Biggest Successes Of Scorpions Were As A Result Of Separation From Police

ON JANUARY 19 the ANC's national executive committee (NEC) met in Midrand. The skies above the conference were dark grey, a reflection of the sombre mood of the country. South Africa was in the grip of a crippling power shortage.

The night before the NEC met, enraged commuters burnt six trains after power cuts brought them to a halt. Inside the meeting halls, however, the NEC was preoccupied with something different: how to shut down the Scorpions, South Africa's specialised and elite crime-fighting unit.

The Directorate of Special Operations (DSO) was formed in 2001 to investigate high-level crimes. Colloquially known as the Scorpions, it was deliberately placed under the control of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) rather than the South African Police Service.

The DSO was envisaged as the best of the best: an attempt to bring together SA's top criminal investigators, prosecutors, intelligence analysts, forensics and financial experts in one agency: South Africa's first line of defence in the fight against organised crime and corruption.

The Scorpions proved to be remarkably competent, conducting a series of high-profile operations against crime syndicates, drug dealers, fraudsters and racketeers. The 2005 Khampepe Commission found that within its first three years of operation the DSO obtained a conviction rate in excess of 90%, compared to 8% for the police's serious and violent crimes units.

They seemed to take a particular delight in bringing down corrupt elites, training their sights on politically-connected businessmen, army generals and senior ANC officials without much thought for the political consequences.

The DSO soon faced a litany of criticism from politicians, the police and their numerous allies. At Midrand, however, it became apparent that the game was over. The Scorpions are finally going to be shut down.

The NEC meeting in Midrand took place roughly one month after the Polokwane ANC conference, in which the old guard dominated by President Thabo Mbeki was swept aside. The new NEC, comprised of loyalists to former deputy president, Jacob Zuma, was determined to consolidate its grip on power and its first demand was that the Scorpions be disbanded by June. After that, any DSO personnel still willing to work for the South African government will be incorporated into the South African Police Service.

Mbeki and his Cabinet meekly acquiesced.

Why has the NEC placed such a high priority on disbanding the Scorpions? The NEC's official explanation is that it wishes to bring law enforcement in line with the constitution, which specifies that South Africa should have "a single police force." This requirement dates back to the immediate post-apartheid era, when the police services of the various "homelands" were dismantled and folded into the SAPS.

However, the constitution does permit the establishment of other armed services, and the Constitutional Court deemed the legislation that created the DSO legitimate.

By relying on transparently flawed legal logic, the NEC has merely heightened the suspicion that it is engaged in political manoeuvring to protect its own ranks - including Zuma - from criminal prosecution.

Politicians are not the only ones with reason to dislike the Scorpions. The DSO has made another enemy that harbours even more resentment: the SA Police Service. Inter-service rivalries are hardly a new development and occur whenever government agencies are forced to compete for resources and prestige. The turf war between the Scorpions and the police, however, became so vicious that it threatened to engulf the government.

When Mbeki first announced the formation of the DSO, he described it as "a special and adequately staffed and equipped investigation unit ... to deal with all national priority crimes, including police corruption."

The Scorpions cultivated their reputation as the elite of South African crime fighting, which seemed to relegate the police to second-class status.

This was borne out by the fact that members of the DSO earned much higher salaries than their police counterparts, and by the heroic coverage they received in the media.

After 2005, the relationship between the Scorpions and the police deteriorated from mutual acrimony to something approaching a secret war.

Early that year, national Police Commissioner, Jackie Selebi made an unsuccessful play to bring the Scorpions under his command. Several months later, mining tycoon Brett Kebble was murdered, and the Scorpions noticed an odd relationship between Selebi and their chief suspect, Glenn Agliotti. Selebi acknowledged the relationship, but claimed that Agliotti was merely a close personal friend.

The DSO was suspicious: why would a figure like Agliotti, repeatedly accused of fraud and drug dealing, maintain a friendship with the head of the police?

From the outside, it looked like a case of police corruption at the highest level. The Scorpions needed evidence to confirm their suspicions, and they allowed Agliotti to plea bargain his way out of drug-dealing charges in exchange for his testimony against Selebi.

In 2007, the Scorpions felt they had enough evidence to charge Selebi, and NPA head Vusi Pikoli, obtained a warrant for Selebi's arrest.

However, Mbeki balked at the idea of arresting the national police commissioner, worried that a scandal of that magnitude could destroy the credibility of his government.

When Pikoli refused to cancel the warrant, Mbeki suspended him.

Nevertheless, newspapers soon discovered the existence of the arrest warrant, and confidence in the police fell to new lows.

Selebi took revenge by ordering a police investigation into corruption in the Scorpions, and then having Gerrie Nel - the Gauteng Scorpions boss in charge of investigating Agliotti and Selebi - arrested on groundless charges of obstructing his investigation.

Eventually, the growing constitutional crisis forced Mbeki to relent.

Selebi was suspended, the criminal proceedings against him went ahead and, several days later, a court threw out the charges against Nel.

The Scorpions had triumphed, and the police had been humiliated. However, two weeks later, the NEC announced it would dismantle the unit.

The NEC may genuinely believe that a single, unified law enforcement agency is the best way to tackle crime.

The ANC's January newsletter made this argument explicitly, claiming that "the incorporation of the Scorpions (into the SAPS) will in fact strengthen the fight against crime by ensuring the integration of all policing functions under a single command structure".

Whatever the psychological appeal of this argument, it is wrong. Competition is a creative and dynamic force, and this is no less true for government agencies than it is for private enterprises.

Ultimately, the Scorpions's biggest successes were the as a result of its separation from the police.

Freedom from the crushing bureaucratic inertia of the SAPS allowed the Scorpions to develop a culture that values co-operation across multiple disciplines.

The DSO managed to eliminate the internal stovepipes that typically prevent criminal investigators, prosecutors and intelligence analysts from working together.

This unique organisational structure and outstanding human capital has been painstakingly developed over many years, at a huge expense, and it will not survive a merger with the SAPS.

It is possible - though unlikely - that DSO personnel will be willing to work, at a reduced salary, for an organisation that has frustrated and opposed them at every turn.

In the end, South Africa will lose one of its best weapons in the fight against crime.

Caromba is a Research Assistant at the Centre for International Political Studies (CiPS), University of Pretoria. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of CiPS or the University of Pretoria.

With acknowledgement to Laurence Caromba and Cape Times