Publication: Cape Argus Issued: Date: 2009-08-02 Reporter:

SA army is 'unravelling'

 

Publication 

Cape Argus

Date

2009-08-02

Web Link

www.capeargus.co.za



The SA National Defence Force is in an "appalling " state of readiness. It could not handle much beyond the most trivial crisis, experts and politicians say.

Despite the purchase of big-ticket items in the controversial arms deal, the defence force is "unravelling" rapidly *1.

They blame ageing equipment, a skills shortage and the lack of a budget to match the increasing demands being made on the force.

"Defence Minister Lindiwe Sisulu has expressed happiness with the readiness of the defence force," says Jane's Defence Weekly Southern Africa correspondent Helmoed-Romer Heitman.

"The reality is that the state of readiness is appalling: The SANDF is in no way capable of handling anything but the most minor crisis."

Heitman says the present SANDF could not mount an effective intervention to stabilise Zimbabwe or rescue its peacekeeping troops in places such as Darfur.

It would struggle to patrol the Mozambique Channel if piracy moved south and hit our shipping directly.

"It lacks the aircraft and ships to patrol our waters effectively," he says.

It also lacks the troops to take over border security from the police, as Sisulu has suggested it should.

Henri Boshoff of the Institute of Security Studies in Pretoria, a retired officer, agrees the defence force "would struggle to execute some simple operations".

He adds that it cannot even deploy a cohesive battalion but must deploy composite units, because too many of the soldiers are "over-age and medically unfit". And budget cuts have had a severe effect on, for instance, firearms training.

He agrees with retired Brigadier-General George Kruys of the University of Pretoria that a high proportion of vehicles deployed for peace support operations are unserviceable.

"The roots of the problem are multiple *3," says Heitman. "Most obvious is the mismatch between defence funding and what is demanded of the defence force.

"The SANDF is doing an 18-battalion job with an 11-battalion army *4. That cannot be sustained."

Professor Renfrew Christie, dean of research at the University of the Western Cape, believes that "the secretariat and the generals have self-censored the requirements of the defence force.

"The result is that the real needs have not been communicated to the Treasury. They should be saying what they really need to do the job."

Another root cause of the problem is "the overdone defence cuts after 1989, which created a massive bow wave of obsolescence *5 that threatens to overwhelm the army in particular", says Heitman.

He also blames the wasted cost of "re-engineering" the defence force according to business principles, which must now be undone.

And he fingers "the unwillingness to enforce discipline or demand integrity, even from senior officers".

The result, says Heitman, is a defence force "that is unravelling, and that will unravel ever more quickly as equipment runs out of useful life, as pilots leave for lack of flying and technical personnel for better salaries, and as experienced officers retire and good junior officers leave in disgust".

But not all the news is bad *4, he says. SA troops have performed well in Burundi, the Central African Republic, Darfur and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The government's bold decision to deploy troops in Burundi 10 years ago and "the professional conduct of our troops" stabilised the country.

He says emerging young officers and special forces in particular are keen, properly trained and want to do the job professionally.

But he warns that the defence force must move quickly to keep them.

Despite the huge controversy around the arms deal, Heitman says "the actual equipment is good, suited to our requirements and was acquired on excellent terms.

"The four frigates, in particular, were a stunning bargain *6 compared with what other navies paid for similar ships in the same period."

Despite the good news, the defence force "is running on empty".

The government must urgently review what it wants the defence force to do and the force must then set out clearly what it requires to do its job properly.

"The government must either provide adequate funding or cut back the demands it makes of the defence force," says Heitman.

DA shadow minister of defence David Maynier says that if it does not do that, the country will be left with "soldiers without vehicles, ships without sailors, planes without pilots, and military hospitals without doctors".
 

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This article was originally published on page 1 of The Sunday Tribune on August 02, 2009

With acknowledgements to Cape Argus.



*1       This is untrue.

Because of the purchase of big-ticket items in the controversial arms deal, the defence force is unravelling rapidly.

