.
Rot on a global scale
A long-running
series of articles by our London-based sister newspaper, the Guardian,
suggests that large amounts of cash are filtered through a covert network of
front companies around the world to disguise corrupt payments by BAE
Systems.
The Guardian first disclosed in 2003 how the company
operated a £20-million slush fund to "entertain" Saudi princes who might
favourably influence its chances of winning the "al-Yamamah" deal to buy
warships and fighter jets.
Citing SFO documents and other legal files,
the paper said BAE was aware of allegations that its own executives were
skimming cash off this fund, but was refusing to investigate because "this is a
means of covering up corruption".
"Allegations include the provision of
prostitutes, sports cars, yachts, first-class plane tickets, Mercedes cars with
drivers, unlimited restaurant meals, cup final tickets, club memberships,
gambling trips, TV sets and sound systems."
An internal BAE security
report referred to allegations of "sex and bondage with Saudi
princes".
In October the Guardian's David Leigh and Rob Evans
discovered that the scale of the payments was much bigger than the
£20-million.
"The government was yesterday scrambling to recover secret
documents containing evidence suggesting corrupt payments were made in Britain's
biggest arms deal. The documents detail for the first time how the price of
Tornado warplanes was inflated by £600-million in the 1985 al-Yamamah deal with
Saudi Arabia. A telegram with the details from the head of the Ministry of
Defence's sales unit had been placed in the National Archives. Yesterday it was
hastily withdrawn," it reported in October last year.
"The Ministry of
Defence documents reveal that the price of each Tornado was inflated by 32%,
from £16,3-million to £21,5-million. It is common in arms deals for the prices
of weapons to be raised so that commissions can be skimmed off the top. The
£600-million involved is the same amount that it was alleged at the time in Arab
publications was exacted in secret commissions paid to Saudi royals and their
circle of intermediaries in London and Riyadh, as the price of the deal," it
concluded.
And in mid-December, after British Prime Minister Tony Blair
had ordered the SFO to cancel its Al Yamamah probe, the paper reported that
investigators had found "that in recent years an enormous sum -- more than
£1-billion -- had been secretly shuffled through BAE's accounts.
"It was
passed through two anonymous offshore companies, registered by BAE in the financial 'black hole' of the British Virgin Islands. One
was called Poseidon Trading Investments, set up in
1999, the other Red Diamond, set up in 1997.
Neither's existence was disclosed in BAE's published accounts, and BAE refuses to give any explanation of their
purpose."
Red Diamond, according to the SFO's request for
assistance from the Scorpions, was also used to pay South
African intermediaries.
"The flow of secret money was coordinated
through Switzerland where BAE set up another anonymously
owned company called Novelmight. BAE kept its secret commission
agreements with agents around the world in the custody of Geneva lawyers," the
paper wrote.
The Saudi deal was just one of several under scrutiny. The
sincerity of Blair's much-vaunted Africa policy was sharply called into question
after he forced a deal to sell a BAE air-traffic control system through a
reluctant Cabinet.
"BAE Systems is being investigated for suspected
corruption over an arms deal with the heavily indebted African country of
Tanzania, in which commissions of more than 29% may have been paid", the
Guardian reported in November.
"The £28-million military
air-traffic control sale was pushed through the Cabinet in 2001 by Tony Blair
against the heated opposition of then development minister Clare Short, who
subsequently alleged corruption. Both the prime minister and BAE reassured
critics at the time that the sale was above board … Tanzania, had no need for an
expensive military system to handle its civilian air traffic, and was at the
time asking for its debts to be cancelled.
Westminster sources say that
the SFO and the Ministry of Defence police, who are conducting a joint
investigation into BAE's deals around the world, believe that millions of pounds were paid into Swiss banks to cement the
sale".
NGWANE DEFENCE AND THE BUDDY SYSTEM
From the
former head of the defence force, to veteran arms dealers and one of the
country's top diplomats, Hlongwane is relying on some well-connected friends to
get his fledgling defence company off the ground.
Ngwane Defence sells
vehicles through its Uri and Ivema divisions, sniper and assault rifles
manufactured by Truvelo in Midrand, as well as riot-control gear and equipment
aimed at emergency relief and demining operations. Its senior staff have strong
connections in the government, the defence establishment and the global arms
trade.
Ambassador George Nene is Deputy Director General of
Foreign Affairs, heading up South Africa's multilateral diplomacy. He was
previously permanent representative at the United Nations, and still serves on
several committees of the world body. That hasn't stopped him from taking up an
appointment as a director at Ngwane Defence.
Nene's work for the
government and the United Nations not only places him in contact with potential
clients for Ngwane, but also may place his diplomatic and commercial interests
in conflict. He declined to comment.
He has several other business
interests, including two other companies in which he shares interests with
Siphiwe Nyanda -- both men are directors in Thsireledzo and Micromatica
27.
Retired general Siphiwe Nyanda stepped down as head of the
South African National Defence Force in May 2005. He is CEO of Ngwane, and last
year told Business Day that the company "should definitely have a slice"
of the local defence market. Nyanda has been a vocal
supporter of Zuma, who was compelled to resign as
deputy president over allegations that he took bribes in return for protecting
the interests of French arms company Thompson-CSF/Thales. Nyanda
maintained interests in at least five private business, including a security
firm, while he was commander in chief of the defence force.
Jane Anne
Collier is Ngwane's operations chief. She began her career at BAE systems in
the 1980s when it was known as British Aerospace, and is married to BAE's
Bernard Collier. He heads the local team at BAE Systems, which handles the
company's obligations to invest in South African companies.
Christo
Stockenström, a Pretoria-based lawyer, is a key player at Ngwane, with a
history as a fixer in the arms trade.
Brigadier General Damian de
Lange is a top South African National Defence Force official who previously
headed the foreign relations division in the Ministry of Defence, and as such,
would have played a substantial role in government-to-government arms
transactions and defence cooperation more broadly. He joined Ngwane in 2004.
With acknowledgements to Sam Sole, Nic Dawes and
Mail & Guardian.