How Arms ‘Bribes’ Were Paid |
Publication | Mail and Guardian |
Date |
2008-12-05 |
Reporter |
Stefaans Brümmer, Sam Sole |
Web Link |
A breakdown of how the key players involved got their
pound of flesh
Dramatic new evidence of corruption in the arms deal is disclosed in
documents used by the Scorpions to motivate for last week’s raids on premises
countrywide.
The documents, seen by the Mail & Guardian, show that “commissions” paid to
agents by British defence giant BAE Systems total more than
£115-million *1 — a
staggering R1,73-billion at
today’s exchange rate.
They also argue BAE could not produce
evidence of legitimate services by their agents which
could justify the huge amounts paid to them.
The documents — affidavits by South African and British investigators, financial
statements and correspondence — formed the basis for the Scorpions’ secret
application to the Pretoria High Court to search seven premises linked to BAE
and its agents last week. They disclose:
- How the vast majority of BAE’s commission payments — £103-million — were “covert”
and made through a secret front company (see box);
- How the covert payments were made to a series of
undisclosed agents —
including Fana Hlongwane, who served as
special adviser to then defence minister Joe Modise at the
time BAE was chosen as preferred bidder (see graphic);
- How BAE allegedly tried to hide the
extent and timing of their relationship with Hlongwane from investigators.
The M&G has previously disclosed his receipt of hundreds of millions of rands as
a “consultant” to BAE;
- How two highly unusual
commission payments were authorised just before South Africa
signed the final contracts in December 1999; and
- Details of interventions by Modise and
then defence procurement boss Chippy Shaik which advantaged the BAE bid.
BAE led the successful bid, with Sweden’s Saab as junior
partner, to supply BAE Hawk trainer jets and Saab Gripen jet fighters
worth more than R21-billion in today’s money *2.
The documents detail evidence obtained by the British Serious Fraud Office (SFO),
which is conducting an investigation parallel to the Scorpions. The SFO evidence
includes:
- A statement under oath by a former BAE executive about how Zimbabwean-born
arms-and-tobacco baron John Bredenkamp, whose company received the largest
“commission” payments from BAE, suggested to him that “key
decision-makers” needed to be identified with a view to “financially
incentivising” them;
- How the former executive was allegedly told that Bredenkamp’s team had boasted
that “we can get to Chippy Shaik *3”;
- How a memo obtained from Bredenkamp’s British operations chief spoke of the
“Third World procedures” required to win the South African bid.
BAE has consistently maintained it acted legally. Hlongwane has in the past
failed to talk to the M&G. Bredenkamp has maintained his innocence.
The latest disclosures will add to pressure on the government to launch a full
judicial inquiry into the arms deal. This week Archbishop Desmond Tutu and
former president FW de Klerk added their voices to calls by Cosatu, Judge Chris
Nicholson and others for an inquiry.
The government has consistently denied corruption in the main arms deal
contracts. It repeatedly quoted the finding of the 2001 Joint Investigation Team
(JIT) report that: “No evidence was found of any improper or unlawful conduct by
the government.”
Critics dubbed the JIT report a whitewash. The Scorpions’ main affidavit in the
Pretoria High Court is more diplomatic,
saying “the [Scorpions] criminal
investigation process is distinct from the JIT process *4
… The JIT’s findings are not and do not purport to be findings reached by way of
criminal investigation*5.”
Now *6 the Scorpions
believe they have a reasonable suspicion of racketeering, corruption, money
laundering and fraud. The evidence
gathered is compelling.
Red Diamond
According to the Scorpions’ affidavit, the SFO investigation reveals that
BAE operated a system of “overt” and “covert” advisers in its worldwide
marketing efforts. After a US justice department investigation of BAE’s
activities in Chile, the company adopted a “least transparent system” to pay its
covert agents, using Red Diamond Trading, registered in the British Virgin
Islands.
It continues: “Mike Turner [a past BAE chief executive] in his interview with
the SFO claimed that the reason for such an opaque system was to ensure
commercial confidentiality and to avoid intrusion by the media and anti-arms
campaigners.
“The SFO suspects that a primary reason behind the inception of Red Diamond was
to ensure that corrupt payments could be
made, and that it would be more difficult for law
enforcement agencies to penetrate the system.”
Hlongwane
Hlongwane allegedly received payments
of R280-million from BAE through four vehicles.
Two were overt: BAE itself and Sanip, a local company set
up by BAE and Saab to manage their offset obligations.
Two were covert: Arstow Commercial Corporation, registered in the British Virgin
Islands, and Commercial International Corporation (CIC), registered in Jersey.
According to the SFO, former BAE executive Allan McDonald has confirmed that
Arstow’s “controlling mind” is a certain Alexander Roberts.
Arstow
The Scorpions note that Roberts “states in his interview with the SFO that
BAE told him to pay a portion of Arstow’s … fees to Fana Hlongwane. Mr Roberts
paid Fana Hlongwane … over R60-million … for his great assistance to BAE.”
