The case against Jacob G Zuma |
Publication |
Mail and Guardian |
Date | 2009-04-03 |
Reporter | Sam Sole |
Web Link | www.mg.co.za |
The blizzard of spin focusing on the alleged political conspiracy against
Jacob Zuma has diverted attention from the facts of the case against him.
If he never faces trial, as now seems very likely, those facts constitute a
powerful matrix of doubt about his conduct and judgment, which the
president-in-waiting has consistently failed to counter. The evidence was led at
Schabir Shaik’s trial and further set out in the most recent December 2007
charge sheet against Zuma and the French arms company Thint. It includes:
The Shaik payments
Zuma’s charge sheet discloses that between October 25 1995 and July 1 2005
Zuma or his family received 783 payments totalling R4 072 499,85 from Shaik or
his companies.
The fact of these payments has never been seriously challenged. The fact of a
long-term regular benefit flowing from Shaik to Zuma is incontrovertible. Were
these payments corruptly received or did Zuma take them innocently, with no
intent to use his influence to benefit Shaik?
Zuma’s intentions
A prosecution would be able to show Shaik had corrupt intentions. The highest
courts have confirmed Judge Hilary Squires determination of Shaik’s guilt and
the logic of Squires’ judgement weighs heavily on Zuma.
Squires noted: “Even if nothing was ever said between them to establish the
mutually beneficial symbiosis that the evidence shows existed, the circumstances
of the commencement and the sustained continuation thereafter of these payments,
can only have generated a sense of obligation in the recipient.
“If Zuma could not repay money, how else could he do so than by providing the
help of his name and political office as and when it was asked for, particularly
in the field of government contracted work, which is what Shaik was hoping to
benefit from. And Shaik must have foreseen and, by inference, did foresee that
if he made these payments, Zuma would respond in that way.”
Zuma’s payback
There is evidence that Zuma used his influence to assist Shaik in ways that
would be difficult to divorce from the payments he received.
In a number of cases he personally met and interceded with Shaik’s prospective
business partners to try to secure Shaik’s interests. The most significant was
Zuma’s meetings in London and Durban with executives of French arms company
Thomson CSF (now Thint), Shaik’s main business partner. Thomson became so
concerned about whether Shaik was politically palatable to the ANC government
that it excluded him from its South African arms deal project.
After the meetings with Zuma the firm reinstated
him.
The Point
In the mid-1990s the Point Waterfront project was seen as a surefire
money-spinner, based on the lead given by Cape Town’s harbour precinct
redevelopment.
The Malaysian company Renong assembled a bid and allocated a 49% black
empowerment share, allegedly on the advice of senior ANC figures.
Shaik mounted a competing bid. In an affidavit obtained for the Shaik trial,
Renong executive David Wilson said Shaik attempted to intimidate him into a
joint bid, and when that failed, tried to use Zuma to muscle in on Renong’s
empowerment allocation.
Shaik arranged a meeting with Zuma and Wilson at Shaik’s Durban apartment.
According to Wilson, Zuma “was clearly uncomfortable ... and I gained the clear
impression from his demeanour, the substance of the meeting and the manner in
which it proceeded that he was there under sufferance.
He spoke in a guarded fashion and appeared to be anxious to get the meeting over
…
“Throughout the discussion, Mr Schabir Shaik would introduce the topics
discussed, whereupon Mr Zuma would confirm and expand upon what Mr Shaik had
said. He said that he was not happy with the persons nominated to represent the
empowerment interests in the Point Development, although he offered no
explanation for this.
“He proposed that Mr Schabir Shaik should be involved in the project and
stressed repeatedly that he would be a good partner for the job. It became
increasingly clear that Mr Jacob Zuma was acting as if Mr Schabir Shaik had some
sort of hold over him.
“At one point Mr Jacob Zuma made mention of the support and assistance he had
received from Mr Schabir Shaik. I gained the strong impression that this support
and assistance was of a financial nature.”
The mercenary Mr Zuma
Other instances clearly show Zuma was not simply Shaik’s puppet.
Witnesses at the Shaik trial testified about Shaik’s recurring irritation how
Zuma spent money without caring where it would come from. The most significant
example was Zuma’s Nkandla homestead, built in 2000 -- a luxury he could not
afford. He contracted builder Eric Malengret at a price of R2,4-million (later
reduced by R1-million), without consulting Shaik, his financial adviser.
When Shaik found out, Malengret had already completed construction worth R226
000 and received R140 000 in progress payments from other Zuma benefactors.
According to Malegret’s evidence, Shaik expressed frustration with Zuma’s
conduct and asked him if Zuma thought “money grew on trees”.
Shaik told Malengret, to stop constuction work -- but Zuma countermanded this.
The R500 000
Payment for the Nkandla homestead was, according to the prosecution, bound
up with the notorious “encrypted fax” drawn up by Thomson CSF executive Alain
Thetard.
The fax reflected Thetard’s report of his meeting with Shaik and Zuma in Durban
in March 2000 -- the month Zuma commissioned architects to design his homestead.
According to the fax, Shaik had indicated to Thetard that Zuma was requesting
R500 000 a year in return for Zuma’s protection in the looming investigation of
the arms deal -- and his support for future Thomson projects.
Zuma denied the meeting to Parliament, while Shaik told his trial the meeting
did happen, but was about a Thomson donation to the Jacob Zuma Education Trust.
The evidence was enough to convict Shaik.
With acknowledgements to Sam Sole and
Mail and Guardian.