Publication: Cape Times Issued: Date: 2008-01-24 Reporter: Deon de Lange

ANC Death Knell for Law Enforcement Success Story

 

Publication 

Cape Times
Date

2008-01-24
Reporter Deon de Lange

Web Link

 www.capetimes.co.za

 

Have Scorpions stung themselves with own poison

Scorpions are active hunters.

They chase their prey in a short, furious dash, employing a sublime combination of venom and brute force to overpower their victims. Then they eat their kill head first.

So it has been with the local law-enforcement variety of scorpions formally known as the Directorate of Special Operations (DSO).

Remember those first television images? Zippy black cars with the menacing red scorpion logo emblazoned across the bonnet. Stern-faced and well-armed officers raiding the home of some white-collar lowlife, while plain-clothed accountant and prosecutor types loaded boxes of evidence in the boot.

The Scorpions, as they became popularly known, were a far cry from the rust-bucket vangwa South Africans had come to associate with law enforcement - and mouth-watering television news drama to boot.

Less than 10 years after this unit was established - and amid much controversy - the ANC has rung its death knell. The DSO is to be disbanded by June, and its investigators divvied up into the SA Police Service (SAPS).

Though officially launched by Thabo Mbeki, then the deputy president, at a public gathering in Gugulethu in 1999, it was only in January 2001 that the DSO's enabling legislation - the amended National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) Act - finally came into operation. Its mandate broadly stated that the unit should focus on people "who commit and profit from organised crime".

Mbeki implied at the launch that the DSO would also look at organised crime within the ranks of the SAPS. Great is the irony, then, that the unit ended up investigating none other than national Police Commissioner Jackie Selebi - and that Mbeki is seen to have intervened on his top cop's behalf.

Initially, the DSO enjoyed massive public support as it pursued high-profile and complex networks of corporate and public fraudsters, drug kingpins, smugglers and racketeers. Its aggressive media strategy fuelled the image of a ruthless crime-busting operation.

Opposition parties were at first sceptical, and some accused Mbeki of creating his own personal police force. But by applying a unique strategy of teaming up investigators, analysts and prosecutors from the start of an investigation (the so-called troika approach), the DSO soon achieved an enviable conviction rate of more than 85% - with a personnel capacity of only 65% - and won most of the sceptics over.

By the end of 2006, the DSO had made 1 891 arrests, finalised 1 305 investigations and seized more than R1 billion worth of contraband.

Perhaps prophetically, the DSO's first boss, Frank Dutton, had resigned by the time the unit became fully operational in 2001. Percy Sonn came and went and, after months of uncertainty, Leonard McCarthy was appointed to lead the DSO in April 2003.

Three months into the job, McCarthy found himself in the middle of a political earthquake. In the course of an ongoing investigation into the controversial arms deal, it became known the DSO was investigating the possible involvement of then-Deputy President Jacob Zuma.

Then the National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP), Bulelani Ngcuka, made the astounding *1 announcement that, although there was prima facie evidence against Zuma, he would not be prosecuted.

The political ramifications of this comment were enormous and haunt the DSO to this day. Critics often raise this as proof of a political conspiracy against Zuma. Ngcuka resigned in July 2004 after being cleared of allegations that he was an apartheid-era spy. He was replaced by Vusi Pikoli.

Meanwhile, the NPA successfully prosecuted Zuma's friend and financial adviser, Schabir Shaik, who is serving a sentence for fraud and corruption.

In finding Shaik guilty, Judge Hilary Squires was reported to have found that Shaik and Zuma had "a generally corrupt relationship", causing Mbeki to fire Zuma as deputy president of the country. (Squires later denied having made such a finding, although the Supreme Court of Appeal attributed it to him when ruling on Shaik's appeal.)

This no doubt emboldened the DSO to re-launch its case against Zuma, but it infuriated Zuma's supporters. The perceived injustice of it all served as a useful platform for Zuma to launch his successful campaign to topple Mbeki.

Continuing on this politically dangerous path, the DSO investigated former ANC chief whip Tony Yengeni. He pleaded guilty to fraud in 2003.

Then it was the turn of other MPs. After the DSO investigated the so-called Travelgate scandal, 38 MPs pleaded guilty to defrauding Parliament of millions of rand.

During this time, the relationship between the DSO and the SAPS was in steady decline. Tit-for-tat arrests and public slanging matches occurred with alarming frequency - and still continue.

