Revealed: Yengeni's R6-million 'kickback' agreement |
Publication |
Mail & Guardian |
Date | 2013-06-14 |
Reporter |
Stefaans Brummer |
Web link | www.mg.co.za |
ANC luminary Tony Yengeni signed a
R6-million bribe agreement with an arms bidder
when he headed Parliament's joint standing
committee on defence in 1995, German detectives
have reported.
The detectives said that they found a copy of
the agreement when they raided ThyssenKrupp, the
German engineering conglomerate which led the
consortium that sold four patrol corvettes to
South Africa for R6.9-billion.
Yengeni, a struggle stalwart and member of the
ANC's national executive committee, this week
refused to confirm or deny the allegation. "I've
got nothing to say on all you're saying," he
said.
The latest allegation significantly adds to
evidence that the main contracts in the
controversial arms deal were tainted by
corruption, contradicting a 2001 finding by the
multi-agency joint investigation team that
subcontracts, at most, were affected.
Bribery is grounds for cancelling the
multibillion-rand contracts for trainer and
fighter jets, corvettes, submarines and
helicopters that the government entered into at
the turn of the century.
The government, perhaps fearful of the
international repercussions, has resisted such a
conclusion. But Judge Willie Seriti's arms
procurement commission, which starts public
hearings in August, will face a barrage of new
evidence to that effect.
The Mail & Guardian has previously
revealed how British multinational BAE Systems,
which supplied the jets, paid roughly
R200-million to Fana Hlongwane, who was the late
defence minister Joe Modise's adviser when the
arms deal was negotiated.
It has also reported how Thyssen allegedly
reached a $3-million (about R18-million then)
bribe agreement with Chippy Shaik, then head of
defence procurement.
Last month the Sunday Times alleged that BAE
bankrolled the late Stella Sigcau's daughter
when she studied in London. Sigcau, then public
enterprises minister, served on the Cabinet
subcommittee that made key arms procurement
decisions.
The new allegations are unrelated to Yengeni's
fraudulent cover-up of a discount he received on
a luxury vehicle from another arms bidder, for
which he was briefly jailed in 2006.
Raids and a find
German investigators raided ThyssenKrupp's
Düsseldorf headquarters in 2006 after tax
authorities became suspicious of payments made
in the course of the South African arms deal.
AmaBhungane has seen correspondence in which
detectives involved in the investigation discuss
some of the evidence found.
Among the gems in the haul was an agreement
allegedly signed by Yengeni and Christoph
Hoenings, an executive of Thyssen Rheinstahl
Technik, a ThyssenKrupp predecessor company.
Hoenings was a key protagonist in the Thyssen-led
German Frigate Consortium's campaign to sell the
corvettes to South Africa.
Allegedly concluded when Hoenings visited South
Africa in September 1995, the agreement promised
Yengeni 2.5-million deutschmark (R6-million
then) on conclusion of the campaign to sell the
corvettes to South Africa.
Hoenings, who has since left Thyssen, this week
refused to comment, saying from Düsseldorf: "I
do not speak to the press, please understand
this, thank you."
Hoenings's online profile on business networking
website Xing.com, however, is
unabashed about his
use of political connectivity to land contracts.
It says he offers "years of experience as a
sales director for exports in
shipbuilding/marine", "strong
contacts with political parties and
well-connected individuals in a number of
developing and emerging countries", and "creativity
in the development of marketing strategies for
obtaining foreign government contracts".
The profile offers the "use of
my personal network
by interested third parties" – perhaps
not unlike Yengeni, whose LinkedIn profile
describes him as an "independent government
relations professional".
During the South African corvette campaign,
Hoenings worked closely with Tony Georgiadis,
the London-based shipping magnate who made a
seamless transition from supplying apartheid
South Africa with embargo-busting crude oil to
being best friends with the top echelons of
former president Thabo Mbeki's ANC.
Georgiadis appears to have been brought aboard
as an agent by the Germans after Christmas Eve
1994, when all seemed lost. That day, Armscor,
the state arms procurement agency, had announced
the shortlisting of shipyards from Spain and
Britain to supply corvettes, eliminating bids
from Germany, Denmark and France.
But Thabo Mbeki, then deputy president,
travelled to Germany the next month, allegedly
to reassure officials.
Hoenings himself was quoted in the Weekend Argus
as saying that Mbeki had told him and the German
foreign minister that "the race is still open to
all contenders".
In May 1995, Cabinet put a hold on the corvette
acquisition pending a "defence review", among
other things to determine the ideal force design
of the post-apartheid defence force.
The corvette tender process was started afresh
in late 1997 as part of a comprehensive
"strategic defence procurement" of jets, ships,
submarines and helicopters.
Yengeni was well placed to assist the Germans
during this precarious time when the South
Africans were reconsidering their needs.
In Parliament, he was ANC chief whip and chair
of the joint standing committee on defence. He
also later served on the defence review, held
under the auspices of the department of defence.
Yengeni allegedly signed the agreement with
Hoenings on September 11 1995. The German
detectives' correspondence details some
corroborating evidence.
Hoenings' travel claims, they said, showed him
meeting Yengeni and Georgiadis in South Africa
on the day the agreement was allegedly signed.
