There’s talk of another grand Truth and Reconciliation Commission-style compromise. Once again, the rationale is to save the nation.

Calls for a “TRC II” over our disaster-prone 1999 arms deal have been growing for months. But last weekend, Blade Nzimande, general secretary of the South African Communist Party (SACP), pushed the stakes higher by stating that the trial of Jacob Zuma “has all the potential of taking our country to the brink, and we do not want that”. This amounts to political blackmail.

For who could push SA to the brink but Blade Nzimande and his ultra-Zuma allies? The threat is clear: if you don’t want the country to totter, accept our terms.

After all, despite furious rhetoric about “defending the revolution”, such a TRC II would not be aimed at white politicians and generals who got off scot-free the first time round, or even extracting any recompense from businesses that profited out of apartheid. Instead, it’s payback time — among comrades.

As a result, the major threat to President Thabo Mbeki comes from within his own party. No sooner had Jacob Zuma’s supporters won control of the African National Congress (ANC) than they resolved to investigate the entire arms deal.

Mbeki was their clear target, a brutal reversal of fortune. The hunter had suddenly become the hunted.

Last weekend, Nzimande made this absolutely clear. A political solution to the Zuma situation had to be found, he said — even if that meant a judicial commission into possible arms deal irregularities by senior ANC officials, including Mbeki.

He said the SACP would support a general amnesty for those found guilty, but only after an investigation “to get to the bottom of what really happened”.

Mbeki has again been accused of soliciting R30m from a German consortium, R2m of which is said to have been given to Zuma, the rest to the ANC.

The serious question that hangs over Mbeki is that not only was he in overall charge of this rotten deal, but that he made extraordinary efforts to block all inquiries — except those concerning personal political rivals, principally Zuma.

Now, having gained control of the party machinery, these rivals are after Mbeki.

The arms deal fiasco may also explain Mbeki’s irrational support for his embarrassing minister of health, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang. Why on earth would a wily politician such as Mbeki so staunchly defend such a serial liability at every step?

One reason could be that her husband was until recently the ANC treasurer. Mendi Msimang must know where most arms deal skeletons are buried; and, crucially, whether — and to what extent — the ANC profited from this pact with the devil.

The usual argument put forward for a TRC-style approach (tell the truth and be forgiven) is that so many ANC VIPs are tainted by the arms deal that the country will not be able to move on till the rot is confronted.

In this instance, however, it looks suspiciously like the way is being cleared for a cynical pact: if we’ve both got dirt on each other, there’s only one way out — explicitly, Nzimande’s “political solution”.

Another colossal problem with the idea of an “arms-deal TRC” is that rather than truth and reconciliation, it would be setting a precedent for impunity.

Each new faction that came into power might take the hint that they could safely pilfer the public coffers for a few years; then, when their power wanes, ascendant challengers would offer an amnesty in return for them stepping down. This sets up the potential for a revolving door of kleptocrats to take an allotted turn at the trough before bowing out under pressure.

Today it is fair to ask about the original TRC: how much truth did we actually get in return for how much reconciliation?

In that case, and at that time, it was probably the only and the best option that we had.

But 14 years into democracy, we should expect and call for accountability. Offers of arms deal amnesties now begin to sound like blackmail.

British, French and German firms queued to pay huge, secret “commissions” to secure contracts for costly armaments we clearly didn’t need. But what sanction would these armament companies — the most corrupt partner in this devil’s compact — face if we allowed such a politically motivated amnesty?

Rather like the original TRC, none at all.

So does Nzimande’s suggestion in any way represent a radical, even revolutionary, approach? Bah, humbug! There’s a nasty whiff of gangsterism in the air.

Rostron is a freelance writer.

With acknowledgements to Bryan Rostron and Business Day.