The government wants it to do its job but does not give it the resources

TWENTY years ago, one of the first public meetings in South Africa between Umkhonto weSizwe (MK) and the then SA Defence Force occurred in the guise of the first navy conference, cohosted at the Waterfront by the local chapter of the SA Institute of International Affairs, of which I was then chairman, and the Institute for Defence Policy.

Expectedly, given the politics of the time, much of the preliminary focus was on the SADF-MK relationship. In the event, there was much more discussion about the future of the navy, long the underdog in the bureaucratic and budgetary struggles with the army, air force and medical services.

One outcome was that the navy, then in a dire state with ageing vessels, many of which were inappropriate for southern sea conditions, went on the diplomatic offensive to justify its role and argue the case for new equipment.

Today, it has that new equipment. Three submarines and four new frigates were procured as part of the notorious defence package in the late 1990s, then costing some $5-billion.

Their record since then has been mixed. Positively, particularly since the anti-piracy Operation Copper*1 in 2011 in the Mozambique Channel, the available frigates are being used more than double their anticipated 120 days annually*2. Enormous strides have been made in transforming the racial composition of the crews. For example, more than three-quarters of the 156-strong complement of SAS Amatola, about to deploy this month, are black, coloured or Asian. Safety standards are also being raised continually.

However, deeper problems threaten the operability of these vessels that have not only curtailed their level of preparedness, but may well shorten their anticipated 30-year lifespan *3.

The first is simply money. The purchase price of naval vessels is usually about 20% of their overall lifetime cost. Today, the SA Navy routinely receives little more than one-third of the R1.2-billion required to logistically support its fleet.

As a result, spares are in chronically short supply, ordered only reactively and subject to as much as 12-month delays*4. Refits are constantly behind schedule. Instead of being at a “functional level of capability”, most vessels are between lower “basic” and “safety ” levels. Three of the four frigates are now sailing with one of their three engines unserviceable. And there is a long-term cost too. With spares being “borrowed ” from vessels under refit and maintenance not being carried out timeously, the lifespan of the fleet is in danger of being shortened.

The dockyard at Simon’s Town has just more than one-third of the 900 staff required to fully support and maintain the fleet, and requires an additional R250-million annually to recapitalise over the next three years. The total hour requirement for refits in 2012/13 is 950 000, yet just 169 950 hours are available. The shortage of skilled artisans is exacerbated by the load placed on navy facilities by their need to maintain the four large sea fisheries patrol vessels.

The second reason concerns the suitability of the current fleet for the tasks expected. There is an urgent need for new, low-tech offshore patrol vessels bigger than the sea fisheries variety and the three old naval strike craft now fulfilling this role, as well as a support craft for peacekeeping operations. With the benefit of hindsight*5, some changes would today be made to the specification of the frigates, not least in the necessary fitment of bow thrusters for those African harbours lacking tugs.

Any new purchases are highly contentious in an environment in which questions about the arms deal have yet to be answered and the same problems of support and long-term operational financing still exist.

The greatest casualty of the corruption stink around the arms deal is the very people who have to operate this equipment. It is in their interest that an investigation is launched that can determine, once and for all, whether bribes were paid*6.

The third challenge is in the African operational environment. The virtually continuous station of one SA vessel in Mozambique is indicative of the dearth of African maritime and naval capability. Without a plan to build capacity and finance African navies, the load will inevitably fall on South Africa ­ a load it cannot conceivably bear and to which many African countries are invariably hostile.

Fast forward 20 years from the 1993 navy conference and many of the same challenges exist for the “senior service”: too little money to do its job and a public hostile to further expenditure, not least given the extent of domestic socioeconomic challenges.

With acknowledgement to Dr Greg Mills and Sunday Times.