Publication: Cape Argus Issued: Date: 2008-01-12 Reporter: Andrew Feinstein

Arms Deal Still Threat to Our Future

 

Publication 

Cape Argus

Date

2008-01-12

Reporter Andrew Feinstein

Web Link

www.capeargus.co.za



Only an open probe into that murky world will do, writes former MP Andrew Feinstein

The ANC's decision to appoint a committee to look into the arms deal reflects the extent to which the deal continues to haunt South African politics.

The creation of a committee to compile a report to better inform the ANC leadership about the deal lays to rest the notion that there was a comprehensive investigation into the deal, as the government and ANC have claimed for years. If there had been an unfettered investigation, the ANC could simply refer to the investigator's report. So, implicitly, the ANC has accepted that the investigation was neutered, that its report was edited *1 to the point of mendacity and the real story has yet to emerge.

What the ANC should remember, though, is that a number of the investigators wanted to include in the report a recommendation that ANC corruption in the deal be further investigated. Their request never saw the light of day.

In an ideal political environment, the ANC committee would garner all the available facts relating to the deal, make public its findings and, where appropriate, take action against any of its own members who were involved in misdemeanours in the deal and subsequent cover-up.

To encourage this approach, which would indicate that the ANC is willing to come to terms with the significant corruption in the deal, I have written to the ANC, offering to give evidence before the committee, based on my extensive research.

However, I fear the committee's real task may be to generate propaganda to be used in an attempt to publicly exonerate Jacob Zuma and exert pressure on the judicial process leading up to his trial.

Another objective, in this fractured political climate, may be to apply pressure to Thabo Mbeki. After all, as I mention in my book, Mbeki's central and controversial role in the deal was barely touched on in the neutered investigation.

It is also worth recalling that when Zuma was first charged with corruption, his legal team suggested they might need to call the president to give evidence as "he is the only one who would know whether the arms deal was corrupt or not".

The portents for the ANC inquiry are not good: the findings of the committee will not be made public, it will pick and choose who it hears evidence from and it includes at least two people whose roles were unfortunate. Naledi Pandor, then chairwoman of the National Council of Provinces, intervened with then Speaker Frene Ginwala to inappropriately direct the ANC component of the Public Accounts Committee as to what we should and should not do and say in relation to the investigation.

And Siphiwe Nyanda was alleged to have received a significant discount on a luxury vehicle from one of the bidders in the deal when he was head of the defence force.

In addition, the shadow of Tony Yengeni, recently elected to the ANC's national working committee, will also hang over the arms deal committee.

It was Yengeni who aggressively tried to stop the Public Accounts Committee from pursuing its inquiries. He was convicted for misleading Parliament about the discount on a luxury vehicle he received from the same bidder while he was chairman of Parliament's defence committee.

What is still desperately needed is a full, independent, unfettered and public investigation into the deal and its cover-up. Only then the public will know what has become of its approximately R50 billion spent on arms, some of which we didn't need and to this day hardly use.

Alternately, we will only get to know more of the truth from the British and German investigations into $200 million in bribes paid on the South African deal.

It is possible that some of the murkier aspects of the deal may be revealed at Jacob Zuma's forthcoming corruption trial. It is essential for our democracy that the judicial process run its course unfettered by any form of pressure from the ANC, its allies or the government.

That Zuma has a case to answer is unequivocal. The judgment in the Schabir Shaik trial, confirmed in the rejection of all his appeals, stated that Shaik solicited money for Jacob Zuma in return for which Zuma is alleged to have used his public offices to promote the interests of the providers of the money. In addition, further evidence has become available to the prosecutors.

The cries of "politically motivated trial" that accompanied the Shaik court case in no way minimise his guilt, proved so conclusively in a number of courts. Where I believe there has been a problem in the process is that more people implicated in corruption in the arms deal have not been called to account. They include the late Joe Modise, Fana Hlongwane and Chippy Shaik.

Zuma must be given his day in court so that, if shown to be innocent, he is able to proudly contest the 2009 election. If proven guilty of the serious charges facing him he will have to face the consequences of his misdemeanours, including the likely end of his political career. It would obviously be in Zuma's and the country's interests if that trial was concluded before the start of the 2009 election.

In the lead-up to the trial it is crucial that the country's law enforcement and judicial authorities are insulated from the political battles within the ANC.

The perceived protection of Police Commissioner Jackie Selebi, the dramatic arrest of Scorpions investigator Gerrie Nel and the strident comments by political leaders about these authorities give the impression that our political leadership wishes these entities to become part of the political playground, rather than focus on the enormous challenge of fighting the violent crime devastating the country. Such an eventuality would signal a serious crisis for our democracy.

The seeds of such shenanigans were planted during the unseemly succession battle within the ANC, in which the country's intelligence agencies were mired. There is no doubt that organs of state were used selectively, depending on people's political allegiance.

Party and state became dangerously merged in the minds of some politicians.

This followed the pattern initiated in the cover-up of the arms deal, where institutions of state, most notably Parliament, were undermined in order to achieve party political or narrow personal ends. That institution has yet to recover its vigour, dealing a devastating blow to accountable and transparent governance.

I worry that Parliament could be further compromised by its speaker, Baleka Mbete, taking on the mantle of ANC national chairwoman and heading the party's powerful political committee. It will be extremely difficult for her to perform her parliamentary duties in a non-partisan manner. A failure to do so will seriously hamper Parliament's ability to hold the executive to account and to conduct its deliberations in a manner that benefits all South Africans. To avoid this she should stand down as speaker or relinquish her party leadership positions.

The moral decline of the ANC began with the arms deal and its subsequent cover-up. We are still suffering the consequences. It is only when we know all the facts about the deal, when the Zuma case has been resolved one way or the other in a fair and open manner, and when the ANC again starts putting the country before the party, that South Africa will be able to meet the challenges of poverty, inequality, insecurity and Aids. That day cannot come soon enough.

Andrew Feinstein is a former ANC MP. His book After the Party: A personal and political journey inside the ANC documents the arms deal and its consequences for South African politics

With acknowledgements to Andrew Feinstein and Cape Argus.



*1      Read disembled and dismembered.

I wonder whether the New Arms Deal Investigators in the ANC will found out whether Tony Heard of the president's office assisted Advocates Lionel van Tonder and Stoffel Fourie in reassembling the Joint Report dated 14 November 2001 from the quite good stuff that went into the Draft Report of the Auditor-General dated around 4 October 2001.