The struggle for power between Mbeki and Zuma has tainted security structures, writes Moshoeshoe Monare, Group Political Editor

A day after Jacob Zuma was elected ANC president in 2007, SACP leader Blade Nzimande called for a clean-up of security structures. This call was an interesting irony, and some dismissed it as a triumphalist purge by Polokwane victors.

It was ironic that a Zuma man was concerned about the political contamination of the security structures. Now, just more than a year later, Zuma's defence team appear to have "abused" the same structures to try to get him off the hook

The word "abused" is used cautiously, on the assumption that they are in possession of tapes at the centre of the pending decision to charge, or not to charge, Zuma.

But it was wrong to dismiss Nzimande's call as a purge because, apart from the controversial tapes, security structures - from the prosecution to intelligence and the police - have been tainted by the ANC's succession battle.

So far, intelligence sources claim the recordings were found by accident during the turf battle between the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and the Scorpions' top officials.

A senior official associated with the Scorpions admitted this week that "we have been aware that we are being listened to". By whom? "NIA."

Another intelligence source, close to the NIA, said Crime Intelligence "guys" were trailing the Scorpions during a "lawful, legitimate operation" and stumbled across this communication.

These conspiracies aside, the security structures are deep in the partisan quagmire.

Communications between Luthuli House and some rogue officers in Musanda - a Pretoria farm housing the NIA, the SA Secret Service and other intelligence centres - are heavily polarised along succession loyalty lines, and are "taking a post-Polokwane shape", according to a concerned security chief.

Former president Thabo Mbeki was also accused of abusing state resources, mainly because he wrongly accepted information from one side, sidelining others in the process.

He has left the security establishment in disgrace, fighting covert wars against each other while the country is terrorised by crime.

The politicisation of security structures is not a recent phenomenon.

"Intelligence agents sympathetic to Zuma employed illegal means to gather information on this circle, hence the panic and the intervention of the executive this week in the row," this correspondent wrote in The Sunday Independent after two spies were suspended following a botched surveillance of businessman Saki Macozoma in the spring of 2005.

"It shouts hypocrisy that the Zuma camp - which has cried foul over abuse of state resources - is equally engaged in the covert information warfare for his survival."

When Zuma argued in 2006 at a national executive committee meeting that there was a political conspiracy against him, Kgalema Motlanthe, then the ANC secretary-general, implied that Zuma, who has a background in spying, was still gathering intelligence. Gathering from where?

The power struggle between Mbeki and Zuma politicised intelligence structures. Unfortunately, this has affected crime-fighting efforts, undermined prosecution and compromised intelligence-gathering, and, at times, threatened national security and brought into question the legitimacy of some of these institutions.

Nearly every security structure has been sucked into the presidential crisis, the succession battle or Zuma's prosecution.

The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA): There has been murky prosecution of political cases, with its heads - from Bulelani Ngcuka to Vusi Pikoli and Mokotedi Mpshe - accused of being politically influenced or motivated. The tape recordings, if true, will legitimise these claims and undermine the NPA's integrity.

The Scorpions: The unit, whose disbandment caused an uproar, has been accused of illegally gathering intelligence. For some, its use of private companies and some old-order elements made it suspect, with Zuma supporters crying political conspiracy.

The NIA: The agency was accused of covert partisan operations, leading to the dismissal of its former boss, Billy Masetlha. Its current director-general, Manala Manzini, was also embroiled in the ugly battle between the NPA and the police during the criminal investigation of National Police Commissioner Jackie Selebi. Crime suspect Glenn Agliotti alleges Manzini was present when he was "coerced" into exonerating Selebi. One former security chief has described the NIA as "rotten", pointing to the fact that its covert offices were once broken into. Others credit Manzini for stabilising it.

The police: Selebi is on special leave pending criminal prosecution, at the heart of which is the fierce turf battle with the NPA, specifically the Scorpions. However, his friendship with Mbeki precipitated the political perceptions about the police force's standing in the succession battle. Zuma sympathisers accused Selebi of refusing to investigate the so-called hoax e-mails that were purportedly aimed at discrediting him.

Ministry of Intelligence: Former minister Ronnie Kasrils was accused by some in the ANC of being involved in the plot against Zuma. He denied this, but he convinced Mbeki to fire Masetlha. Intelligence Minister Siyabonga Cwele is one of the security chiefs close to Zuma;

Private intelligence outfits: When DA leader Helen Zille's communications were intercepted, Kasrils told journalists last year that suspicion would fall on the NIA, pointing a finger to private outfits. There are rumours of spy outfits in KwaZulu-Natal helping to fight the succession and Zuma's legal battles. This could not be confirmed independently.

The inspector-general: The integrity of Zolile Ngcakani was brought into question when he declared that the so-called hoax e-mails were fake even before concluding his investigations. The chief director of the Office of the Inspector-General, Imtiaz Fazel, wants tighter regulation of security structures.

This newspaper described the situation in January last year as "Mbeki's security council implosion", meaning the new administration will find this community in ruins unless its heeds Nzimande's call for an overhaul.

At least one Security Ministry official has indicated that there will be "a sweep" to clean up these structures.

He explained that they would make sure the new people were not tainted by the current political battles - a tough task, given the extent of the contamination.

"We will ensure a stringent screening; we will want to know the colour of their underwear," the official said, referring to the vetting of new security chiefs.

At least the new administration can use current vacancies to make a fresh start - assuming the process will not be compromised because of new loyalties,.

This is the situation at the moment: the police commissioner is in an acting position; Pikoli was fired as prosecutions head pending his legal challenge; the NIA has had three heads in four years; someone is needed to head the unit that will replace the Scorpions; and Crime Intelligence is still without a boss after Ray Lala was redeployed.

There have been many reports and commissions on the stability and operations of security agencies: the Pikoli Commission probed the integration of intelligence agencies in the late 1990s; the Moerane Commission probed the transformation of military intelligence, also in the late 1990s; the Khampepe Commission looked at the location of the Scorpions; and the Ginwala Inquiry looked at Pikoli's fitness to hold office. There have also been the Gilder report and Mathews Commission on the conduct of the intelligence services.

However, political interference and the abuse of state organs are debated only during crises, without sober analysis and introspection.

Without such sober analysis, there would be a "further breakdown of professionalism", said one member of the National Security Council.

"We must be cautious of the dangers of political loyalty by security structures. Such (loyalty) also weakens and (can) collapse the state and these structures," he added.

Former intelligence co-ordinator Barry Gilder once said the intelligence officers should be loyal to and serve the government of the day, irrespective of the ruling party or incumbents.

But one security chief countered: "The loyalty should be to the constitution, as governments can be bad. Look at the apartheid government."

The day Zuma is elected president of the country - if the ANC wins the elections - will Nzimande remind him to clean up the services, or will the new head of state expect Gilder-like loyalty?