In 2005, Mbeki appointed the Khampepe Commission to get to the bottom of the ongoing feud and to examine the DSO's "mandate and positioning".

Simultaneously, camps within the ANC started coalescing around Mbeki and Zuma, with the political fallout playing itself out in all areas of the security establishment.

The Khampepe Commission recommended that the DSO remain independent of the SAPS, but that its investigators be politically accountable to the minister of safety and security.

It also instructed top officials to meet and iron out their differences.

In its submission to the commission, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) pointed out that much of the tension between the SAPS and the DSO was unavoidable and should simply be managed better.

It went on to suggest that a degree of competition between the two was actually a good thing that could bring out the best in both.

"We would caution against repositioning the DSO simply because of the controversy that has broken out about some of its decisions. Such controversy cannot always be avoided, and the fact that the DSO has demonstrated unequivocally that it has the will and capacity to investigate and prosecute individuals of the highest profile is of enormous importance in building confidence in the institutions of the law in South Africa," the ISS argued.

In her research on the topic, Jean Redpath points out that accountability mechanisms could be improved.

Justice Minister Brigitte Mabandla complained that the ministerial committee established for oversight purposes did not function effectively. In fact, this committee did not meet once in the first four years of the DSO's existence.

Other concerns relate to the enormous discretionary power vested in the NDPP. He has the power to veto any prosecution *3. Laws are currently being drafted to give effect to the commission's recommendations.

Finally, Selebi's self-confessed links with a known criminal made him the subject of a DSO investigation, pushing the strained relationship between the policing agencies to near breaking point.

Mbeki stepped in, suspending Pikoli and appointing the Ginwala Inquiry to examine his fitness to hold office.

Having trod on so many political toes, the DSO faced mounting criticism from within the ANC - most notably from the ANC Youth League *4, which accused the unit of selective prosecution and spearheading a political campaign against Zuma.

Having successfully displaced Mbeki and most of his allies from leadership positions, supporters of Zuma - now ANC president - want the DSO gone for good. But party leaders are quick to dispel suggestions that this decision is related to the fact that Zuma finds himself uncomfortably skewered on the tenacious scorpion's powerful claw.

The decision to "incorporate" the DSO into the SAPS was officially floated for the first time at the party's national policy conference in June last year. But after the Zuma camp took over at the national conference in December, this resolution was strengthened, suggesting the DSO be "disbanded" altogether.

According to the resolution, the decision is based on the constitutional requirement for "a single police force". However, Section 199 (3) of the constitution makes provision for other "armed organisations or services" to be established in terms of national legislation - as was done with the NPA Act.

To disband the DSO on such specious grounds adds to suspicions that the move is politically motivated and purely vindictive. The ANC has also said the DSO is a political tool in the hands of Zuma's enemies. Unless evidence of this is forthcoming, the allegation should not be taken seriously.

Lacking a clearly motivated argument for the unit's disbandment, it is easy to conclude that the new ANC leadership wants to dissolve this effective law enforcement agency for no other reason than to punish it for daring to investigate the ANC president and other prominent party members *5.

In the meantime, it seems the ANC is prepared to throw the baby out with the bathwater in pursuit of a political vendetta against the agency that has stood toe to toe with senior party members, looked them in the eye, and slipped the cuffs over their fingers.

With acknowledgements to Deon de Lange and Cape Times.


*1       Idiotic announcement.

If the Scorpions ever stung themselves this was it.

This is the profit from making political appointments of very-experienced persons to high positions.


*2      How can a committee be effective if it does not meet?

This was done on purpose.


*3      Which is exactly what Bulelani Ngcuka did with Jacob Zuma.

He tried to do a political deal whereby Zuma escaped criminal charges, but relinquished all or some of his political ambitions.

But others who had been promised things coming out of successful political ambitions were having none of that and emboldened the criminal who bit back with a vengeance.

Without robust political support from the main man Ngcuka wobbled within months - then toppled.

The new NPA chief, Vusi Pikoli escaped out of the constrictions of the Department of Justice and soon established a quite confidence  in himself which soon led to new competence in the NPA - only to have his head figuratively lopped off by you know who.

In the meantime Ngcuka thought it pertinent to also let the biggest Arms Deal criminals off the hook, i.e Thomson-CSF of France.


*4      Merely the proxy warfighters of those vulnerable.


*5      Like Mac Maharaj, whose investigation results have not seen the light of day after about five years.


This is a very sick country.

It needs healing.