Publication: The Star Issued: Date: 2007-02-24 Reporter: Michael Schmidt

Has SA Invested in Weak Ships?

 

Publication 

The Star
Date

2007-02-24

Reporter

 Michael Schmidt

Web Link

www.thestar.co.za

 

Serious questions have been raised over the strike capability of the expensive new ships of the South African Navy (SAN). A new independent study claims they are vulnerable to attack from submarines, aircraft and warships, and have little ability to perform the key role of gunboat diplomacy through offshore bombardment.

These critiques emerge from an unpublished and unauthorised manuscript on the South African National Defence Force, A Guide to the SANDF, by defence analyst Leon Engelbrecht. It is the first study of the armed forces in 16 years.

Engelbrecht argues that the four new Valour-class frigates and three new Type 209 submarines are too light in their weapons and defensive counter-measures departments. This is the part of South Africa's multibillion-rand arms deal currently proving most controversial - because of an alleged $3-million (R21-million) bribe paid by the frigate's builders, ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems, to former arms acquisition programme head Chippy Shaik.

But Helmoed-Römer Heitman, the Southern African correspondent for Jane's Defence Weekly and author of a similar study, South African Armed Forces (1990), said Engelbrecht had failed to take into account the significant upgrades planned for the naval weapons systems *2, the choices for which would become clear only as the new navy's role developed *3.

Rear Admiral Kevin Watson, the navy's project director for the acquisition of the vessels, confirmed that the bulk of the expenditure on the frigates (65%) had been on the ships, not their weapons systems. This, he admitted, was at odds with the international norm of a 70% ship/30% weapons split.

As a result, according to Engelbrecht, while the ships were top notch, there were significant weaknesses in the weapons, and the counter-measures the ships were able to deploy against enemy attack.

The frigates will be armed with eight Exocet missiles, 16 Umkhonto missiles, a single turreted Denel 76mm gun, Oerlikon 20mm cannons and a South African Denel/Reutech 35mm cannon.

According to Engelbrecht, the frigate's "current armament [was] suited only for limited, short-duration self-defence". Its "land-attack capability [was] limited to guns too light for the task" and it had "no land attack missiles". This inability to add muscle to incursions ashore is underlined by Engelbrecht's argument that "the [Valour] class deliberately lacks a land- attack cruise missile capability for political reasons: such weapons are seen by some as 'too aggressive' and out of keeping with the Valour-class's 'defensive posture' *5.

"However, like its peers, the SAN recognises the growing importance of fighting in the littoral battle-space and supporting land forces … As a result, a missile land-attack capability is likely to be added as funds become available and sensitivities are assuaged."

Heitman said that budgeting, not political shyness, had delayed the development of the navy's land-attack capacity. Still, in Engelbrecht's estimation, the frigates' existing weapons were not up to scratch:

The French anti-ship "Exocet missile was too slow to penetrate modern air defences and too short-ranged to allow the mothership adequate stand-off to evade detection and response … Some commentators have criticised the choice of the Exocet … because of its lack of land-attack ability … Others have hammered the system for its age (developed in 1967), its low relative speed and small warhead, compared with some more modern systems such as the Indo-Russian BrahMos *6," which was touted to the SAN at last year's Africa Aerospace and Defence show in Cape Town.

Heitman suspected the SAN had bought one Exocet and leased the rest *6, but would upgrade to the latest, longer-range (173km) model, which had land-attack capabilities. The SAN was also interested in the supersonic 300km-range BrahMos cruise missile.

The South African Denel Umkhonto-IR is a short-range (12km) anti-aircraft missile, which is still in its development stage, having been "tested only to a limited extent", while "several navies and air forces already have supersonic anti-ship missiles. How the Umkhonto will deal with these is not known." The frigates can have their capacity doubled to 32 Umkhontos, but will probably carry only eight missiles and so "can easily be swamped by saturation attack *7".

Also, after a missile has been fired, empty launch canisters have to be removed from their silos, but: "As far as can be determined, this cannot be done by the Valour-class at sea, [so] reloading will have to be done alongside [in port] or require a replenishment vessel, as a depot ship, in calm seas".

Heitman admitted the missiles might have difficulty intercepting supersonic assaults, but said the Finns' recent acquisition of the Umkhonto and Sweden's interest showed the missile was taken seriously. He added that no navy was able to reload its vertically launched anti-aircraft missiles at sea.

The Italian OTOBreda 76mm cannons were acquired for the Warrior-class strike-craft in 1977 and four reconditioned ones were fitted to the frigates as "an interim cost-saving measure. Senior naval officers are well aware the gun is too small to effectively support forces ashore."

Heitman agreed, but also echoed Engelbrecht in saying the SAN was looking to replace the 76 with a navalised 155mm gun, which could use Denel's world-class G5 and G6 ammunition. Such a long-rage gun, rather than missiles, would be able to bombard enemy air bases, gun emplacements and ports. But this, Heitman argued, would be relevant only once the SAN had acquired multi-role ships capable of landing troops to secure beachheads softened by such bombardment.

In addition, the frigates were not fitted with torpedoes (as they were capable of), and its anti-submarine warfare ability was very basic, Watson admitted. Heitman said "there's absolutely f*** all [the frigates] can do to a submarine except ram it *7".

But the frigates would all go through "a massive upgrade" of their weapons, counter-measure and weapons-control systems in the coming years, he said.

Watson said the frigates' helicopters would initially be used in a surveillance role because they increased the ships' line of sight from 37km to 555km *9.

