SANDF can earn its keep and assist in development |
Publication |
Business Day |
Date | 2013-05-30 |
Reporter |
Helmoed Römer Heitman |
Web Link | www.bday.co.za |
In Court: Members of the South African National Defence Force waiting for
their trial about a wages protest in 2009 to begin at Heidelberg
military base, earlier this month
Picture: Puxley Makgatho
DEFENCE spending is a necessary evil, a grudge purchase much like burglar
bars and insurance premiums. But there are ways to reduce the negative
economic effects of defence spending in the longer run and to steer portions
of defence spending to support development goals.
One possibility that could have an immediate effect on many small
communities would be to exempt the South African National Defence Force (SANDF)
from the centralised purchasing dictated by the State Tender Board and its
"term contracts".
For instance, why should an infantry unit in Phalaborwa not be able to buy
its vegetables from emerging farmers in its immediate vicinity, who are
struggling to find markets, rather than from a wholesaler in the
Johannesburg area?
That would be more efficient for the unit and would give the local farmers a
boost.
Similarly, why should SANDF units all purchase their diesel fuel from a
single company in a province far from where most units are located?
Other immediate potential lies in making use of SANDF assets and
capabilities to help further development in rural areas. The available
potential is not as great as some might like to think underfunding has
caused its damage here too but there are some possibilities to consider.
Army engineers, for instance, have a range of skills and equipment that
would be useful to help small rural communities to deal with problems such
as damaged bridges, broken borehole pumps and washed-away sections of road.
The engineers need to practise their skills and their equipment does not
improve by standing in a war reserve park. Similarly, South African Military
Health Service personnel can assist in rural clinics and medical drives in
truly outlying areas, while at the same time developing their experience
base and skills. Some of this is already being done but we could be doing
more if this was policy, and if the National Treasury could be persuaded to
provide the small amount of additional funding needed to, for instance, pay
for fuel to move a bulldozer to where it is needed, or to deploy medical
teams by helicopter or light aircraft where road access is difficult, which
would also give the South African Air Force valuable additional flying hours
for its aircrews. Even fighter units have a potential role: a thermal
imaging reconnaissance pod can be a valuable tool to support agricultural
planning and monitor bush-fire and flood lines; and, in the latter case, to
do so quickly and provide real-time information to emergency services.
Looking somewhat further ahead, one could also consider developing a basing
policy that is primarily focused on military need and efficiency, but
secondarily focused on placing units in areas where there is serious
underemployment. Combine such a basing policy with one of decentralised
procurement and you have a major cash-flow injection for small rural towns.
A major military base not only consumes a lot of food that could be
purchased locally, but also a range of other ordinary civilian goods, from
cleaning materials to stationery, all of which could be purchased from local
suppliers. A major base also requires a range of services that could be
provided by local firms, from minor construction work, electrical
installations and plumbing to servicing and repairing its ordinary bakkies,
cars and trucks.
And, of course, the soldiers and their families will be spending some of
their salaries in their new home town.
Over time, a locally focused recruiting policy could also be implemented to
draw people from the surrounding community into the unit, some of them
serving their period of duty in the unit itself, others perhaps being posted
elsewhere and finding new opportunities there once their service has been
completed.
The SANDF has again been given responsibility for border protection, with
the bulk of the burden falling on the South African Army, which will have to
establish new units if it is to perform this task effectively.
This presents an opportunity to develop a new basing policy as outlined
here, with careful planning enabling the army to establish battalion and
company bases where they will facilitate optimal border patrols but also
support impoverished rural communities.
Also looking further forward, the SANDF could work with other departments to
develop a short-service system that combines regular and reserve service
with vocational training; perhaps a 10-year contract comprising eight years’
service in a regular unit, the last four in a border patrol unit with a duty
schedule that facilitates part-time vocational training, and two years in
the active reserve while undergoing full-time vocational training to qualify
in any particular trade.
That would give the army, in particular, the large number of soldiers and
junior noncommissioned officers it needs, without the problem of not having
promotion posts for them, and give those short-service soldiers a proper
career once their service period has been completed.
A similar system could combine short service with a university bursary, to
provide the junior officers the military needs but for most of whom there
are no regular posts beyond the rank of first lieutenant or perhaps captain.
Again, the military would have the junior officers it needs and those young
people could obtain a tertiary education they might otherwise not be able to
afford. While neither of these examples shows any immediate economic
benefit, they would serve to develop for South Africa the artisans and
graduates that we will need for our future economy, many of them from
backgrounds that would not otherwise have enabled them to obtain that
training or that education.
There are good, working examples of all of these suggestions to be found in
countries such as Brazil, Indonesia and Pakistan, among others.
And it is not just in developing countries that it is common to make use of
military capabilities outside their primary functions. In Germany, it is
often army helicopters with medical corps teams that are pre-positioned
along the main routes during holiday seasons, and armoured reconnaissance
vehicles use their thermal imaging sights to look for soft spots in
riverside dikes when rivers are in heavy flood.
There are similar examples to be found all over the developed world.
Similarly, the US Reserve Officer Training Corps provides university
bursaries in return for specified periods of regular military service, and
also provides funding for tertiary education after periods of voluntary
reserve service. Again, there are similar examples to be found in several
countries in Europe.
No worthwhile defence force is cheap, and the military is certainly no
alternative to either the relevant government departments or to private
enterprise. But a developing country, which is what South Africa is, must
make the most of its assets. Making intelligent use of the various
"collateral" capabilities of the military will not only reduce the sting
when paying the bill, but will support wider national development goals.
And, as a final thought, when we do buy equipment, why can we not phase
acquisitions to ensure that the quantities justify, and timing allows, local
development and manufacture where that is technologically a practicable
option?
• Heitman is a defence analyst.
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With acknowledgement to Helmoed Römer Heitman and Business Day.
It's not that
there isn't enough money to buy a cost-effective defence force.
There's plenty in this bountiful land.
It's just that it is being stolen in vast quantities from the people.
30% of GDP is disappearing out of the fiscus due to corruption that makes
the crime of Apartheid look petty.
RSA GDP is R1 000 000 000 000 or R1 000 billion.
30% of that is R300 billion.
The defence force only costs R42 billion per year (and much of that is
wasted in any case).
This country needs to get corruption under control.
But unfortunately, like the fish, it's in the head.
And it certainly does not suit the main fish for the units to be buying
their vegetables locally.