That and the absolute lack of institutional discipline, self discipline, ethics, morals, brainpower and money, inter alia.


2.      Yet the SA Navy has 7 brand new frigates and submarines costing R30 billion in today's money values.

And the SA Air Force has nearly 50 brand new jet aircraft costing R45 billion in today's money values.

And the SAAF has another R30 billion "invested" in 12 or so brand new jet airlighters.

All the time is has nearly 38 quite useable Cheetah C jet fights and 12 recently furbished C-130 Hercules turboprop airlifters.

Yet the SAAF has known for more than 25 years that it need a replacement for its maritime patrol aircraft.

We at UEC Projects were in the mid to end 1980s working on a maritime patrol aircraft which got canned.

Why did it get canned?

Because the SAAF's money had to go elsewhere - there where they didn't want it to go - new jet fighters.

Simply said, the SAAF were neither ready for new jet fighters, couldn't afford them and didn't want the Gripen.

The SAAF didn't need a replacement for the Impala jet trainers under its newly adopted and later Modise-reversed two-tier fighter training system and clearly stated that if it had to have new jet trainers, then it wanted the Aermacchi MB339 and not the British Aerospace Hawk 100.


*3      The roots of the problem are obvious and simple :
*4      Nonsense.

The SANDF is doing a one company job (one company of 100 men to patrol our borders) with an 18-battalion army.

It is not our SA Army's job to do anything in Burundi, the Central African Republic, Darfur and the Democratic Republic of Congo.


*5      What about the bow wave of obsolescence of ordering the Gripens in 1998 and only getting them delivered between 2008 and 2015.

The Gripens that we ordered have already been superseded.

The new jet fighters that the SAAF will need in the 2015 to 2020 timeframe should be ordered in 2012 following a proper user requirement statement and project study starting in 2008 to 2010.


*6      Helmoed never fails to not disappoint on this abject nonsense.

The SAN's and DoD's own Evaluation Report in 1998 recommends the Spanish Bazan 590B frigate rather than the German Blohm+Voss MEKO200SA frigate, based on the pre-ordained military-cost index.

So if the MEKO 200SA was a stunning bargain then the 590B was by dint of logic and even more stunning bargain.

Indeed opting for the Bazan offering would have saved the SAN about R1,3 billion in 1998 Rands of acquisition costs and at least another few billion Rand since then with problems experienced with the MEKOs (serious problems are still ongoing).

But that was in 1998.

What a stunning price it actually was from the European South African Corvette Consortium, consisting of Blohm+Voss, TRT, HDW, Thomson-CSF Navale and ADS, was an initial quote for R6,001 billion in May 1008 and a final price of R6,873 billion in December 1999, after more than a year of haggling over price.

During this time, despite the price of the combat suite increasing from R1,470 billion to R2,599 billion, the functionality of the combat suite decreased by about half.

The quantities of nearly all the equipment were reduced by half (anti-ship missiles, ant-air missiles, chaff rocket launchers, tracking, radars, etc. etc.). Some equipment such as torpedoes and certain command and control elements disappeared altogether.

Typically the SAN got about 50% of what it wanted (and it had accurately worked out and allocated price-wise as initial ceiling budget) for anot double the price.

That bang-for-buck at around 25%

A stunning deal indeed.

The question is why?

The answer is because Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma, Joe Modise, Chippy Shaik, et al all had their hands deep in the outstretched cookie jars of Thyssen Rheinstahl Technick and Thomson-CSF.

Those cookie jars *7, although offered by TRT and Thomson-CSF, were of course soon to be replenished by the South African Taxpayer for TRT and Thomson-CSF to take forward to their next victims.

A stunning deal indeed.


*7      As often as not also termed as porcine troughs.

And currently there's alot of gobbling at the GBADS, A400M troughs and alot more to come with the inshore patrol vessels, offshore patrol vessels, hydrographic research vessel and helicopter landing vessels acquisition programmes.

I suppose it's time to get on my Mr Creosote outfit and my barf bucket.

It's a deal.