Arms deal detail unveiled |
Publication |
Business Report |
Date | 2012-11-22 |
Reporter |
Terry Bell |
Web Link | www.iol.co.za |
A Gripen fighter jet is transported from Cape
Town harbour to the Yysterplaat air force base
Picture: Gary van Wyk
Another crack has opened up in the
façade of secrecy
surrounding the controversial
multibillion-dollar arms deal. It came last
night on Sweden’s TV4 channel in the
first of two
special reports by the Kalla Fakta (Cold Facts)
investigative team.
The report is likely to have
serious political
repercussions in Sweden and will
reopen lines of
inquiry in South Africa. In it, former
National Union of Metalworkers of SA (Numsa)
treasurer Philimon Shiburi and union central
committee member Petrus Ngcobo admit that a R10
million handout to build a training school was
offered to Numsa on condition that the union
support the purchase of Swedish-built Gripen
fighter jets.
No official of the union seems to have been
party to this agreement between Numsa, plane
maker Saab and Swedish metal union Svenska
Metall (SM). However, shortly before the arms
deal was signed, the ANC issued a statement that
Numsa supported the purchase of Gripen fighter
jets.
Shiburi and Ngcobo admitted to TV4 that they had
sight of the agreement in Sweden as part of a
Numsa corruption investigation in 2000, but both
Saab and SM deny that this clause existed.
However, Shiburi is adamant: “One of the
conditions of [the agreement] was that we’ll do
our level best in supporting them to acquire the
arms procurement [contract],” he told the
television team.
After viewing the interviews with Shiburi and
Ngcobo, arms deal campaigner and former ANC MP
Andrew Feinstein told TV4: “It’s
extremely damning that two senior
officials of the union who have actually seen
the agreement say that there was a direct
relationship between the money for the school
and the support for the school on the condition
that Saab win this particular contract. That
just smells to me like corruption.”
According to Feinstein, support from Numsa was
crucial at that time for Saab. “If they were
going to win this contract they needed to put
together a political coalition that would make
it easier for the South African government… to
choose the Gripen.” Kalla Fakta points out that
in 1999, the SA Air Force had already rejected
the Gripen and there was
talk within the ANC
of scrapping the arms deal *1.
Against this background, the ANC released a
statement: “The National Union of Metalworkers
of SA have pledged their support for the Gripen
proposal to supply fighter aircraft to South
Africa.”
It added that the “foreign companies” together
with SM would “support Numsa in establishing an
industrial school in South Africa”.
But, according to Numsa, no union official was
involved in this. Former Numsa training officer
Melanie Samson told TV4: “It’s fascinating that
there’d been a lot of work done on the Numsa
school without the participation of Numsa.”
However, in 1999 the Cosatu affiliate was in a
state of flux, without a general secretary. The
union’s former general secretary, Silumko
Nondwangu, admits that there was “no leadership”
at the time. As a result “all sorts of
characters” had the opportunity to use the union
“to pursue their own selfish personal, economic
interests”.
It was Nondwangu who appointed a three-member
Numsa team in 2000 to travel to Sweden to try to
clear up the allegations of corruption that had
surfaced. These included not just the R10m for a
training school, but also R40m in “commissions”
from Saab and its British partner BAE Systems,
possibly channelled through the Swedish and
South African unions. Such “commissions”, which
BAE has already admitted to paying, are widely
seen as sweeteners given to politicians and
others who could influence the purchase of
aircraft that were both over-priced and
unwanted. However, in buying them, jobs were
probably saved in the Saab factory.
Numsa was desperate to establish the truth of
the matter, but the investigation in Sweden by
Samson, Shiburi and Ncgobo drew a blank. The
team felt they were fobbed off by both SM and
Saab officials, treated to lavish meals, but
given no information. They cut short their visit
and returned.
Significantly, their host at the time was then
SM official Stefan Lofven, who is today the
leader of Sweden’s Social Democratic Party, who
is punted as the next Swedish prime minister. As
the SM international secretary in the 1980s,
Lofven dealt directly with the emerging South
African unions and, Samson admits, was “very
close” to Numsa’s first general secretary, Moses
Mayekiso.
This name, TV4 says, was included as a signatory
on the agreement relating to the school project,
although Mayekiso was then no longer involved
with Numsa.
Nondwangu’s reaction was that he felt “betrayed”
by what had happened. A proper investigation
into the allegations of corruption required
special skills and “financial muscle”. In 2000
Numsa “lacked this”.
Current Numsa general secretary Irvin Jim, who
has consistently opposed the arms deal, said
yesterday: “I was interviewed by the Swedish
television and told them Numsa has nothing to
hide. We took a decision to investigate and we
rejected the school proposal. We will also
co-operate fully with the (Siriti) commission of
inquiry into the arms deal.”
With acknowledgement to Terry Bell and Business Report.
*1
But one thing is for sure, the South African
Force was then not close to being ready to
making a decision to revamp itself.
It is on record as saying that it did not want
to be lumbered with not only new aircraft at
that time, but two new classes of jet aircraft
at the same time.
The SAAF had just brought into service 48 and
more beautiful Cheetah C jet fighters.
These would be good for at least 15 years and 20
years with a pre-planned life-extension.
Indeed these very same Cheetah Cs are today
flying around South America in the service of
the Ecuadorian Air Force.
Even the Impala jet trainer and light jet
fighter was not completely dead then as the SAAF
had literally hundreds of them and some of the
newer ones did not have unacceptable hours on
their airframes.
Sure, the Impalas needed replacement soonish,
but the SAAF is on record that firstly it wanted
a two-tier training system which does not
included a lead-in jet trainer and secondly it
very definitely did not want the British
Aerospace Hawk 100.
If the SAAF had to have a three-tier training
system, and it was later forced to do so by
Minister of Defence Joe Modise and Chief of the
Air Force Lt Gen Willem Hechter, it clearly
wanted the Aermacchi MD339.
The reason that SAAF did not want the British
Aerospace Hawk 100 was that it cost 70% more
than the Aermacchi MD339 while only offering
about 15% greater military value (mainly the
ability to have hard points for light weapons -
like the Impala Mk II).
But none of these impediments were too great for
the redoubtable masters of the art British
Aerospace.
It simply bribed all and sundry to get back the
three-tier training system and discard price in
the pre-stipulated value system.
It bought into Saab to get the Gripen into the
mix as the advanced light fighter aircraft
(ALFA) and then used all of is considerable
influence to get the Hawk and Gripen
inextricably linked and lumped, both technically
and contractually.
The veritable anuses in the DoD and Armscor
didn't have a clue.
Except the value of their offshore money-market
accounts.
And now the SAAF is literally hamstrung by
equipment it cannot afford.
And, alas, Joe Modise and Richard Charter are
not even around to enjoy the fruits of their
earthly labours.
Both died in questionable circumstances.
Richard Charter died on the weekend before he
was to entertained the Directorate for Special
Operations with a Section 28 interview into the
Hawk and Gripen acquisition.