Evidence of ANC arms deal link |
Publication |
Mail & Guardian |
Date | 2001-01-19 |
Reporter |
Staff Reporter |
Web link | www.mg.co.za |
Political connections of a company
that won part of the R43-billion arms package
are at the centre of the latest disclosures in
the unfolding scandal.
A company with links to the African National
Congress has emerged as a key beneficiary of the
R43-billion arms deal. The company, Nkobi
Holdings, which is named after the late Thomas
Nkobi, former treasurer general of the ANC, is a
shareholder in Thomson CSF, a company that will
be providing systems for the navy’s new
corvettesone of the most controversial parts of
the arms package.
The man behind Nkobi Holdings, Shabir Shaik,
this week confirmed that Nkobi was a shareholder
in Thomson CSF’s South African arm. Shabir Shaik
also confirmed his connections to the ANC and
that he had once served as Deputy President
Jacob Zuma’s financial adviser.
When asked whether he or Nkobi Holdings had
donated money to the ANC, Shaik said that was
“not a fair
question”. Asked whether he was denying
having given money to the ruling party, he said:
“No, I am not
denying it. “For many years I was [Zuma’s]
financial adviser. I helped him when he held the
post of minister of tourism in KwaZulu-Natal. I
travelled with him abroad as I did with
[former transport
minister] Mac Maharaj and President
[Thabo] Mbeki. But
that does not mean anything,” he said.
As the Mail & Guardian reported last
week, Shabir Shaik has been a director of
Thomson CSF’s Southern African arm since 1996.
An insider from Nkobi Holdings this week went
public about Shaik’s involvement in the
formation of Thomson CSF Southern Africa. The
insider, Professor Themba Sono, also told the
M&G how Nkobi
Holdings planned its bid for the corvettes
contract in the arms package as early as 1996and
about the way it claimed to use ANC contacts in
general to bag government contracts.
Until now Shabir Shaik has featured in
revelations about the arms deal because of his
relationship to his brother, Shamin “Chippy”
Shaik, the defence secretariat’s head of
procurement since July 1997. Chippy Shaik
previously worked in the Department of Defence’s
policy division. There he was involved in the
defence review, the government’s blueprint for
its weapons acquisition programme that is now
the centre of the political storm involving the
government’s handling of an investigation into
the deal.
According to Sono, Shabir Shaikand other
representatives of Nkobi Holdingsattended
meetings that resulted in the setting up of
Thomson’s local arm. Sono says that from the
beginning, Shabir Shaik discussed the corvettes,
and how Nkobi/Thomson could provide electronic
systems for them. Sono says that during meetings
at which the corvettes were discussed, Shabir
Shaik made it clear that Nkobi Holdings’ role
was to provide
political connectionsas opposed to financial
backing or technical expertise.
“Everybody understood that
the political
connection was so strong from Shabir’s side
that there was no need for Nkobi to come up with
the money. Shabir said words to the effect that
without him and Nkobi none of them [other
business partners] would get any contracts,”
Sono says. Sono adds that throughout his stint
at Nkobiwhich stretched from April 1996 until
January 1997Shabir Shaik was in regular contact
with both Chippy Shaik and Mo Shaik, his other
brother who was formerly in the intelligence
service and who is now South Africa’s ambassador
to Algeria.
Sono says Shabir Shaik would frequently call one
of his brothers during business meetings. Sono
said discussions on the corvettes also took
place during meetings involving Nkobi Holdings,
Thomson CSF representatives and senior employees
of a subsidiary of Denel, the state arms
company. These meetings resulted in the
formation of Prodiba, a company that won the
government’s tender for the new driver’s
licence.
At one of these meetings, Sono recalls, a Denel
representative explained that the name Prodiba
was taken from “Madiba”, Mandela’s clan name.
While the Prodiba meetings involved key players
from Thomson CSF, Nkobi and Denel, the company
has not, until now, featured in the weapons
deal.
Thomson CSF won its contract in the arms deal
through a joint venture with African Defence
Systems (ADS), a company that was appointed by
the defence secretariat to coordinate the
acquisition of the corvettes and to integrate
the ships’ systems. Thomson CSF bought 80% of
ADS from Altech, the South African technology
group, in two stages in 1998 and 1999. Shabir
Shaik is also a director of ADS.
