It is impossible to believe that the
sudden decision to purge Armscor chief executive Sipho Thomo is
unrelated to his stance on the Airbus
A400M heavy-lift aircraft -- though Armscor chairperson Popo Molefe denied the
connection this week.
Government cancelled the A400M contract after Thomo last month
publicly blurted out R47-billion as the
cost of the aircraft in a move that appeared
calculated to kill the deal.
Sure, the disclosure was a bit embarrassing
for Defence Minister Lindiwe Sisulu, who was conducting closed-door negotiations
with Airbus, but if government believed cancelling the A400M was the best
option, why come down on Thomo?
Then again, it's not the first time that opposition to the A400M has threatened
to cost Thomo his job.
In March 2005 the Mail & Guardian reported that Thomo's suspension the
previous month was linked to his refusal to rubber-stamp a detailed "declaration
of intent" on the A400M that was due for signing on March 28 of that year.
Allegations against Thomo were contained in a forensic investigation ordered by
then-secretary of defence January Masilela relating to the export of several
Ratel infantry vehicles and the sale of expired ammunition.
The Armscor board, led by Molefe, appointed its own audit team, which cleared
Thomo.
A legal expert told the M&G at the time that government could not avoid
legal constraints on procurement by dressing it
up as a "programme for the development of skills" -- an explanation
offered at the time by Masilela.
This was the same conclusion reached much later by the auditor general, who
categorised payments towards the A400M programme as
unauthorised expenditure.
But why was there this obsessive insistence on
doing this deal -- and trying to protect it?
The deal was pushed very hard by former public enterprises minister
Alec Erwin *1 as a means of resuscitating
South Africa's aerospace industry, especially Denel, which was already
struggling under the weight of Erwin's previous scheme to "save" the parastatal
through the infamous *2 1999 decision to
buy fighter jets from BAE Systems.
Business Day commentator Tim Cohen
probably got closer to the truth when he wrote last month: "It seems to
me the deal was the indirect consequence of one of South African Airways' many
bungled aircraft-buying sprees, when then-chief executive officer Andre Viljoen
bought 38 Airbus A320s and A340s in 2002.
"After SAA's first hedging disaster, this was pared back and SAA cancelled
orders for 15 Airbus planes in 2004. It seems a deal was struck in which Airbus
allowed SAA to renege on the deal if the contract was swapped for A400Ms."
But a well connected businessman told the
M&G this week that another key factor
regarding the sensitivity of the A400M deal was the
ubiquitous "commissions", which seem to
dog all arms deals. The story goes that there was
a complicated commission arrangement
involving both *3 the civilian Airbus orders (cancelled) and the A400M
(now also cancelled). One wonders if the "agents" are still going to get their
money -- or whether someone is going to cry foul.
Watch this space *4.
With acknowledgements to
Sam Sole, Stefaans Brummer and Mail and Guardian.
*1Corruption and/or irregularity and/or enrichment are wall to wall
and floor to ceiling in the volume that is current South Africa.
But when it comes to the really big ones: Arms Deal, Coega, A400M, Denel, Eskom,
Pinnoccio is always at the hub of things.
In communications engineering we call this correlation, in forensic analysis we
call this - correlation.
Some people, like the Statistician-General, use statistics to lie - but actually
true statistics never lie.
*2Watch this space.
*3Other common denominators in this instance are :
1.Aerosud;
2.Fana Hlongwane.
Of course, there's also the ubiquitous ghost of Joe Modise.
4.Watch it indeed.
And don't be surprised if Yusuf Surtee comes creeping out of the woodpile.