After his return to Germany, Hoenings entered a
provision for the 2.5-million deutschmark in
Thyssen Rheinstahl accounts.
At the time, foreign bribery was not illegal in
Germany. It was, in fact, tax-deductible,
meaning there was no need to disguise such
actions internally.
The provision was removed when Thyssen
Rheinstahl and Krupp merged two years later and
investigators found no indication in the
accounts that the money was paid.
The detectives thought it likely, however, that
Yengeni ultimately received the money by
indirect means.
Certainly, the contact continued as the defence
review unfolded. Hoenings's travel claims
specified another four sets of meetings in 1996
and 1997 involving him, Yengeni and Georgiadis.
One set of meetings was in Germany and two were
in Switzerland the final one in Zurich in
November 1997, two months after the corvette
tender, ultimately won by the Germans, was
reopened.
Also found, the detectives said, was a claim by
Georgiadis for the air fare for Yengeni's first
visit to Zurich. Georgiadis allegedly faxed
Hoenings the travel agent's invoice, with the
note: "The attached for your 'confidential' file
(in case he [Yengeni] ever denies having come)."
Georgiadis said this week: "I really, really
have no comment whatsoever to make on anything
regarding that, okay … I know nothing about it
[the bribe agreement]."
German authorities abandoned their investigation
of Thyssen in 2008, apparently after reaching a
tax settlement. They did not prosecute
corruption, in part because it was difficult to
prove that any of Thyssen's actions continued
after foreign bribery was outlawed.
A ThyssenKrupp spokesperson said on Thursday:
"The issues related to your request were duly
investigated by German authorities. These
investigations have been [settled] without any
findings."
In 2011 there was an outcry when it was
discovered that then-defence minister Lindiwe
Sisulu had appointed Yengeni to a committee to
conduct a new defence review, despite his
conviction for the luxury car cover up.
Sisulu insisted in parliamentary answers to the
Democratic Alliance that Yengeni had "paid his
dues by serving a prison sentence and was
released from custody".
At a media briefing she said: "I chose him to be
a member of the committee because of the role he
played in the first review.
"He has the necessary background of how we've
come to be where we are."
Judge Willie Seriti's arms procurement
commission on Thursday confirmed it was aware of
the allegedly explosive nature of the evidence
found by German authorities and said it was
trying to secure it.
Commission spokesperson William Baloyi said: "We
are aware of the many statements from a variety
of sources within South Africa to the effect
that the German investigators have uncovered
massive evidence implicating various people and
entities in wrongdoing … We have been
communicating with the German authorities to
secure such evidence and are still awaiting
their final response. Obviously the interactions
with [them] are of a sensitive nature and we can
therefore not comment further."
The commission will start public hearings in
August.
With acknowledgement to Stefaans Brümmer and Mail & Guardian.
This in a nutshell
was the deal the Mbeki et cie wanted.
We purchase R30 billion odd of defence equipment
and we want 7,5% of that in kickbacks.
That's a whopping R2,25 billion.
About half came from the Brits and Swedes and
about half came from the Germans and French.
No one has looked at the Italians and their
Agusta helicopter deal, but rest assured that's
how Count Agusta does deals as well. But that's
relatively small potatoes.
The large potatoes were shared by the big fish
Joe Modise, Fana Hlongwane and Richard Charter,
although Joe died before he could appreciate it.
He was probably helped on his way.
Two other big fish recipients were the ANC
Women's League led by Winnie Mandela and its
National Party equivalent led by Marike de
Klerk.
Middle fish include the likes of Chippy Shaik
and Tony Yengeni as well as Tony Ellingford,
Llew Swan and Jeremy Mathers.
There is a myriad of bottom dwelling small fry
who names will hopefully come out at the Seriti
Commission.
On the other side of the ocean there are a lot
of bottom dwelling middle fish who specialise in
reverse kickbacks.
Chiefs among these are specialist bagmen like
the deliciously named Jurgen Koopman of Thyssen,
along with colleagues Christoph Hoenings and
Sven Moeller, Klaus-J Moeller of Blohm+Voss and
Alan McDonald of BAe.
Most of the German side was controlled by the
main man, Tony Georgadis the leader of the
German Strategic Alliance.
Georgadis actually taught Hoenings the trick of
the double key safe deposit box at London bank(s)
for the storage of commission agreements.
Pity (for them) all this ingenuity got
outsmarted by bigger wits and we are in
possession of many of these smoking guns.
RAdm(JG) Jonny Kamerman revolved right out of
the post of SAN corvette and submarine Projects
Director (a post especially created for him by a
grateful Thabo Mbeki) into the post of Vice
President for International Sales of Blohm+Voss,
effectively taking over from Klaus-J Moeller
(who was put out to pasture before the long arm
of the law could grab Blohm+Voss and the German
Frigate Consortium for bribery and corruption.
It'll be a nice change to get the chance to
cross-examine Sea Lord Kamerman and First Sea
Lord Robert Simpson-Anderson without hands tied
behind our backs by Selby Baqwa SC.
In fact I'd better stop tapping this keyboard
and get a bucket as my drool is going to kill
this thing.