Pierre Moynot, a Thomson CSF representative who
has been party to all these talks since 1996,
said this week one of the Nkobi group of
companies had received a 30% stake in Thomson
CSF’s South African operation. Moynot said that
when, in 1998, CSF bought ADS, Nkobi’s
shareholding in Thomson decreased to 25%. Moynot
said ADS’s combat suite deal was worth
R2,5-billion, adding that
Nkobi Holdings had
paid for its shares in these companies. *1
This contradicts Sono’s account of meetings
where Nkobi’s failure to provide equity had been
accepted.
Chippy Shaik’s defence against any allegations
of nepotism is that he recused himself as chair
of the arms procurement committee when it
considered the corvettes’ systems. As far as his
role in the defence review is concerned, he said
this week that he had merely formulated 129
different options for the defence force to
consider, only some of which included the
corvettes.
Chippy Shaik declined to discuss Nkobi Holdings
this week on the grounds that he had nothing to
do with it. He said he preferred to hold off
replying on most of the questions put to him by
the M&G because there was a possibility
he would be involved in
litigation from a
Cape-based company, CCII, which has cried foul
about losing out to ADS on the corvette
contract.
Chippy Shaik skirted questions as to
whether, after he recused himself, he had been
present at meetings where the contract had been
discussed. Chippy Shaik said key players
involved in the process had confirmed in writing
to the public accounts committee in the National
Assembly that he had had nothing to do with the
final selection of Thomson/ADS.
Last week, Chippy Shaik said Thomson CSF’s
Southern African operation had not been involved
in any military work until it bought ADS in
1999. This appears to contradict both Sono’s and
Shabir Shaik’s account of Thomson’s business
plans. Sono resigned from Nkobi in January 1997
after becoming wary of the way it operated.
He says he was introduced to Shabir Shaik in
1996 by a close friend, Dwight Triegaardt, a
director of Nkobi. Sono says Triegaardtwho also
later resigned from Nkobitold him Nkobi had
been dealing with Denel and that Nkobi felt it
needed credible black Africans for its board.
“The name, Nkobi, made me think that this was an
organisation closely attached to the ANC. I felt
that they wanted to do businesseveryone at that
time was jumping to do business with the
government. I understood that political
dimension right from the beginning,” said Sono.
Although Sono was an appointed executive
director, according to his business card, he was
never reflected as such in the company registry.
The shareholders in Nkobi Holdings are
registered as management (25%), Education Trust
Fund (10%), the Nkobi family (5%), South Africa
Clothing Workers’ Union (through the Workers’
College) (10%), and Starcorp (50%). It is
understood that Starcorp belongs to Shabir Shaik.
Sono says Shabir Shaik said bluntly on many
occasions “we bring the political goodwill.
There has to be a tit-for-tat with these
companies.” He says Shabir Shaik frequently
dropped names of high-profile political figures.
“He talked of how he had travelled with Thomas
Nkobi to raise funds.”
Sono continues: “I went to Indonesia with Shabir
in October 1996, replacing Zuma, who could not
make it on the trip. Shabir kept the details
from all of us. I felt there were other meetings
involving Nkobithe official board deliberations
were insubstantial. I felt that we [the board]
were just a think-tank to provide an operational
framework for others. I had realised that this
other ‘ghost board’ likely consisted of
political heavyweights in KwaZulu-Natal.”
“As for the driver’s licence bid, we met quite a
lot at Denel and at Thomson CSF. At one stage
when we discussed what Nkobi should contribute
to the joint venture, Shabir said we had the
political clout and
the political connections.”
Sono says that one stage during his stint at the
company it emerged that Nkobi Holdings had
funded a trip by King Goodwill Zwelithini to the
United States. When questioned about why Nkobi
Holdings needed to do this, Sono says Shabir
Shaik replied that this was “for the benefit of
the movement [ANC]. I was led to believe that
the reason for us paying was to help woo
Zwelithini from Inkatha.”
