Publication: Cape Times Issued: Date: 2008-08-28 Reporter:

Sinking Navy Needs Billions

 

Publication 

Cape Times
Date

2008-08-28

Web Link

www.capetimes.co.za



The South African Navy wants to spend billions more of taxpayers' money on patrol ships - because the hugely expensive corvettes they bought to monitor the country's seas are not ready or up for the job.

This has emerged from a staff paper commissioned on behalf of Chief of the Navy, Vice-Admiral Johannes Mudimu from the SA National Defence Force's (SANDF) Legal Services Division, which states that the navy "urgently and critically" requires the 85m-long multi-purpose hull patrol boats to replace its aging vessels.

The paper also states that the navy's lack of ability to patrol South African waters has led to the plundering of the country's marine resources.

The document, which the SANDF on Wednesday insisted had no official status, also reveals that the navy expects to face strong resistance to its mooted purchase of the "indispensible" ships, because of the backlash that followed government's previous R30-billion arms deal.

However, it suggests that government could partially fund the purchase of the hulls - the estimated total cost of which runs into billions of rands - with money saved from the "decommissioning of old ships".

The corvettes cost about R6-billion *1. Each hull is expected to cost a minimum R300-million.

Defence spokesperson Sam Mkhwanazi on Wednesday claimed the document, which was sent to Mudimu from SANDF Chief of Legal Services Major General SB Mmono in June this year, was a 2003 "academic study" conducted by a legal services staff member "in his personal capacity".

But the document, which is in possession of Independent Newspapers, includes numerous references to events, papers and conferences which occurred well after 2003.

It also confirms that the document was commissioned on behalf of the chief of the navy.

Mkhwanazi claimed, however, that the reference to "commissioning" might be as a "result of a misunderstanding of that word *2".

Mkhwanazi declined to respond to questions about the document, including its statement that the corvettes and submarines purchased as part of arms deal would only come into service in 2012, six years after the 2006 date given by government for when the corvettes would be "operationally ready".

At the time that the corvettes were purchased, government claimed that they would be used, among other functions, to conduct "regular patrols for the protection of our marine resources against poaching and pollution in our Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ)".

The staff paper now states that the limited budgets experienced by the navy, as a result of the huge arms deal costs, had left it unable to patrol this 1.3 million sq/km *3.

According to the SANDF's legal services department, given the area's size and "massive potential in terms of fish, mineral and fossil wealth, the failure to patrol (one cannot control without patrol) is a departure from international trends verging on dereliction of duty".

This lack of control had led to "the unrestricted plundering of valuable resources like the Patagonian tooth fish", the document stated.

The SANDF's legal department has, however, sought to downplay the navy's responsibility for this situation.

In the document, it insists that the navy has an "indirect responsibility" in conducting air and surface patrols of South African waters and claims it is "incorrect" to state that the defence force has a responsibility to manage the country's marine resources *4 *5.

While admitting that the navy had "historically" conducted patrols of South Africa's seas, the memo stated that downsizing and severe budget cuts - caused largely by the massive arms deal expenditure *6 - had left it a "shadow of its original force structure with a number of 'gaps' apparent in its capacity".

The paper concluded that a possible solution to securing the EEZ, re-building the navy's credibility, and justifying the patrol boat expenditure, lay in establishing a coast guard within the navy.

"The answer therefore logically lies in a redefinition of the role of the navy, especially in peacetime.

"From a political point of view there is no question that politicians, especially after the whole defence arms acquisition furore *6, require the so-called 'bang for buck'.

"The SA Navy, seriously suffering a serious lack of credibility, has yet to pay its way. The SA Navy is convinced that a South African coast guard must be established as a separate flotilla," it stated.

Speaking to Independent Newspapers on Wednesday, Democratic Alliance spokesperson on the arms deal Eddie Trent said the paper's revelations "come as no surprise".

"With each passing month and year it becomes more obvious how misguided and plain incompetent it was of the ANC government to purchase enormously expensive, highly sophisticated weapons without proper forethought."

"They could have done without the submarines *7 and bought cheaper corvettes from Spain *8. We did not need the Gripens *9 or the Hawks *10.

