PRESIDENT Jacob Zuma’s secret representations to the National Prosecutions Authority (NPA), lobbying it to scrap his corruption charges in 2009, are littered with threats to expose the NPA’s political agenda, embarrass politicians and cause widespread mayhem in the country*1.

The written pleas, which run to more than 240 pages and have never been released publicly, were signed by Zuma’s lawyer, Michael Hulley *2.

Notably, they do not include any reference to the “spy tapes”, presumably because their legality was still in question at the time*3.

They were submitted to the NPA in early 2009, a year after Zuma had been elected leader of the ANC in Polokwane, and three months before he became President of SA in April 2009.

In memos later, the Scorpions investigators rejected Zuma’s arguments as tantamount to “blackmail”.

Here are some excerpts of Zuma’s secret representations:

‘‘If [former head of the NPA, Vusi] Pikoli had after the President’s dismissal of Zuma not reviewed the 2003 decision and reversed this, he would have created a very embarrassing situation for President Mbeki. How could President Mbeki ever justify Zuma’s dismissal?’’

‘‘For Zuma’s removal as Deputy President to ever have any credibility, he had to be prosecuted. Pikoli . . . must have felt pressured by these considerations. ’’

‘‘The case that the decision to prosecute Zuma was improperly and unlawfully tainted beyond redemption by political influence is overwhelming.’’

Prosecutions boss Mokotedi Mpshe is “a tool in the hands of the executive *4 [because] they instruct him on what to do in respect of the prosecutions process, and he does what they instruct”.

The case will create “great tension between [the ANC] and the NPA. No doubt damage will be done to both sides in the process’’.

‘‘ Only Zuma’s prosecution by the NPA constitutes an obstacle to the Presidency of the country and that remains the only realistic hope of those opposed to his presidency.”

‘‘ Should the trial go ahead, it would severely disrupt the national elections and it may even skew the results.’’

‘‘ The decision to maintain the prosecution . . . seeks to dictate the leadership of the ANC and indeed the Republic of South Africa and leaves such decision effectively in the hands of the National Directorate of Public Prosecutions. Such a decision is fundamentally unfair to the ANC and favours the other political parties in the general election.’’

‘‘ There is considerable potential . . . to create massive divisions in the general public and to lead to general unrest.’’

‘‘[ It] will very likely be seen as an attempt to deprive the public of their leaders and to thwart the will of the people in order to favour the wishes of some of the middle classes.’’

‘‘It will affect business confidence in South Africa: persons from the business world will bear this out.’’

‘‘ The effect of trial proceedings will be adversely felt during the 2010 World Cup. It is simply detrimental to the image of the country as a whole to have a trial involving the President at that time. It can only adversely affect foreign investments, tourism and generally tarnish the image of South Africa.’’

‘‘At the very least the prosecution of the President will inevitably and directly precipitate a constitutional crisis of very significant proportions.”

With acknowledgement to Mzilikazi Wa Afrika, Rob Rose, Stephan Hofstatter and Sunday Times.

*1       Threats to :

• expose the NPA’s political agenda;

• embarrass politicians; and

• cause widespread mayhem in the country.