Sono talks of how he lent Shabir Shaik R75 000
to pay staffa sum for which Sono subsequently
sued. “He never paid me back, despite thanking
me warmly for the loan and saying that even his
brothers would not make such a kind gesture to
him. I was partially repaid in November 2000
after we settled out of court.”
“As for the Nkobi name, Shabir said he had
looked after the late Thomas Nkobi before he
died. Shabir said Nkobi died in his [Shabir’s]
house. He said he looked after the Nkobi family,
and that Thomas had blessed the company, and
that the company was supposed to honour him for
the great work that he did.” It is understood
the Nkobi family has objected to the use of its
name in the company.
“During 1996 Shabir went to Malaysia at least
twice. He also went to France at least three
times. I was led to believe the trips to
Malaysia were funding expeditions for the ANC. I
was also under the impression foreign companies
keen to invest in South Africa paid money to
Nkobior tried to team up with it.”
According to noseweek, the investigative
magazine, as early as 1990 Shabir Shaik went to
Malaysia to raise funds for the ANC. He then
became the adviser to Nkobi. The magazine says
that when Nkobi died, Shabir Shaik used funds
from Malaysia to establish a trust fund named
after him.
Noseweek says that in
1995 Mandela’s
lawyer, Ismail Ayob, told Malaysian prime
minister Mahatir Mohamed that Shabir Shaik did
not represent the ANC. “But scarcely a
year later Shabir was taken on an official visit
to Malaysia by Zuma and also accompanied Jeff
Radebe, Minister of Public Enterprises, on an
official trip to Russia.” Sono also referred to
these trips.
Sono says he spoke to the M&G in his
personal capacity, and had not shared any of
this information with the Democratic Alliance,
for which he is a Gauteng MPL.
When interviewed this week, Shabir Shaik said:
“Go ahead and write what you want to write. Your
newspaper has always done that. We fought evil
and apartheid for 45 years.
We can certainly
fight the Mail & Guardian a few years
more.” While admitting extensive links to
leading lights in the ANC, Shabir Shaik denied
he had won any contracts through these
connections.
He said his high morals and belief in God
prevent him from participating in any
skulduggery. “I believe in a God, after all. I
became friendly with these people long before
they held any positions of power.” Shaik claimed
that his brother Chippy’s position in the
Department of Defence made it even harder for
him to obtain contracts.
Shaik admitted to the M&G that he had
discussed the deal to supply corvettes to the
South African navy with his brother as early as
1994. But, he pointed out, at that time Chippy
did not hold a position with the Department of
Defence and could not have had any input on the
decision of whether to buy the corvettes. He
also claimed his brother was not the only person
involved in deciding where contracts are
awarded.
“If I could rely on my brother sending anything
my way that I wanted why do I only have a deal
for R2,6-billion? My company only got one out of
the 26 bids we applied for. “Shaik admitted to
having interacted with government during the
deal, but claimed this interaction was not
underhand.
“With the best business plan and the most
capital you will still not succeed in business
without business intelligence.
I made appointments
with government and visited them. I did not have
any special access to information or people
though.”
Additional reporting by Stefaans Brümmer,
Nawaal Deane and Evidence wa ka Ngobeni
With acknowledgement to Mail & Guardian.
A blast from the past which somehow also evade
my virtual press office (
www.armsdeal-vpo.co.za).
Everything we knew early in 2001 has been
confirmed and held true a dozen years later.
The date of this article is the same as Big Fish
Mbeki went ballistic on national TV berating
Judge Willem Heath and waiving two of my my
organograms in front of the cameras.
*1
What happened in the shareholding agreements is
that the BEE companies' dividends would be held
in an escrow account and later to used to share
for the shares.
But ADS only started paying dividends in 2001
and so these payments were not made when share
ownership took place.
And the share price was actually a nominal
amount and nowhere related to the goodwill value
of ADS which was about to get a R1,4 billion
corvette combat suite contract from Armscor.
Mbeki had already guaranteed ADS the contract to
ADS and Thomson-CSF for the combat suite and its
sensors through interlocutor Yusuf Surtee.
By this time Shaik and his principal were
running fast and furious snapping their occult
BEE interests in the Arms Deal
More will be revealed.