Seriti ‘likely to arrive at same conclusion as Fakie in inquiry’ |
Publication |
Business Day |
Date | 2013-10-21 |
Reporter |
Hopewell Radebe |
Web Link | www.bday.co.za |
Auditor-General Terence Nombembe
Picture: Puxley Makgatho
DEPARTING Auditor-General Terence Nombembe
has defended the outcome of the first
investigation into the arms deal that was
undertaken by his predecessor, Shauket Fakie,
saying the Seriti commission of inquiry is
likely to come to the same conclusion.
Mr Nombembe was replying to questions by
reporters at the University of the
Witwatersrand on
Friday*1 during an event to observe
Black Wednesday
(October 19 1977), when the former apartheid
regime banned some newspapers and arrested
journalists. His comments came as the Seriti
commission’s public hearings resume today
after they were postponed last week to give
Lawyers for Human Rights time to prepare for
the cross-examination of Armscor’s Rob
Vermeulen.
The rights body is representing Paul Holden
and Hennie van Vuuren, authors of The Devil
in the Detail: How the Arms Deal Changed
Everything, and Andrew Feinstein, a former
African National Congress (ANC) MP and
author of two books After the Party: A
Personal and Political Journey Inside the
ANC, and The Shadow World: Inside the Global
Arms Trade.
Mr Nombembe said it was unfortunate that the
Joint Investigation Team Arms Deal Report,
compiled by Mr Fakie, then public protector
Selby Baqwa and former national director of
public prosecutions Bulelani Ngcuka, was
queried and
discredited the way it was.
During a hearing by the standing committee
on public accounts, Mr Fakie was questioned
on claims that the final report of the
inquiry into the arms deal had been
"heavily edited" and "doctored".
In a special report tabled in parliament in
2000*2, Mr Fakie had said his audit into the
prime contracts of the arms deal had
revealed several material deviations from
generally accepted practices.
"Mr Fakie tried to explain the
procedures of the auditor-general’s office
when conducting its business and then draws
its independent conclusion but no one
listened … (the report) remains a credible
document that would soon be proven as such
because the (Seriti) commission will come to
the same conclusion," Mr Nombembe said.
He said his office had responded to the
commission’s inquiries and had submitted all
the information it required long before the
public hearings started.
Also attending Friday’s commemoration was
former intelligence minister Ronnie Kasrils.
He urged journalists to continue campaigning
against the enactment of the "secrecy bill",
saying that no South African should trust
anything going on within the state security
apparatus until it had been overhauled.
"We have a lot to worry about considering
the calibre of people that the president
appointed since taking office to administer
the security services of the country," he
said.
Mr Kasrils took the Zuma administration to
task for shelving the Matthews report
officially known as the Ministerial Review
Commission on Intelligence on reforming
the functions of the intelligence services.
It made recommendations on transforming the
intelligence agencies and state security.
Its recommendations have not been
implemented, because as it was tabled, Mr
Kasrils and several other ministers left the
government after former president Thabo
Mbeki was removed from office.
Mr Kasrils called for the report to be
revisited and for the state security
establishment to be transformed to include
proper accounting procedures and for checks
and balances to be properly structured
before the "secrecy bill" becomes law.
Otherwise the office of the auditor-general
would be unable to audit the intelligence
units properly, he said.
Mr Nombembe bemoaned South Africa’s high
levels of tolerance for audit disclaimers
against most municipalities and some
departments, saying due to the lack of
public outcry and activism the government
was not dealing decisively with guilty
parties. He said audit disclaimers should
never be tolerated, and pressure should be
placed on institutions such as Parliament to
ensure serious consequences for people who
could not explain expenditures to auditors.
"We should not have a situation whereby
there is no knowledge of where money was
spent by any government entity or
departments," Mr Nombembe said.
Deputy auditor-general Kimi Makwetu is to
replace Mr Nombembe later this year.
With acknowledgement to Hopewell Radebe and Business Day.
Terence Nombembe did a fairly good job since
Stooge Shauket Fakie CA(SA) vacated this hot
spot.
Then he cocks up the whole things in a
couple of seconds of ANC arse-licking
madness at the University of the
Witwatersrand on Black Friday.
It is true that the investigators of the
Office of the Auditor-General did a
reasonably good job with their Arms Deal
Audit Report.
But that one was dated 2001-10-04 and a
distant and partial draft of the final JIT
Report.
The final JIT Report was dated 2001-11-14
and completely rewritten by Advocates Lionel
van Tonder and Christoffel Fourie, probably
with a whole lot of guidance in disassembly
and reassembly by one Tony Heard of the GCIS
and previously editor of esteemed newspapers
like the Cape Times, but fell on lean
financial times. This was after the three
agency draft dated 2001-10-04 were sent to
MINCOM and discussed at a meeting dated
2001-10-17.
