The extent of the elite unit's power, and how it wields it, is at the
heart of the debate on whether it should be disbanded, write KARIMA BROWN and
CHANTELLE BENJAMIN
Johannesburg businessman Hugh Glenister's radio advertisement for his
petition to the government for the Scorpions not to be disbanded, appeals to
people who want to keep their families safe in their homes to sign it.
Patrolling the suburbs to arrest suspicious people is not the Scorpions'
responsibility, but the extent of their power and the manner in which they wield
it, lies at the heart of the national debate on whether they should be disbanded
and incorporated within the South African Police Service (SAPS).
The African National Congress (ANC) launched a scathing attack on the Scorpions
this week, saying the unit is staffed with "former apartheid agents" bent on
"bringing down" party leaders .
The ANC conference in December last year passed a resolution calling on the
Directorate of Special Operations (DSO, popularly known as the Scorpions) to be
relocated from the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) to a new unit in the
SAPS dedicated to combating organised crime.
This evoked a storm of protests from opposition parties and civil society groups
who believe the ANC is attempting to close down an effective "law enforcement"
agency that has had the courage to prosecute senior political figures in the new
dispensation.
Yet the future and mandate of the Scorpions has long been a bone of contention,
and predates its case of corruption against ANC president Jacob Zuma and its
probe of suspended national police commissioner Jackie Selebi, also facing
charges of corruption.
ANC secretary-general Gwede Mantashe will not be drawn on whether the party has
conducted an audit on the staff composition of the Scorpions to determine how
many "former apartheid agents" are in their ranks, saying that the party does
not want to be sued.
He does, though, query how the Scorpions handled cases involving ANC leaders,
saying it points to "huge inconsistencies".
"The way they administer justice makes us question their motives. It seems as if
they will plea bargain with people accused of murder and very serious crimes
such as coup plots if they can, by this, bring down ANC leaders."
Mark Thatcher was allowed to make a plea-bargain deal, but so were MPs who
defrauded taxpayers of more than R24m in the Travelgate case; and former ANC
chief whip Tony Yengeni's plea-bargain deal saw him serve less than a year,
enabling his return to Parliament .
Mantashe accepts that SA's negotiated settlement means many former apartheid
functionaries chose to remain in their posts and the ANC had to make its peace
with that reality.
"We know and accept we have to hug hyenas to go forward, but the actions of some
of these people begs many questions," he says.
ANC securocrats argue the unit often uses the services of former apartheid
agents as consultants.
They say Maritz Spaarwater, a senior apartheid intelligence operative, is on
their books. Many prosecutors "who applied unjust laws" in the past are now
leading investigations against ANC people.
The Scorpions often use auditing firms for their complicated cases. The ANC says
there is a "revolving door policy" between the firms and Scorpions, and personal
links that may be questionable.
The relationship between the media and the unit has also irked ANC leaders who
accuse it of "Hollywood-style" probes aimed at causing maximum public
embarrassment of the new regime. The Scorpions' leaks to the media were
condemned by Judge Joos Hefer in the findings of his inquiry into claims that
former NPA boss Bulelani Ngcuka was an apartheid spy.
The Scorpions' off-the-record briefings, alleged attempts to influence public
opinion ahead of the ANC policy conference last year and publication of the
Special Browse Mole report which accused Zuma of plotting against President
Thabo Mbeki with African leaders authored by the Scorpions, have resulted in a
politically loaded environment.
In 2005, Mbeki set up the Khampepe commission to determine whether the unit
should remain housed in the NPA or be moved to the SAPS. Several security
cluster ministers and senior securocrats took opposing views on the issue. The
commission pointed to the reality of serious differences among not only
government officials but ANC leaders.
There is widespread support in the ANC for the view that the formation of the
unit is at odds with constitutional criteria.
Mo Shaik, former deputy intelligence co-ordinator of the National Intelligence
Co-ordinating Committee, asks: "What exactly is the DSO? What principles govern
it? What checks and balances exist? Is the DSO part of SA's 'security services'
as defined in the constitution? Can it be characterised as a 'police service'
since it performs policing functions or is it the investigative and crime
intelligence divisions of the National Prosecuting Authority?"
The drafters of the NPA Act wanted to house prosecutorial, investigative and
intelligence activities in one entity. The unit is allowed to "collect
information" on cases it is investigating, but not to gather intelligence. This
ambiguity has led to it resorting to private consultants and agencies.
Shaik says this places the unit "above" the constitution, opening it up to
political manipulation.
With acknowledgements to Karima Brown, Chantelle Benjamin
and Business
Day.
Asking Mo Shaik his opinion on the DSO is like asking a
nile crocodile its opinion on the opportunistic diet of large reptiles.
Or Chippy Shaik on best practices in the citation of references in dissertations
and theses submitted for higher degrees.
Or Schabir Shaik on the best way to pass High Voltage Engineering.
Or Yunis Shaik of the best way to describe the brothers' apparent opponents when
interviewed on TV.