Politics & Power is a new analytical weekly feature

With acknowledgements to Michael Schmidt and The Star.


*1       What about the $22 million (R156 million) payments paid by the frigate's builders, ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems, to other South African's via Monrovia, Liberia (the country with the slackest corporate law and regulations in the world).


*2      Heitman of course is correct in the fact. The Navy purchased an excellent platform with very weak combat system.

But it was not meant to be that way. The SA Navy Combat Suite User Requirement Specification specifies a very powerful combat capability in respect of anti-surface offence, as well as anti-air and anti-submarine defence.

The only thing was that once Thabo Mbeki guaranteed Thomson-CSF and ADS the contract for the combat management system and sensors in 1997 (two years before the contract was signed), the DoD and Armscor were over a barrel. Suddenly and R1,9 billion fully-fledged combat suite went up to R3,9 billion (with Chippy Shaik gleefully rubbing his enrichment
lamp all the way). With a little hard bargaining, but mainly cutting the quantity and quality (quote, unquote) of the combat suite scope of supply, the project team brought the price down from R3,9 billion to some R2,9 billion. Then with a risk sharing approach, as well as the probably exclusion of the price of the anti-ship missiles, the price went down to R2,3 billion and was "in reach of the then price objective" of R2,1 billion. But Chippy pipes up with the affordability study indicating an [acceptable] price of R2,600 billion and so the negotiations ended forthwith and the price went up to and closed at R2,599 billion on the nose. The R300 million sounds more like the wonga splodged by Thomson-CSF in its excitement of getting such a windfall.


*3      This of course is nonsense.

        During 1995 to 1997 the Defence Review was undertaken. This confirmed the SA Navy's documented Naval Staff Requirement (NSR) for a multi-role light frigate with the specified combat capability.

The only thing was that the Government's irregular and unlawful acquisition process lead to a situation where the specified capability and equipment were unaffordable in 1999 compared with the ceiling price of R6,001 determined in August 1998.

So the DoD had to embarked on a series of very stealthy (and unlawful) manouvres to get a frigate. First it chopped its organic maritime helicopter, then it added R872 million to it "ceiling" price, then it halved its equipment expectation, then it didn't purchase but leased its anti-ship missiles, then it purchased functionality shortfalls out of the SA Navy's running budget.

Now the DoD is again purchasing maritime helicopters, new anti-ship missiles, torpedoes and a decent naval gun (not a 40-year old 3" pop gun off the strike craft).

This is called fiscal stealth and makes the radar and thermal stealth of the MEKO 200AS look like child's play.


*4      Wrong - the international norm of a multi-role surface combatant is 30% platform / 70% weapons.

But the ship's stealthy acquirers will eventually get the requisite 30% platform / 70% weapons.

Here's what the taxpayer will pay :
Combat Suite = R2,599 billion = 30% (in 1998 Rands)
Combat Suite = 70% = R6,064 billion (in 1998 Rands) = R11,109 billion (in 2007 Rands)

*5      This is also nonsense. The land attack capability is purely a tactical one. The Exocet MM40 Block 2 has a range of some 70 km and a warhead of 165 kg. Even if it had a land attack capability the range and small warhead limit it to a tactical battlefield weapon.

Exocet MM40 Block 3 (or equivalent) has a land attack capability, but still has a range of about 150 km.

Seeing that the ship only has eight ASM launchers the entire naval arsenal is only 32 rounds and these beast cost about US$20 apiece, one couldn't just blast away into one's enemy's territory.

A politically sensitive land attack missile is one with a range of greater than 500 km and payload of greater than 300 kg. For example, one of Bat Boy's favourite early morning diversions is authorising the launch of the Tomahawk Land Attack Cruise Missile. This beastie has a range of 2 500 km and carries a warhead of some 500 kg. And they only cost US$0,5 million a pop - now that's a bargain.


*5      And the Chinese "Dragon's Teeth" series.

These all have ranges of 250 km up to 2 000 km, massive warheads from 250 kg up to 500 kg and supersonic speeds from 2,0 Mach to 2,8 Mach.

It's a nightmare.


*6      Quite how this fits into the boundaries of the Public Finance Management Act, heaven only knows.

But it gets worse. What Heitman is now saying in the open has been suspected since 2001.

On enquiry, the MoD has stated unequivocally (or is it actually equivocally) that the SDP corvette price included 17 Exocet MM40 Block 2 missile rounds in addition to launch tubes and launch controllers.

If it transpires that the MoD has been lying, it should be in big, big trouble with SCOPA.


*7      And saturation attack is just what the Chinese anti-ship tactic is all about - 4 to 6 missiles simultaneously engaging from all four quadrants plus the lovely zenith-diving one.

Should keep Reutech Radar Systems's Optronic Radar Tracker (ORT) and Mtek's Electro-Optic Tracker (EOT) quite busy for those 43,2 seconds from missile detect to who knows what.

As for Thomson-CSF's Threat Evaluation and Weapon Assignment (TEWA) function, let's just hope that this can converge in the saturated space of Mach 2,8 multiple incoming bogies, garlic, escargot, bribes to get the contract, bribes to cover up the investigation and a dose of charming gallic candour.


*8      Which is quite difficult when the submarine has dived to 10 m and launched two wire-guided heavyweight torpedoes with 300 kg high explosive payloads.


*9      With a line of sight of 37 km and using a previous Heitman literary gem, one might as well take the entire ship's crew behind the electronics complex in the Simon's Town Naval Base and put them out of their misery with a bullet in the back of the head.