The conviction of former police commissioner Jackie Selebi
has correctly been heralded as another example of the
independence of the South African judiciary. It has also been
suggested that it places South African democracy in a good light
-- the willingness to prosecute the highest-ranking police
officer who had been an influential cadre of the ruling party is
illustrative of a governmental commitment to the principle of
accountability to legality.
That claim is again correct but it hardly tells the complete
picture of the Selebi saga. Consider the essential facts:
In February 2007 the Scorpions informed the then national
director of public prosecutions, Vusi Pikoli, that they needed
information from the South African police regarding the murder
of Brett Kebble. They told Pikoli that they suspected that Glenn
Agliotti might have been involved in the Kebble murder. Agliotti
had close links with Selebi, who had infamously said that
Agliotti was his "friend, finish and klaar".
The police, unsurprisingly, were not cooperating with the
Scorpions in their investigation. Pikoli turned to the then
minister of justice, Brigitte Mabandla, and her superior,
then-president Thabo Mbeki, but seemingly to no avail. In May
2007 Pikoli informed Mbeki that the National Prosecuting
Authority (NPA) would be compelled to acquire search-and-seizure
warrants if Selebi continued to ensure an uncooperative police
response.
By September 2007 the NPA obtained the necessary warrants
against Selebi. When Pikoli informed Mbeki, the president
instructed Mabandla to intervene, which she did by writing to
Pikoli, instructing him not to proceed until she was satisfied
that there was sufficient evidence to justify the execution of
the warrants. Pikoli insisted on proceeding and Mabandla then
called for him to resign. When he refused, Mbeki suspended him
on the basis that the relationship between "the minister and the
NPA head had broken down irretrievably".
At this point, enter Mokotedi Mpshe, whom Mbeki appointed as
acting head of the NPA. Of course, Mbeki could not fire Pikoli;
even his legal advisers knew that. So he appointed the Ginwala
Commission to inquire whether Pikoli was still fit to hold
office. Although Ginwala found, in December 2008, that most of
the allegations against Pikoli were unfounded, she somehow held
that Pikoli should have acceded to a request from Mbeki that he
be given two weeks to create the enabling environment for Pikoli
to proceed -- whatever that might have meant. Ginwala speculated
that this reason may have had something to do with national
security and hence Pikoli's insistence on proceeding revealed an
insensitivity to these key concerns. On this tenuous basis,
Mbeki's successor, Kgalema Motlanthe, refused to reinstate
Pikoli as head of the NPA.
Thanks to the judgment of Judge Meyer Joffe, we now know that
Pikoli, at the very least, had good grounds to suspect that the
police commissioner was a crook who enjoyed corrupt
relationships, inter alia with Agliotti. Let's give Mbeki the
benefit of the doubt: he genuinely did not believe what Pikoli
had told him about Selebi's corruption. The point is that an
independent NPA exists to do its job and if, in its professional
view, there were sound grounds for proceeding against a corrupt
police chief, the president should avoid political interference.
And there was at the time more than enough evidence to proceed
against Selebi. This is not a case of relying exclusively on the
hindsight of the judgment of Judge Joffe -- even the timid Mpshe
realised, upon assuming office, that the evidence against Selebi
was compelling, resulting in charges for corruption and
obstructing the ends of justice.
Viewed in this factual context, the Selebi saga shows that gross
political interference took place at the highest echelons of
state power, seemingly to protect a corrupt police commissioner.
Instead of accepting the constitutionally mandated independent
exercise of the NPA's power to prosecute, Mbeki interfered and
removed an NPA chief who was doing his job. And for what? To
protect a man who has now been proved beyond reasonable doubt to
be a corrupt police commissioner.
Judge Chris Nicholson, who was so brutally rebuked by the
Supreme Court of Appeal, may well now have history on his side.
Although his judgment in the Zuma case was incorrect in its
application of the rules of evidence and procedure, the later
revelations of the conversations of Leonard McCarthy showed
that, although evidentially wrong, his apprehensions of
political interference have been proved to be correct.
This apprehension is only compounded when viewed in the context
of the Selebi trial. Ironically, Pikoli was replaced by Mpshe,
who eventually stopped the Zuma prosecution. Tellingly, Pikoli
has stated that he would not have dropped the charges, leaving
one to wonder what might have been if Pikoli, rather than Mpshe,
was in office. Mpshe was then replaced by Menzi Simelane,
himself a key player in Mabandla's action against Pikoli.
Simelane has not only ensured the termination of the Scorpions
but also appears to promise a more executive-minded and
compliant NPA.
The NPA's huge challenge is to reconstitute itself fully as the
independent body it was intended to be in terms of the
Constitution. We now have overwhelming evidence that the NPA was
used against Mbeki's political opponents and to protect his
political allies, however corrupt. This is sufficiently
compelling that we are owed an explanation of their motives from
those who continue to revise and promote the legacy of Mbeki.
With acknowledgements to
Serjeant At The Bar and Mail and Guardian.
Mbeki should go to jail and Zuma
should go to jail.
Next of the list after Chief Chacma Selebi is new Chief Chacma
Cele.
The latest crimes of the chef chacmas is to arrange a R500
million deal for a friend and then arrest the journalist who
wrote about it.
The another time something similar happened was when the
previous chief chacma arrange for another main whitsleblower
Bheki Jacobs to be unlawfully arrested in Cape Town, flown to
Pretoria in the middle of the night in a charted VIP jet and
then incarcerated for more than a week, initially at least
without his chronic illness medication.
Incidentally this private jet was probably owned by that chief
chacma's friend, Brett Kebble.
But within a couple of years Bheki Jacobs was dead in his middle
forties. Either he died after being deprived of his chronic
illness medication, or he was poisoned in prison.
MZ needs to watch not only his back but his stomach.
My solution is that when chacma's become rogue, eliminate them.
With my own problem chacmas I use a .223 or sometimes a .308.
These are very effective. I even have a permit.
For these other chacmas the full force of the law is
appropriate.
Rogue chacmas often employ the services of a more juvenile
chacma.
A good start would be to get rid of Chacma Simelane.
In the meantime, I wonder how that other juvenile chacma Leonard
McCarthy is doing in New York.
And for that matter, how juvenile chacmas Shauket Fakie CA(SA),
Selby Baqwa SC and Bulelani Ngcuka BNonJuris are doing in the
next stages of their fraudulent lives.
And for that matter, how juvenile chacma Mokotedi Mpshe is doing
in the next stages of his fraudulent life.
The NPA certainly has had a long line of these monkey genes,
only interrupted by Vusi Pikoli who got himself very quickly
fired when he demonstrated his sapiens genes.
But it's telling to note who appointed all these baboons in the
first place.