Erwin’s arms deal offset flop |
Publication |
City Press |
Date | 2014-02-16 |
Reporter |
Charl du Plessis |
Web link |
Alec Erwin Picture
Lauren Mulligan/Foto24
As the first senior
politician to serve in the
Cabinet that signed off on
the controversial arms deal
prepares to take the stand
tomorrow at the Arms
Procurement Commission
headed by Judge Willie
Seriti, a damning audit
report reveals just how
badly South Africans were
conned.
Former trade and industry
minister Alec Erwin
(pictured) is set to take
the stand tomorrow. He is
the first politician to do
so after months of evidence
from the military, Armscor
and government officials.
Today City Press can reveal
details of a damning audit
report into some of the
economic benefits the
country received from the
arms deal – which proves
that the offset deals were
little more than an
elaborate con.
This is the first time any
audit of the offset deals –
contracts obliging foreign
companies to provide
investments and jobs in
return for buying their arms
– has been made public.
Not only does it appear that
the much-vaunted jobs and
investment promised by
government failed to
materialise, but the audit
makes it clear that
government made it possible
for arms companies to write
off billions they owed South
Africa.
The report, an audit
conducted by the department
of trade and industry (the
dti) of 40 out of 121 offset
projects, reveals that:
. Arms deal companies,
including two that would not
have won deals were it not
for their massive offsets
offerings, later negotiated
dodgy deals that saw their
actual investments massively
inflated by the dti. This,
in effect, enabled them to
write off billions of rands
owed to South Africa;
. Out of 24 audited projects
in which arms companies had
promised the creation of 56
531 jobs, only 3 815 jobs
(6.7%) had materialised;
. The dti’s reported figure
of 3 815 jobs was unreliable
because the audit team
“could not verify from the
supporting documents if the
total number of jobs
reported were created and
whether they were sustained
or not sustained”;
. French arms company Thales
was credited with an
investment worth $171.2
million for a failed medical
waste plant that cost them
just more than $1.1 million;
. German Submarine
Consortiums (GSC) failed to
meet specified conditions,
resulting in a €15.2 million
shortfall in investment; and
. The failure of an entire
“carbon manufacturing”
project by British
Aerospace/Saab (BAE Systems)
was never reported and only
discovered when the audit
team asked about it.
The report, dated October
2012, was obtained this week
by DA MP David Maynier after
a lengthy battle with the
dti.
Asked about the report,
former ANC MP Andrew
Feinstein, who was forced
to resign from the party
over his stand on the arms
deal corruption, said it
“shows that the offsets are
a complete disaster, which
is exactly what we said at
the time”.
“We warned them when I was
still in Parliament about
the dangers of offsets. They
knew … But the imperative of
getting the bribe was so
profound they would not heed
any advice.”
Feinstein, who studied the
methods used by arms
companies the world over,
said experience showed that
arms companies very seldom
made good on the “vast
majority” of economic
promises.
Paul Holden, a co-author of
a definitive book exposing
arms deal malfeasance, said
the dti’s report was
“incredibly damning”.
“It basically shows that the
actual economic benefit is
far less than what was
promised,” he said.
“When government undertook
these [arms] transactions,
they did so on the basis
that the economic impact
would be mitigated by
offsets. This report
suggests that has not
happened,” said Holden.
An example of this is the
case of British
Aerospace/Saab (BAES) and
the GSC, which respectively
supplied fighter jets and
trainers and submarines.
Neither of these companies
would have been selected
purely on the
competitiveness of their
bids.
It was the massive offset
offerings (or National
Industrial Participation
Programmes) that swung the
projects their way.
Holden’s book, which he
co-authored with Hennie van
Vuuren, called The Devil in
the Detail, shows that BAES
offered roughly 10 times
what its competitors offered
in offsets at the time it
won the deal – about R10
billion.
Similarly, the GSC
contracted for R18.25
billion in offsets.
But the 40 projects audited
in the report show that both
these arms companies were
able to claim massive
deductions in offset
projects.
