Publication: defenceWeb Issued: Date: 2013-05-07 Reporter: Helmoed Romer Heitman

Feature: SANDF – Optimum Force Design

 

Publication 

defenceWeb
Date 2013-05-07
Reporter Helmoed Römer Heitman
Web link www.defenceweb.co.za



The ‘Battle of Bangui’ in the Central African Republic in March and its aftermath should cause government to think about what sort of Defence Force South Africa needs. While the troops fought magnificently, the Defence Force had no means of either promptly reinforcing or extracting them. A similar challenge could have arisen in November when M23 rebels occupied Goma in the DRC.

South Africa cannot afford to become involved in security matters on the continent when the defence budget does not allow for it.

This article sets out one possible interim force design allowing the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) to execute its present missions and develop a small contingency reserve.

Essentially the Defence Force would be able to:

•Patrol and protect our land borders, maritime borders and zones (including islands) and airspace.

•Patrol shipping routes critical to South Africa, for instance the Mozambique Channel;

•Support the Police in anti-terrorist operations;

•Respond effectively to threats to vital external interests, for instance the Khatse Dam in Lesotho and the Cahora Bassa power station and Maputo harbour in Mozambique;

•Conduct small non-combatant evacuations, for instance embassy staff;

•React promptly at combat-group strength with air and naval support to a security crisis within the SADC or in an adjacent country, with follow-on forces for twelve months;

•Sustain the current peace support commitments in Darfur and the DRC;

•Maintain a contingency force of approximately brigade strength and equivalent reserve capacity in the Air Force and Navy.

What does this translate into in terms of actual force elements?

Army

The Army will need to be expanded somewhat to allow proper rotation – 1 in 4 is the highest sustainable tempo – for peace operations, patrolling the border and having rapid deployment and contingency forces. Considering this by tasks, we might have:

TaskForce Requirement

  • Border Protection 8 dedicated/mission-tailored battalions and 1 specialist battalion, grouped into geographic sectors

  • Quick Reaction/Rapid Deployment Force 1 airborne brigade (air assault, parachute and air-landed battalion groups)

  • 1 motorised/mechanised battalion group (Drawn from the reinforced mechanised brigade.)

  • Peace Support Commitments 1 light mechanised brigade, 1 motorised brigade

  • Contingency Force 1 reinforced mechanised brigade


The airborne brigade would provide crisis response capability in conjunction with the Special Forces.

The light mechanised and motorised brigades would each be responsible for a particular peace support mission (4 infantry battalion groups each, mechanised and motorised infantry, plus support units). The former would deal with Darfur, the latter the DRC, or later with other missions in regions suited to their capabilities.

The mechanised brigade would serve as the main contingency force and would include a tank regiment, forming basis on which to build a stronger force in the future, and would provide heavy units should one of the above brigades become involved in peace enforcement.

The Army could then also establish a small tactical division HQ to command a multi-brigade operation if necessary. As funding allows, reserve units could be brought back to operational status to provide additional short-term capacity.


Navy

TaskForce Requirement

  • Surveillance Patrols 4 attack submarines (2-3 operational)

  • Mainland EEZ Patrol 6 offshore patrol vessels (4-5 operational)

  • Distant Patrols (Mozambique Channel, West African waters, Marion/Prince Edward Islands ) and Contingency Task Force 8 frigates, 3 combat support ships

  • (5-6 frigates and 2 support ships operational)

  • Port Security 1 task-tailored unit per port.

 
Other fleet possibilities include 8 OPVs and 6 frigates, or 6 OPVs, 4 frigates and 4 ocean patrol vessels.

None of these fleet designs would provide any ability to deploy forces by sea, except Special Forces elements. That capability would have to be added later, although it could be possible to acquire three LHD type vessels designed to also serve as combat support ships. That would provide an adequate sealift capability for most situations, albeit tight when one is in refit.


Air Force

TaskForce  Requirement

  • Air Space Surveillance andDefence Static and deployable radars

  • 6 Gripen available (The total requirement for Gripens available for operations comes to 24, which would normally require a fleet of about 34, but some missions could be handled by Hawks in the interim.)

  • Maritime Surveillance and Patrol 8 coastal surveillance aircraft

  • 6 long-range surveillance aircraft (eg HC-130J)

  • 18 shipboard helicopters (Super Lynx)

  • Border Surveillance and Patrol 6 surveillance aircraft (optronic and other sensors)

  • Air Assault 12 Oryx available in SA

  • 12 Oryx available for peace operations

  • (This will require a fleet of 34 aircraft; an additional 6 aircraft will be required for the Navy’s support ships, and at there should be at least 6 additional aircraft fully equipped for Special Forces operations, making a minimum fleet of 46 aircraft.)