The changing of the report reduced the
length of the combined reports from about
950 pages to 384 pages (there may well have
been one longer draft of the AG's report of
some 1 200 pages which has been hidden from
me.
The final report combined the extremely weak
Public Protector's Report which effectively
watered down the final joint product to just
about nothing - which is exactly what Mbeki
et al wanted and told the JIT to do.
If Terence Nombembe told his listeners on
Black Friday that the Arms Deal Audit
Report.dated 2001-10-04 was worth the more
than a year and some R15 million (in 2001
Rands) of taxpayer's money, then I would
recommended to them that they believe him.
Instead in the six weeks between the final
AG draft and the final JIT Report allowed
Shauket Fakie at the behest of Mbeki and his
MINCOM to substantially change the report in
every single way - from a fully footnoted
and cross-referenced forensic audit report
with clear and hard-hitting findings of
wrong doing to a urine sodden douche rag.
Fakie and Baqwa, with Ngcuka listening, told
parliament on more than one occasion that
the draft report was subject to change
concerning only matters of national
strategic security, of which there were
none, and some editing to make the report
more user friendly.
This is simple perjury.
They removed the draft key findings of
irregular involvement by the likes of Joe
Modise and insetted one that the Government
and in paricular MINCOM and Cabinet were
clear of any wrongdoing.
Indeed one aspect which cause Nombembe to
wish he'd kept his trap shut on Black Friday
is the latest stunning revelations by
Armscor witnesses at the APC that the SDPs
were conducted outside of its standard
acquisition standards and processes which
are founded in the statue being the Armscor
Act of 1977, therefore probably rendering
the SDPs irregular and unlawful.
This was done by Minister of Defence Joe
Modise issuing a Ministerial Directive No.
4/147 effectively instructing the selection
process to be made at three different levels
and thereby both over-riding Armscor
standard processes and at the same time
providing every opportunity for selections
based on stipulated value systems and
formulae to be over-ridden at the higher
levels (that is SOFCOM controlled by Chippy
Shaik) and MINCOM controlled by Mbeki,
Modise and Erwin).
And this did happen.
In the LIFT case the selection of the
Aermacchi MB338 was over-ruled by MINCOM to
become the British Aerospace Hawk.
In the submarine case the selection of the
Fincantieri boat was over-ruled by SOFCOM to
the HDW Type 209.
In the patrol corvette case the selection of
the Bazan 590B was over-ruled by SOFCOM to
become the Blohm+Voss MEKO 200AS .
In each case either massive bribes and/or
covert commissions can be proven or are
prima facie.
That, dear countrypeople, is (part of) the
big picture - the big theory.
If Seriti J brings you the same picture as
Fakie, Finks & Co then he's going the same
way.
*1
*2
There was an even more important special
report tabled in parliament in 2003.
I know, I caused it.
Shauket Fakie failed that test and should
now be languishing in the penitentiary.
Shaky Fakie's problem was that he had very
little idea of the import of the AG's
special Report in 2000. Indeed this whole
thing had been initiated when Henri Kleuver
was AG and Fakie was a deployed cadre as
deputy AG in charge of auditing the bent
paper clips in the 4th secretary's waste
paper basket. Then affirmative action and
transformation elevated him to The Chief
Stooge in the OAG.
A year later Fakie, along with Fellow
Stooges, Baqwa and Ngcuka, with great
fawning fanfare, issued the final JIT Report
to parliament.
Whatever misgivings he and they may have had
a year previously had effectively
evaporated.
The SDPs and their perpetrators, MINCOM and
the SA Government, now had a clean bill of
health.
Any deviations from statutory acquisition
processes were sanitised by concluding that
this was allowed and justified that the Arms
Deal was strategic, allowing almost anything
to happen.
The JIT found Chief of Acquisitions Chippy
Shaik to have a material conflict of
interest and that his recusal "was no
recusal at all". Despite mountains of
evidence they did not report that there
actually was a formal and recorded recusal,
but actually that Shaik acted in
contravention of his recusal - which is
probably conduct of a criminal nature. The
Three Stooges offer no recommendation in
this regarding rendering their report
effectively useless.
Regarding the corvette combat suite and IMS
in particular, The Stooges are cannot offer
any conclusions nor recommendations despite
spending R6 million and a whole year on this
aspect alone. This was because it was too
complicated for them. Well not surprising
for three deployed cadres.
Indeed Mr Nombembe, the travesty of what is
the JIT Report is in itself going to come
under scrutiny at the Seriti APC.
As I have told the APC researchers and
evidence leaders, if Fakie and Finks Co had
done their job properly in 2001, there would
be no need to appoint the Seriti APC a dozen
years later at a cost of R102 million. Not
one of them has ever disagreed with me.
Make no mistake, if Seriti arrives at the
same conclusion as Fakie in his inquiry,
they are two peas in a pod.