Publication: The Star Issued: Date: 2006-03-08 Reporter: Laurent Leger

Shadowy Arms Deal Pimpernel

 

Publication 

The Star
Date

2006-03-08

Reporter

Laurent Léger

Web Link

www.thestar.co.za

 

Poor Alain Thétard. The man who led the Thales operation in South Africa for years, long enough to be implicated in the corruption case against former deputy president Jacob Zuma, has always been in the wrong place at the wrong time.

Thétard, now 58, has devoted his whole career to the 100-year-old French defence electronics giant. Yet he is neither an engineer nor an industrialist *2: his training is in law, in accounting and in finance. He is a man who manages money and dossiers.

Today he is at the centre of the French group's shadiest operations, though it seems he has never personally benefited from the notorious "commissions" or bribes *1. Rather, Thétard acted as a sort of "notary" for these commissions.

"His problem is that in the 1980s he held a position where he had to sign thousands of sensitive contracts *2 on behalf of the group", says an industrialist who knows him well.

"Thétard was responsible for managing the contracts of Thales' agents," a former senior manager of the company says. In other words, he had to manage the hundreds of intermediaries who made it possible for the French group to win contracts in countries all over the world. Members of royal families, ministerial assistants, lawyers, advisers to presidents, influential businessmen. Some were honest, some less so. As "head of management of the international network of agents *3", Thétard signed deals paying these agents for their services.

"Structurally, he could not make decisions *4, certainly not about the choice of agents. Only the Thales salespeople in the countries concerned could choose them," says a former manager who worked alongside Thétard.

As a good "notary", silent, secretive and devoted to his superiors, he put the contracts together and made sure they were properly drafted. No more, no less.

In this way Thétard found himself knee-deep in that most embarrassing of scandals for the Thales group: the $2,5-billion sale of six frigates to Taiwan *5.

A network of agents to whom Thomson-CSF (as Thales was called at the time) took the group to an international arbitrator to claim payments they said were due.

French authorities, suspecting that fat bribes had been paid, launched an investigation. Once again, it was Thétard who had signed the contract.

Summoned to Geneva, on March 15 1994, to explain himself before the arbitrators, he spoke of his work. His testimony offers a rare glimpse into the corridors of power in a big defence group: "In the exercise of my functions I deal with dossiers which are worth billions of French francs and others which are worth only hundreds of thousands. I sign a large number of documents of this sort … It is not my business to know who the beneficiaries are. When we deal with service providers (a coy word for 'intermediaries'), it happens very often that these providers, for one reason or another, point us towards a company …"

As he admitted, Thétard sometimes had to deal with dossiers "worth billions". Yet this Thales employee was then living in one of the more modest parts of Paris, the Rue du Menilmontant.

He continued his testimony in Switzerland: "The contracts are often placed in the safe, because they contain defence secrets. And when I am told these are defence secrets, it is not my business to check."

Thétard, the perfect secretary, had regular contact with the French customs authorities, to whom he had to declare the commissions paid abroad, so as to claim tax deductions. But he never met the principal actors in the drama concerning France and Taiwan, such as the then minister of foreign affairs, Roland Dumas, or his mistress. If commissions had indeed been paid by Thales, which they were not, both would probably have pocketed significant sums of money.

When the story broke in France, Thétard was protected by Jean-Paul Perrier, his superior and the uncontested head of Thales' international operations. He was sent to South Africa. "He's been put out to grass," was the rumour at the time in Paris defence industry circles. In other words, it was considered wise to keep him away from judicial curiosity. After all, he had signed thousands of documents, and one never knows …

His former secretary in South Africa, Sue Delique, confirmed that meetings took place between Thétard, Zuma and Zuma's financial adviser Schabir Shaik.

During the Schaik trial she said Thétard asked her to type and fax to the Paris head office of Thales' international operations - using an encoder - a note about an arrangement through which, in exchange for an annual payment of R500 000 to Jacob Zuma, the French group would benefit from Zuma's protection during the judicial enquiry into the arms deal. Later, Thétard explained that this note was never sent *6.

Visibly, as an agent of Thales abroad, Thétard was no longer merely the "notary" he had been a few years earlier. He had become an actor in the business. And he too now had his hands in the dirt.

His friends - who say he had no enemies in the group - say he is discreet, with a "British" sense of humour. "He has nothing of the adventurer, far less of the gambler," says one.

In December 2005, I was able to speak to him for a few minutes on the telephone. After his South African troubles, he had been redeployed by the group to a German subsidiary.

His voice was playful and rather likable, a far cry from the picture painted by a former secretary, Marion Marais, who described her boss as arrogant and crazy.

"Yes, I think it's a good idea for us to meet," Thétard told me. "I would like it to be known that I am just another employee of the Thales group. A simple man, not a senior manager. I have always acted in good faith for the group. *2"

Thétard described himself as loyal to his superiors and before agreeing to meet me he said he would have to ask for the approval of the communications directorate.

Of course, as with any sensitive dossier, Thales played the red card. The meeting was refused.

"We have consulted Thétard, and he does not agree to a meeting," *7 I was told.

Oh, really?

Laurent Léger is a Paris freelance journalist, specialising in defence

With acknowledgement to Laurent Léger and The Star.

*1       One should neither too quickly presume guilt nor presume innocence. Thetard is and has been found by the highest courts in this land, to be a profound liar and opportunist.

Indeed the DSO has or had a warrant for Thetard's arrest, including on a charge of perjury arising out of an NPA Act Section 28 interview with them under oath.

Perrier and Thetard were also both very un-cooperative with investigators in France and Mauritius. Perrier at least has bank accounts with substantial balance in Lebanon, the French equivalent of the Channels Islands or Cayman Islands.

It is also clear that of the US$600 million paid in bribes by Thomson-CSF in respect of the Taiwanese La Fayette frigate deal, a goodly percentage of the wonga got repatriated back to France, including to executives of the French supplier companies, Elf, DCN and Thomson-CSF.

Thetard was born in Algeria - I wonder if there are bank accounts there.


*2      Big companies like Thomson-CSF and British Aerospace always choose someone without intrinsic core capability to manage their occult affairs. That's the way they get locked into a mutually beneficial symbiosis : loyalty/reward.

Thomson-CSF is known as one of the most corrupt companies on earth, if not the Western world. I would be blown down with a feather if Thomson-CSF never rewarded Thetard and his ilk very handsomely indeed for his devotion far beyond the call of duty.


*3      There were actually dozens of people such as Thetard in the organisation known as Thomson-CSF International. I can name all of them.


*4      This is not true; there was a hierachy of decision-making, something like : It's all documented in Thomson-CSF records.


*5      A US$2,5-billion sale of six frigates to Taiwan with US$600 000 in "commissions".


*6      Another lie: a reliable witness testified that she actually transmitted the encrypted fax on Thetard's instruction and forensic evidence in the form of telephonic proves that the fax was sent.


*7      This is the Thomson-CSF/Thales way.

Great article, but where's the photo?