  • Parachute, Air Landed and Special Forces Operations 12 heavy/long-range transports (eg A400M)

  • 6 medium transports (eg C-130J)

  • 12 light transports (eg C-27J)


Deployable Close Air Support 6 Rooivalk available in SA
6 Rooivalk deployed for a peace mission
(The Rooivalk requirement would normally require a fleet of at least 18, and is a minimum for the mechanised force to be credible and allows for only one peace mission. There is a major shortfall here.)
Reconnaissance/Strike Force Reconnaissance 6 Gripen available in SA
6 Gripen available for deployment
Deployable Combat Air Patrol 6 Gripen (eg ‘no fly’ zone over Darfur)
Aerial Refuelling 4 multi-role tanker/transport aircraft (These would be multi-role aircraft for use as tankers and long-haul transport, and convertible for VIP tasks).
 
Looking forward, one would like to add airborne radar capability and to expand the airlift to be able to deploy a parachute battalion group in a single lift and an air-landed battalion within 48 hours. There is also a clear need for some heavy lift helicopters.


Special Forces

The Special Forces are too small if South Africa is to play an effective regional security role. There is also a case to be made for returning to the previous approach of specialised units for urban operations, rural operations and maritime operations.

The Cost

The total force package outlined here would cost in the region of R60 billion per year, assuming that the equipment was acquired over a ten-year period – about R25 billion for the Army, R6 billion for the Navy, R10 billion for the Air Force and R500 million for the Special Forces. The remainder would cover overheads, including the Military Health Service and joint training establishments.

That is 50% up on the present budget, but would allow the Defence Force to meet its current commitments and have a reserve. Also, much of the additional funding would be spent inside South Africa on salaries and locally manufactured equipment, so being an additional cost to the Treasury but not necessarily a full cost to the country.

With acknowledgement to Helmoed Römer Heitman and defenceWeb.


Comments
 
+3 #1 Jacques de Vries 2013-05-07 14:51

Good propositions all, but I believe the lever point is the political will that provides the budget and wherewithal for making it all possible. Without a doubt, the Army has been 'short-changed' the most in the last large strategic defence procurement package and needs the lion’s share of any injection of funds and materiel for across the board benefit of the SANDF. It is fully right that government should support the local military industrial complex too, since many of the technologies and competencies borne and fostered in South Africa are among the best in the world. In light of recent setbacks such as CAR, propositions such as those made here should trigger a second call for proposed recommendations or changes to the 2012 South African Defence Review, and at the least, greater engagement by policymakers in the government security cluster to have such procurement, logistics and training proposals gain physical expression.
 
 
+2 #2 Mickey Walden-Smith 2013-05-07 16:30

The numbers are solid and sustainable especially if it the equipment is aquired over a ten year period. What I think, if I may, the government really needs to re-think it's policy on the army/navy/airforce reserves. As much as I hate to say it, Australia has very well-oiled system in terms of there military reserve units and they play a very large role in Australia's security missions in thier theates of operations. Please could you write an article where in you could discuss a possible intergration of the Australian reserve system as a model for our national defence etc.? That would really be a great read. Regards
 
 
+3 #3 Johan Jooste 2013-05-07 17:18

When will we get real and learn to play a league that we can win and afford. The SA Army that will secure our homeland and our sovereignty must come first and that need not be the an elaborate force that many yearn after as a a memory of the past. The obligation in Africa can also be met in calculated allied operations without "bursting the bank".
 
 
#4 Richard Young 2013-05-08 09:10

This article might have better be entitled "Feature: SANDF – Maximal Force Design by Field Marshal Romer Rommel of the Invade Afrika Korps".

Currently the SANDF costs the country some 1,1% of GDP and there are strenuous efforts to up that a little. The reason why this is justified is those idiots Mandela, Mbeki, Modise, Manuel, Erwin, etc. forgot to add a running budget onto the Arms Deal, thereby effectively rendering it nugatory.

This is in times of peace in the SADC and nothing but peace for the next two decades. So that increase would seen unlikely.

But to push it to the 1,8% of GDP that the current Defence Review and Force Design seem to be punting is more a case of smoking one's socks after a strong day after the budget spreadsheet.

8 OPVs and 6 frigates!

And 4 ocean patrol vessels. What are these?

Last time the management of the DoD and SAN hoodwinked the taxpayers by calling the frigates patrol corvettes. This was done clearly with that purpose. As soon as the downpayment to the Germans was made they reverted to frigates. Some naval wag called them an FSG - Frigate Sonder Guns. That wag had two broad stripes on his shoulders.

So now the requirement is for some ocean patrol vessels.

Is that a true corvette but with a 30 mm machine gun?

Or is that a frigate with a 35 mm gun that does not work?

Interesting as well is that we need a fleet of 34 Gripens to keep 24 fighting.

Yet we order 28 Gripens and were only delivered 26.

Where are the other two Gripens?

Having contributed a fair wack of tax over the last thirty years of back breaking work, at least enough tax to fill a Gripen tank, I demand to know the whyabouts and whereabouts of those other two Gripens.

Noticeable, except as EADS Airbus Loadmaster, are the A400M bankbusters again on the Field Marshal's shopping list, after them previously getting the CEO of Armscor fired after ordering 9 of them and paying a R3 billion downpayment. The Joint Operations special team under the leadership of a fighting admiral, prior to ordering them, concluded that "the SAAF neither needs the A400M nor can it afford it".

And lastly (for the moment) it's nice to see those Rooivalke coming into combat deployment. I love the smell of roasted rebels in the morning.