Arms deal critic stymied by Catch-22 rules |
Publication |
Sunday Argus |
Date | 2014-03-09 |
Reporter |
Ivor Powell |
Web link |
‘From time to time they let
me know they are working on
it, but the documents never
materialise. And since the
majority of them would have
to be individually
declassified, it seems
highly unlikely they will be
provided in time for me to
use them’
Devil in Detail : Stymied
by red tape
SOUTH Africa’s
controversial Strategic
Defence Packages have thrown
up some spectacular numbers,
but few as remarkable as
those required by Judge
Willie Seriti of arms deal
critic Richard Young before
Young would be in a position
to cross-examine Armscor
witness Frits Nortje.
CATCH 22: Judge Willie
Seriti’s sessions a lawyer’s
minefield.
To comply with
directives issued by Judge
Seriti, the chairman of the
Arms Procurement Commission
(APC), Young would have to
ensure that about 8 000
documents, running to tens
of thousands of pages, were
electronically scanned and
made available to Armscor
and Department of Defence
lawyers before he could
crossexamine.
According to commission
rules, all documents in the
possession of the party
wishing to cross-examine
must be made available – or
discovered – to the legal
team representing the party
to be questioned ahead of
the hearing.
In the usual course of legal
procedure, this would mean
legal teams would be given
sight of scheduled
documents, and allowed to
make copies (at their own
cost).
In Young’s case, there were
devils lurking in the
detail.
Constrained by commission
rules that require the
discovery of all relevant
documents and not merely
those that will be directly
referred to in
crossexamination, Young had
included in his discovery
schedule a generic list of
four caches of documents,
additional to 1 061
documents itemised. These
related to a series of
Promotion of Access to
Information Act applications
to the Department of
Defence/ Armscor, the office
of the attorney-general and
the public protector – about
7 000 documents, most not
scanned or in electronic
format.
DoD’s lawyers expressed
interest in these documents,
asking for sight of all of
them, while cherry-picking
only 23 documents from the
detailed list.
The commission last month
indicated that all relevant
documents should be
available in electronic
form. This was after Young,
complying with the Armscor
request for the 23 documents
referred to above, had
photocopied them.
By Young’s calculations, the
task of disclosing the four
schedules of generic
documentswould require him
and assistants to work for
33 weeks full time. Judge
Seriti, however, wanted the
job done in 12 days and
accepted Nortje’s lawyers’
assurances that it should
not take more than five
days.
Judge Seriti expressed
“disappointment” when Young
requested a postponement.
Nortje, programme manager of
the four frigates acquired
by the South African Navy,
was meant to testify in
November, but this was
postponed when Young applied
to cross-examine him.
Even if Young had delivered
his documents in electronic
format in time to question
Nortje, he would have been
cross-examining under severe
constraints because tranches
of documents which he
requested from Armscor and
the Department of Defence
months ago have yet to be
made available, or
declassified, before he
could use them in
questioning.
On February 27, Young said
he was in a position where
“I cannot properly prepare
crossexamination of APC
witness Nortje and
accordingly withdraw my
application to do so”.
Subsequent meetings between
Young, the commission’s
evidence leaders and legal
representatives for Armscor
and the Department of
Defence have softened the
requirements.
On Thursday, lawyers asked
for just 74 of the 1 061
documents.
Young is not the first
would-be public interest
crossexaminer to be caught
in this Catch-22.
Last month, lawyers acting
for arms deal critics Andrew
Feinstein, Hennie van Vuuren
and Paul Holden were poised
to cross-examine former
trade and industry minister
Alec Erwin on the National
Industrial Participation
Programme.
By government calculations,
the expenditure of about R30
billion (in 1999 currency –
now about R70bn) would have
been more than redeemed by
NIP investments to the value
of about R110bn.
However, in the week before
Erwin appeared before the
commission the Department of
Trade and Industry dropped a
bombshell in the form of a
declassified audit report on
arms deal offsets.
Confirming the substance of
earlier reports – which
showed that, despite the
offset programme having been
certified as being duly and
successfully concluded (and
the weapons prices therefore
payable) in fact only about
R6bn had actually flowed
into the South African
economy – the report sharply
highlighted where the
problems had arisen.
At stake was a system of
“multipliers”, according to
which investment credits
were awarded against
putative benefits to the
South African economy,
rather than how much the
contractors actually stumped
up.
In some cases, credits had
been awarded at a rate of
70, 80 and even 100 to one –
as opposed to the
multipliers of two and three
usually countenanced by the
department.
Though the issue was not
canvassed in detail in the
audit, indications were
given that such fantastical
mathematics were employed at
the behest of an
interdepartmental oversight
committee whose members
included officials from DTI,
the Department of Defence,
Armscor and Foreign Affairs.
However, the commission’s
evidence leaders did not
question Erwin about this.
Nor did the lawyers
representing Feinstein,
Holden and Van Vuuren, who
could pose questions only
with reference to documents
cleared by the commission as
evidence. Requests for
discovery and
declassification of key
documents relating to the
offsets have been
outstanding for more than a
year. Bizarrely, this meant
the lawyers were not in a
position to refer to a key
document – the 1999
Affordability Report which
had found that the arms deal
was not affordable.
Though declassified the
previous day, the document
had not passed through the
commission’s bureaucracy and
therefore remained offlimits.
This meant that the lawyers
had to concede they were not
in a position to proceed
with crossexamination and
Erwin was “excused” without
having answered any of the
hard questions.
While steering clear of
commenting on the
commission’s procedure,
constitutional law expert
Pierre de Vos said the
treatment of would-be
crossexamining parties had
“done little to assert the
legitimacy of Judge Seriti’s
commission”.
With acknowledgement to
Ivor Powell and Sunday Argus.
"From time to time they let
me know they are working on
it,” Young told Independent
Newspapers, “but until two
weeks ago none of the
documents ever materialised
and then it was just a
fraction (around 10%). And
since the majority of them
would have to be
individually declassified,
it seems highly unlikely
they will be provided in
time for me to use them.”
Late
this week on Thursday
afternoon Armscor’s lawyers
requested just 74 documents
out of the 1 061 that I
discovered and produced,
making rather a mockery of
its demand by means of a
formal order two weeks ago
for all of them within five
days.
But what concerns me most is
that the APC's and Armscor's
legal representatives
colluded behind my back to
procure an order with which
it is clearly not reasonably
capable of being complied
and in the face of my
extensive efforts to assist
the APC over the last two
years.
For me this does not bode
well for any further
participation by me.
In any case, when Nortje was
originally going to testify
this was only in respect of
Points 1 and 2 of the APC's
Terms of Reference,
Rationale and
Utilisation for the
APC's Phase 1.
Off course, I want to
cross-examine about
Impropriety,
Fraud and
Corruption and it is
clear that Nortje is still
nowhere near ready for that.
No wonder Nortje now refuses
to testify until he has seen
my documents.
All at the same time neither
Armscor nor the DoD have
made any kind of formal
discovery despite my formal
applications to the APC for
them to do so.
We shall see.