DA MP seeks to force disclosure on arms deals |
Publication |
Weekend Argus |
Date | 2013-08-11 |
Reporter |
Ivor Powell |
Maynier proposes amendment to act
AS JUDGE Willie Seriti’s Arms Procurement
Commission stutters into motion, the DA’s
defence spokesman David Maynier has introduced a
private bill in Parliament aimed at preventing
an arms deal scandal from happening again.
Maynier’s proposed amendment to the Defence Act
(No 42 of 2002) would compel the Department of
Defence to:
Table before Parliament its strategic
acquisition master plan.
Report back on a quarterly basis on all armament
acquisition programmes undertaken.
Table ad hoc reports on all armaments
acquisition programmes in which there are cost
overruns of more than 15 percent, and deviations
of more than six months from weapons delivery
schedules.
Based on the NunnMcCurdy Amendment introduced in
the US in 1983 to address mushrooming armaments
acquisition costs, Maynier’s bill was submitted
to the speaker of Parliament for consideration
on Thursday.
It comes against the backdrop of long-range
failures on the part of the Department of
Defence to comply with its own regulations in
respect of reporting back to Parliament.
The 1996 White Paper on Defence envisages that
an annual “acquisition master plan” as well as
medium- to long-term “defence requirements
statements” will be shared with Parliament’s
standing committee on defence.
The department’s defence material division’s
policy, process and procedures for the
acquisition of armaments makes it clear that
“the relevant parliamentary committee(s) will
have an oversight function to provide guidance
on relevant facets of its acquisition
programmes”.
But for at least the past four years no such
reports have been forthcoming.
On several occasions, defence mandarins have
bluntly refused to account to Parliament on
acquisitions related matters.
In this vein, in April last year then-defence
and military veterans minister Lindiwe Sisulu
stonewalled a written question about, among
others, how many Gripen fighter aircraft and
Hawk lead-in fighters had been delivered in
terms of the strategic defence procurement
packages of the late 1990s, and how many were
serviceable.
Sisulu also blocked the appearance of former
South African Air Force chief General Carlo
Gagiano before the standing committee in which
the usually forthright air force chief would
have been required to provide answers to related
questions.
More recently, Sisulu’s successor, Nosiviwe
MapisaNqakula, has been equally unforthcoming on
the planned acquisition of a high-end
presidential jet.
Meanwhile it has come to light that – again
without keeping Parliament in the loop – the
Defence Department is engaged in several
acquisitions programmes that observers have
predicted will cost at least R100 billion –
nearly half as much again as the estimated R70bn
of the 1990s arms deal.
Under code names like Hoefyster, Assegaai,
Vagrant, Vistula and Biro, the programme is
directed at a variety of materiel, including
offshore patrol vessels, anti-aircraft missile
systems, armoured vehicles and artillery, most
of which seeks to redress deficiencies in the
defence capabilities of our infantry deployments
on peacekeeping missions.
At the same time – and in an even more secretive
environment – Weekend Argus understands that
billions more rands have been earmarked for
hitech weaponry such as thermobaric
rocket-propelled grenades and multi-barrelled
high-velocity machine guns.
Against this backdrop, last week the Arms
Procurement Commission President Jacob Zuma
established in late 2011 also ran into a wall
with the refusal of the Defence Department to
release key documents into evidence unless these
were first declassified or other protocols were
entered into.
Meanwhile, the South African Air Force has
reportedly grounded
almost the entire fleet of Agusta helicopters it
acquired in the arms deal*1, and at least
14 of the 26 Gripen fighters have been
mothballed as a result of shortfalls in
operational funding.
In April last year, not one of the three
submarines acquired by the navy was seaworthy,
and a serious mechanical fault had been
identified in the four frigates.
With acknowledgement to Ivor Powell and Weekend Argus
*1
It speaks volumes about Item 1.1 Rationale and
Item 1.2 Utilisation.