"By saving billions, we could then have had the finances to purchase the vessels that the navy is now requesting."

* This article was originally published on page 1 of The Pretoria News on August 28, 2008

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With acknowledgements to Cape Times.
 

*1       The corvettes cost exactly R6,873 billion all inclusive in 1999 Rands.

The equivalent in 2008 Rands is about R16 billion.


*2      I came here to discuss this matter on a mandate.


*3      The SA Navy simply does not have the budget to fully or properly operate or support its frigates or submarines.

This is a fact, not an argument.


*4      This is correct.

The mission of the SA Navy is to fight and win at sea.

This fight is against those attacking the sovereignty of the Republic of South Africa, not those plundering the Patagonian Toothfishes and Orange Roughys (bless their hearts).


*5      The responsibility to protect the country's marine resources is that of the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism - yes, Kortbroek van Schalkwyk.

Although a complete political dingbat, Kortbroek seems to have been a more effective minister that most of the others, including the minister of defence.


*6      This is the true and ironic result of the SA Government's decision, not the SA Navy's decision, to purchase German MEKO 200AS light frigates and German Type 209 Coastal Submarines.

The SA Navy elected to purchase the Spanish Bazan 590B light frigate and Italian Coastal Submarine.

At least regarding the frigates, the SA Navy would have saved about a billion Rand in 1999 Rands which would have gone a long way in operational and support costs.

But this makes an absolute mockery of the SA Government's stated position, more recently and more often that not propagated by the biggest liar in the country, Pinnoccio Erwin, that the Government actioned the Arms Deal for the sake to the equipment itself, the capability of the SANDF and the strategic requirements of the country.

Just 10 years after the Arms Deal was approved by Cabinet the SANDF is at the weakest it has ever been. Both the SA Navy and SA Air Force are unable to deploy their new equipment and both find themselves in a quandary regarding their national responsibilities. The SA Air Force has only taken delivery of 2 of its new Gripen jet fighters, yet has to shutdown its force of Cheetah C jet fighters 4 years early in order to fund the Gripens which are only going to be arriving in the next 4 years or more. So effectively for at least 4 years the country will not have a proper air defence.

If anyone supports Erwin in saying the Arms Deal was about national defence interests, then they are at best as big a fool as he is, or at worst in on his sweet deal.


*6      He means "the whole defence arms acquisition debacle".


*7      The SA Navy could have done without the submarines.

Indeed it blew one up a few weeks ago and will in any case have to do without S101 for the better part of the next year.


*8      The SA Navy could have and wanted to acquire cheaper corvettes from Spain.

The Cabinet led by Mbeki, Modise and Erwin manipulated the NIP weightings based on the German steel offerings to take the contract away from Bazan and hand it on a plate to the German Frigate Consortium.

On another plate was US$22 million for the ANC and another US$3 million for Chippy Shaik.

On another plate was R5,5 billion for the the German Submarine Consortium.


*9      The SAAF did not need to initiate the purchase of R10 billion of advanced light fighter aircraft in 1997.

Indeed the SAAF had not worked out what it really wanted or needed by then.

At the very earliest, the SAAF needed new advanced light fighter aircraft by 2012, more likely by 2015.

At the very earliest, the SAAF needed to initiate the acquisition of new advanced light fighter aircraft by 2007, more likely by 2010.


*10     The SAAF did need a new lead-in fighter trainer to replace the ageing Impala Mk 1 and Mk 2.

But the SAAF had not yet worked out exactly how to train its fighter pilots by 1997 and therefore did not formally know what it really wanted or needed.

But in any case once the Government short-circuited the SAAF's planning process between September 1997 and June 1998, the SAAF decided very clearly that it preferred the Italian Aermacci MB339 over the British Aerospace Hawk 100.

British Aerospace paid R1,5 billion in commissions to land the Gripen and Hawks deals.

My information is that at this time the SAAF has two Hawks operational and two Gripens in its possession - that's 8 years after we paid British Aerospace and Saab about R3 billion in the first advance payment in April 2000.