This was supposedly for helping with the offset and black empowerment
requirements of the Hawk/Gripen campaign.
“Neither Mr Roberts nor BAE could supply the SFO with any
written evidence regarding the legitimate work *7
Fana Hlongwane did that could reasonably justify compensation in the magnitude
of R60-million.”
The Scorpions affidavit adds that Hlongwane’s companies also received over
R120-million directly from BAE, which “could not produce any significant records
… of work done that could reasonably justify [such] compensation” — as well as
another R51-million through Sanip, the local BAE-Saab company.
CIC
CIC was a Jersey company run by offshore financial consultants Hugh Thurston
and Leonard Day. According to the Scorpions, the SFO interviewed Day in Jersey,
who said Thurston asked him to purchase CIC “as a vehicle for use by Fana
Hlongwane”.
The Scorpions affidavit continues: “Red Diamond entered into a consultancy
agreement with CIC on November 11 1999 for what appears to be services provided
post-signature of the contract between BAE and the government of South Africa.”
It appears Hlongwane received nearly R5-million from BAE through CIC. Documents
seized by the SFO suggest BAE tried to
claim their financial relationship with Hlongwane began only in 2003.
The Scorpions note: “The SFO believe that BAE have sought to conceal from the
SFO the involvement of Fana Hlongwane during the [contract] negotiation phase.”
Two special payments
The SFO’s evidence suggests there was a scramble by BAE to make two highly
confidential commission payments to seal the deal, prior to the signature of the
final contract with the South African government in December 1999.
A Gripen jet fighter. Gripens and Hawk jet trainers cost South Africa more
than R21-billion
On December 2, the day before the contract was signed, BAE approved payment
of $4-million (R40-million) to Huderfield Enterprises, a covert company set up
by BAE’s overt agent, Richard Charter, alongside his overt consultancy, Osprey.
According to a contemporary handwritten note obtained by the SFO, senior BAE
executives were concerned about how Charter would repay the money if “anything
goes wrong”.
Earlier a special £100 000 payment (R1,5-million) was made to Arstow on October
5 1999, after the South African government announced the procurement of the Hawk
and Gripen aircraft.
These two payments were approved through an
extraordinary “ex-committee” procedure
that only a handful of BAE’s most senior executives attended.
The Bredenkamp way
The Scorpions affidavit recounts the extraordinary evidence of ex-BAE
executive McDonald *8,
who told the SFO he had personally also
received £5-million from the deal.
“Allan McDonald
told the SFO in interview that when he first met John Bredenkamp and Julien
Pelissier regarding their consultancy arrangements in South Africa, John
Bredenkamp suggested identifying the key decision-makers, with a view to
‘financially incentivising’ them to make the right decision with regard to the
Hawk/Gripen contract.
“Mr McDonald went on to state that during his tenure on this campaign … Mr
Bredenkamp and his team contributed
nothing towards the selection of BAE as preferred bidder
... In this context it should be remembered that Kayswell [the covert company
owned 60% by Bredenkamp] was the highest paid BAE adviser, receiving over
£40-million.”
It appears this negative view of the Bredenkamp organisation’s contribution
filtered back to them. Among documents the SFO summonsed from Pelissier —
Bredenkamp’s right-hand man — was an
indignant memo he sent his boss.
“I find it extraordinary coming from people who had no involvement and therefore
no knowledge whatsoever on the inputs and
activities over a period of four years in a ruthlessly
competitive market, incorporating both
first-world and third-world procedures,
towering egos of all the
key players and continuous rival attempts to undermine our position as
representatives.”
The Scorpions affidavit says the reference to “third-world
procedures” is regarded as a veiled reference to the
payment of bribes.
Chippy Shaik *9
The affidavit says further: “Mr McDonald also told the
SFO that Richard Charter complained to him that Mr Bredenkamp’s team had been
speaking to Chippy Shaik,
chief of acquisitions, about the Hawk without the prior knowledge of the
campaign team on the ground, [and] Mr McDonald also stated that the Bredenkamp
team told him ‘we can get to Chippy Shaik’ and that they knew the contents of
Chippy Shaik’s diary.”
In an interview with the SFO, Bredenkamp distanced himself from any operational
involvement in Kayswell’s activities.
The Scorpions affidavit states: “He accepted that he was the majority
shareholder, but expected the other shareholders to run the business.”
However, this was contradicted by McDonald
*10, who maintained that Bredenkamp was “the boss” of
Kayswell and that Bredenkamp gave progress reports directly to then BAE director
Mike Turner.
Concluding their request for authorisation of the raids, the Scorpions note: “In
view of the huge sums of money involved, there is at the very least a reasonable
suspicion that … Bredenkamp and/or … Pelissier and/ or Charter … used some of
the money they received to induce or reward Fana Hlongwane and/or
certain other officials
involved in the evaluation of the various bids …
“Alternatively, there is at the very least a reasonable suspicion that Fana
Hlongwane may have used some of the huge sums of money he received, either
directly or through the various entities which he controlled, to
induce and/or reward such officials
for such assistance.”