This was done through the
controversial use of
“multipliers” which were
negotiated through
subsequent “package deals”
with the Industrial
Participation Control
Committee (IPCC),
responsible for
administering the arms
offset deals.
Holden said the use of these
“multipliers” was originally
banned, companies were
supposed to get one credit
for one dollar or euro of
investment, local sales or
net exports. These credits
would then go towards
removing the company’s
offset obligation.
“But only one year down the
line, they agreed on package
deals,” said Holden.
These allowed for one dollar
or euro of actual investment
in risky or unattractive
investment areas to be
multiplied many times over,
in one case 95-fold.
The real picture is far
worse as the report
highlights only 40 of 121
offset projects.
In the audit of the BAES
projects, the company was
given credit for a
staggering $460.4 million
in investment although their
actual investment was no
more than $14.46 million.
Similarly, the GSC audit
revealed an actual
investment of €27.574
million, which was inflated
to give it credit for an
investment of €1.285
billion.
But another dti document
that City Press has
obtained, and testimony
before the commission,
indicates that the total
value of the credits BAES
was granted in terms of its
offset commitment was the
equivalent of $7.65 billion
on an actual investment of
just $398 million.
The same document indicates
that the GSC’s actual total
investment of €69.7 million
was inflated to €3.11
billion.
The audit report states that
the dti accepts “no
methodology” was developed
to multiply the actual
investments and that it
would have been based only
on the “perceived
importance of the project”.
Maynier said the report was
likely to create some
difficulty for Erwin.
“The internal audit report
provides terrifying insights
into the maladministration
of the arms deal offsets.
There is little doubt now
that the arms deal offsets
were a monumental fraud,” he
said.
With acknowledgement to
Charl du Plessis and City
Press.
No only were the offsets a
monumental fraud,. the
entire Arms Deal was a
monumental fraud.
The only equipment required
at the time were corvettes
and helicopters.
But the SAn required
frigates instead of
corvettes.
The defence review indicated
a requirement for medium
lift of helicopters, i.e.
crew plus 11-man stich plus
equipment, yet the SAAF got
light utility helicopters
instead.
The SAN neither needed to
replace its submarines right
then and in fact not at all.
In 1997 he SAAF did not need
to replace its Cheetah Cs
for a decade and a half.
The SAAF did not need a new
trainer jet because it had
hundreds of Impalas and only
needed 24 good ones for its
trainers and in any case the
SAAF had made a formal
decision after a formal
study to adopt a two tier
training system (Pilatus
Astra plus light fighter).
DIP was also a scam.
The entire local part of the
corvette combat suite at
some R1,6 billion was not
caused by the SDPs and so
fell to fail that critical
test.
Other parts of the DIP need
serious review.
The biggest DIP contract was
from BAe to ATE for an
amount of just R500 million.
Yet just a decade later ATE
was bankrupt and sold to
Paramount, a prime trough
filler of many of the local
usual suspects.
Clearly ATE had its splodge
of Arms Deal cash quickly
mopped up by its directors
and redistributed to
themselves and their trough
feeders.
A Big DIP recipient of
course was Denel, yet
perennially running off
every year since then to the
keepers of the public purse
(read ANC majority in
Parliament) to beg (and get)
another R500 million per
year to keep solvent.
Another BIG DIP recipient
was Saab which was placed to
acquire Denel, yet it
somehow cocked up and
everything went tits up,
lost money on some of its
foreign Indirect DIP deals,
lost its plans to acquire
Denel and is quietly
divesting its defence away
from the country towards
South America where the
offsets are strong, but at
least have a semblance of
honesty.
The company to make it big
in DIP is Aerosud, bosom
buddies with Joe Modise et
cie, who made sure this
would happen come what may.
Erwin and his Grand
Larceneers Mandela, Mbeki,
Modise, Manuel et cie had
this golden goose well and
truly plucked, stuffed,
peri-peried, drawn and
quartered.
They forgot about the
knoffel in the sauce and
which would leave a most
foul taste in their mouths
for the next two decades or
more.
Just desserts, but at a cost
of hundreds of billions over
30 to 40 years to the
taxpayers.
Lock them up.