Mbeki has Fanned flames of bitter ANC succession battle We are seeing a leadership contest conducted by stealth, writes Xolela Mangcu.

South Africa has come to the proverbial fork in the road. We are in this position because the African National Congress (ANC) has failed to manage the politics of succession, with grave implications for national cohesion.

Whenever President Thabo Mbeki has been asked to engage in discussions about succession he has suggested that it is a matter that should wait for the ANC leadership elections in December 2007.

However, while this is technically an internal ANC leadership matter, the ramifications reach beyond the party. It is precisely because the ANC is the ruling party that all sectors of our society should be concerned about the processes that will be followed within the organisation in electing a new leadership structure.

Mbeki himself has called on the public to join the debate about leadership in the ANC, though this call was widely interpreted as a way to leverage public support against his enemies in the party.

The unveiling of the ANC's leadership team on the eve of the December elections would deprive the public of the opportunity to interrogate the person who is likely to make crucial decisions about its collective fate.

Instead of open public deliberation we have leadership contestation by stealth. Individual candidates campaign behind closed doors, encouraging rumour-mongering and conspiracy theories.

Unfortunately, secret political campaigns lend themselves to the kind of rumour-mill politics we have seen in the ANC since it emerged that its deputy president, Jacob Zuma, was no longer the presumptive candidate to succeed Mbeki. Zuma's supporters have been arguing that there is a conspiracy against his candidacy, emanating from the highest offices of the land, which is a veiled and sometimes not so veiled reference to Mbeki.

Their complaint is that state organs such as the National Prosecuting Authority are being used to reduce Zuma's chances in the succession race. The conspiracy theory began to evolve when the former national director of prosecutions, Bulelani Ngcuka, said there was prima facie evidence of corruption by Zuma. He made the statement after it emerged that there was a fax allegedly implicating Zuma in the solicitation of a bribe from one of the companies bidding for participation in the controversial arms deal.

Mbeki fired Zuma from the cabinet on the strength of the Durban High Court's finding of what was widely reported as "a generally corrupt relationship with Schabir Shaik", a phrase, it transpired, Judge Hilary Squires never uttered.

Mbeki then appointed Bulelani Ngcuka's wife, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, to take over Zuma's position as deputy president of the country, adding further fuel to the conspiracy theories. Zuma toured the country addressing rallies of ANC supporters. He accused the educated elite of trying to prevent him from succeeding Mbeki as president because of his background.

Zuma was subsequently charged with the rape of a woman young enough to be his daughter. His supporters suggested that the case was a set-up.

The succession campaign had clearly begun, although not officially. Despite denials from Mbeki and his aides, it has become clear to all and sundry that the ANC is deeply divided over the issue.

The division goes beyond the two individuals, Mbeki and Zuma, to a clash between the socialists in the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and the South African Communist Party (SACP), on the one hand, and the pro-business wing of the ANC, represented by people such as Saki Macozoma.

Mbeki himself has given contradictory messages - at times he has called for the creation of a black capitalist class, and on other occasions he has decried the materialism that has gripped the ANC. He has criticised those who use government influence to enrich themselves, but has also lashed out violently at those who criticise self-enrichment, labelling them racists.

Suffice it to say that a divided ruling party does not augur well for the cohesiveness of the country, either in terms of policy implementation and effectiveness, or with respect to the social fabric. Some analysts have suggested that the tripartite alliance should split and the unions and the communists should form their own party (or parties).

My own position is that, given the slim chances of an opposition party ousting the ANC, we are better off with Cosatu and the SACP remaining within the alliance. An ANC without either of these internal countervailing movements would be more likely to ignore critical voices from outside. A cursory examination of opposition politics has shown how easy it has been for the ANC to dismiss the official opposition as nothing more than a party of white privilege. It is unlikely that the Democratic Alliance will form the governing party in South Africa at any time soon.

A breakaway party would simply not be able to garner enough support, at least not in the immediate future. The very same cursory examination will reveal that the only constituencies likely to be listened to are those who pose a political challenge to the president within the ANC, or at least are able to change the balance of forces one way or the other. While it is important to have a vibrant opposition, it is equally important that a democratic culture should emerge from within the ANC.

What is now even more worrying about the succession battle between Mbeki and Zuma is that it has taken on ethnic overtones, even though support for both individuals cuts across ethnic lines. After all, the Zulu-speaking Zuma has a large following in the predominantly Xhosa-speaking Eastern Cape, and Mbeki's support comes from all over. Yet I have heard that the people calling for a third term for Mbeki in the Eastern Cape have pledged support for their "brother" from the region. Some of Zuma's supporters have been less coy in their support for someone they call "100% Zulu-boy". Over the years, the ANC has been able to contain tribal division, but when the power stakes are high some may throw caution to the wind.

Race is also a factor in the politics of succession. Thabo Mbeki has positioned himself as the Race Man of South African politics - the custodian of black nationalism. He has persistently appealed to the politics of race to defend himself against critics on HIV/Aids, Zimbabwe and corruption. He labels his critics as either racists who are "fishers of corrupt men" or black sellouts who have become what he calls "foot lickers" of the white man. This has been extremely divisive politically and has de-legitimised the predominantly white opposition party.

Arguably, the official opposition is equally implicated in the re-racialisation of politics, going back to the Democratic Party's "fight back" campaign of 1999 - an unapologetic appeal to former conservative Afrikaners. The campaign was successful and the opposition's representation was increased.

But there has been relatively little success in silencing independent black voices. It is hard to convince the public that Cosatu's criticism of government is motivated by racism. According to the columnist Jonny Steinberg, Mbeki coaxed to the surface of South Africa's political culture "an anxious man's nationalism and a paranoid's nativism". This left us with a shrill and belligerent political culture: "in diffuse and unhappy ways he has triggered a flurry of trench-digging. It is a troubling legacy to leave behind." Cosatu has been even more scathing: "We find it particularly offensive that President Mbeki has seen fit to play the race card in a manner that suggests that the people with business interests - whom he is defending - are somehow blacker than the working-class components of the alliance. Moreover, the President's style of engagement leaves much to be desired. He never debates on the strength of his arguments or correctness of the points he is raising. He seeks to misrepresent people's genuine concerns in order to ridicule those he disagrees with and question their integrity. He plays the race card even against organisations whose membership consists mainly of the very ANC members he is leading. In doing so he has antagonised countless organisations and left the ANC and the alliance deeply divided."

Whichever way we look at it, there is little to be said for a succession battle run behind the scenes. This proves again that the politics of secrecy, control and centralisation are likely to lead to destabilisation. We ignore this lesson at our peril.

This article appears in Focus 45 (March 2007). Focus is published by The Helen Suzman Foundation.

With acknowledgement to Xolela Mangcu and Cape Argus.