Serious question marks have been raised over the strike capability of the South African Navy's (SAN) expensive new ships. A new independent study claims they are vulnerable to attack from submarines, aircraft and warships and have little ability to perform the key role of gunboat diplomacy through offshore bombardment.

These alarming critiques emerge from A Guide to the SANDF, an exhaustive 20-chapter unpublished and unauthorised manuscript on the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), written by defence analyst Leon Engelbrecht.

It is the first study of the armed forces in 16 years - despite the huge changes that have taken place in the interim.

Engelbrecht argues that the four new Valour-class frigates and three new Type 209 submarines are too light in their weapons and defensive counter-measures departments.

This is the part of South Africa's multi-billion rand arms deal currently proving most controversial, because of an alleged $3 million bribe paid by the frigate's builders, ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems, to former arms acquisition programme head Chippy Shaik.

But Helmoed-Römer Heitman, the southern African correspondent for Jane's Defence Weekly and author of the last similar study, South African Armed Forces (1990), said Engelbrecht had failed to take into account the significant upgrades planned for the naval weapons systems, the choices for which would only become clear as the new navy's role developed.

Rear Admiral Kevin Watson, the navy's project director for the acquisition of the vessels - four Valour-class frigates complete with AugustaWestland Super Lynx helicopters plus three Type 209 submarines - confirmed that the bulk of the expenditure on the frigates (65%) had been on the ships themselves and not their weapons systems.

This, he admitted, was at odds with the international norm of a 70% ship, 30% weapons spending split.

As a result, according to Engelbrecht, while the ships were top-notch, there were significant weaknesses in the weapons, and the counter-measures the ships were able to deploy against enemy attack.

The frigates will be armed with eight Exocet missiles, 16 Umkhonto missiles, a single-turreted Denel 76mm gun on the bow, an Oerlikon 20mm cannon on each side of the bridge, and a single South African Denel/Reutech 35mm cannon on the hangar roof overlooking the aft helideck.

According to Engelbrecht, the frigate's "current armament (was) suited only for limited, short-duration self-defence".

Its "land attack capability (was) limited to guns too light for the task" and it had "no land attack missiles".

This inability to add muscle to incursions ashore is underlined by Engelbrecht's argument that "the (Valour) class deliberately lacks a land-attack cruise missile capability for political reasons: such weapons are seen by some as 'too aggressive' and out of keeping with the Valour-class's 'defensive posture'.

"However like its peers, the SA Navy recognises the growing importance of fighting in the littoral battlespace and supporting land forces during war and peace operations. As a result a missile land-attack capability is likely to be added as funds become available and sensitivities are assuaged."

Heitman said, however, that budgeting, not political shyness, had delayed the development of the navy's land-attack capacity.

Still, in Engelbrecht's estimation, the frigates' existing weapons were not up to scratch:

The French anti-ship "Exocet missile (was) too slow to penetrate modern air defences and too short-ranged to allow the mothership adequate standoff to evade detection and response …".

"Some commentators have criticised the choice of the Exocet … because of its lack of land attack ability at a time of heightened interest in littoral warfare and more robust peace enforcement.

"Others have hammered the system for its age (developed in 1967), its low relative speed and small warhead, compared to some more modern systems such as the Indo-Russian BrahMos," which was touted to the SAN at last year's Africa Aerospace and Defence show in Cape Town.

Heitman said while he had a suspicion the SAN had bought one Exocet and leased the rest, the plan was to upgrade to the latest, longer-range (173km) model which did have land-attack capabilities. The SAN was also very interested in the supersonic 300km-range BrahMos cruise missile.

The South African Denel Umkhonto-IR is a short-range (12km) anti-aircraft missile that is still in its development stage, having been "only tested to a limited extent, and only against subsonic targets," while "several navies and air forces already have supersonic anti-ship missiles. How Umkhonto will deal with these is not known in the public domain".

The frigates can have their capacity for 16 Umkhontos doubled to 32, but will probably only carry eight missiles and so "can easily be swamped by saturation attack".

Heitman admitted that the missiles might have difficulty intercepting supersonic assaults, but said the Finn's recent acquisition of the Umkhonto and Sweden's interest showed the missile was taken seriously.

The Italian OTOBreda 76mm cannon were acquired for the Warrior-class strike-craft in 1977 and four reconditioned ones were fitted to the frigates as "an interim cost-saving measure. Senior naval officers are well aware the gun is too small to effectively support forces ashore".

Heitman agreed, but also echoed Engelbrecht in saying the SAN was looking at replacing the 76 with a navalised 155mm gun which could use Denel's world-class G5 and G6 ammunition.

In addition, the frigates were not fitted with torpedos (as they were capable of), and their anti-submarine warfare ability was "very basic," Watson admitted - "because that is not a very high threat at the moment".

Heitman said while there was no such threat currently, "there's absolutely f*** all they (the frigates) can do to a submarine except ram it".

But the frigates would all go through "a massive upgrade" of their weapons, countermeasures and weapons-control systems in the coming years, he said.

With acknowledgement to Michael Schmidt and Cape Argus.