• Shortened Published Version
• Original Unpublished Version

Shortened Published Version

2003-07-09

The Editor
Business Day

Sir

The letter by Paul Gerber (Same Old Tune, June 27) begs a response.

Gerber wants to know who is sponsoring Terry Crawford-Browne's campaign and why.

But reciprocally, who is Gerber?

Is he the business development manager for a large defence electronics company with a R1,2bn stake in the arms deal; a company that is a contractor for the aircraft component of the arms deal?

Gerber questions whether the "average rational South African" wants the SA National Defence Force to "die a natural death due to mass obsolescence of its equipment". My answer is no, and I claim to be an average rational South African.

Gerber's rhetoric is fallacious. The defence force's equipment is not and was not about to succumb to "mass obsolescence" when the decision for the acquisition was made by the Cabinet in 1998.

The defence department has produced a list of the defence force's main equipment capability block obsolescence. There is a major difference between mass obsolescence and block obsolescence.

The first equipment on the defence force's replacement list was a squadron of frigates for the SA Navy. The department addressed this by purchasing the four Meko A200S "patrol corvettes" that are indeed frigates, albeit with modest combat capability.

But these corvettes are not to replace the Warrior-class strike craft that will be obsolete in about 2010, but the President-class (type 12) frigates, the last of which the SA Navy lost in a mid-sea collision in 1982. The "mass obsolescence" of these frigates does not seem to have been an overwhelming concern of government in the intervening 20 years.

When the SA Navy finally decide what it wanted from a frigate, it chose four Spanish vessels at R2,4bn in 1995 only to have the tender cancelled by the government. So we wait another few more years for the Mekos to become operational in 2006.

The SA Air Force took into service 38 Cheetah Cs in 1997. These are due to become obsolete only in 2012.

The air force was not supportive of the R11bn Gripen acquisition. This acquisition spawned another "requirement", a lead-in jet trainer ostensibly compatible with training for the Gripens.

The airforce wanted the far less expensive Aermacchi MB339. So it is easy to imagine why overseas suppliers were particularly pleased with their agent's success in selling jets the air force did not really want or need and which the country cannot really afford.

The government's rationale became a "strategic" one: partner with European nations and their weapons manufacturers in the quest for offset and international market share for Denel. British Aerospace got the nod on R16bn worth of aircraft so that it would become Denel's partner.

But as recently as two months ago, after the UK-supported Iraq war, in a fit of pique government broke off negotiations with British Aerospace.

Curing the defence force's equipment obsolescence was surely not the government's prime objective in these defence packages.

With acknowledgements to Richard Young and the Business Day. 

Original Unpublished Version

2003-07-06

Sir

The letter by correspondent Paul Gerber published in Business Day on 2003-06-27 begs a response.

Mr Gerber wants to know who is sponsoring Terry Crawford-Browne's campaign and why. I don't think Mr Crawford-Browne has ever hidden this from anyone, but he can respond himself (which I sure he will).

But reciprocally, who is Mr Gerber?

Is he the business development manager for a large defence electronics company with a R1,2 billion stake in 1998 Rands in the Strategic Defence Packages (Arms Deal); a company that is partly owned by a South African industrial group with a significant BEE shareholding (no BEE - no deal) and partly by a foreign company who is a prime contractor for the military aircraft component of the Arms Deal?

In the context of the monotony of Mr Crawford-Browne's tune, is it mere co-incidence how, after nearly every time there has been negative press about the Arms Deal, that this company has featured prominently in the media waxing lyrical about the Arms Deal and its business spin-offs?

Mr Gerber questions whether the "average rational South African" wants the SANDF to "die a natural death due to mass obsolescence of its equipment". My answer is not and I claim to be at all times an average rational South African.

But Mr Gerber's rhetoric is in itself fallacious. The SANDF's equipment is not and was not about to "mass obsolesce" when the multi-project acquisition decision was made by the cabinet in 1998.

The DoD has itself produced a list of the SANDF's main equipment capability block obsolescence.

Now there is a major difference between mass obsolescence and block obsolescence.

The first equipment on the SANDF's replacement list was a squadron of frigates for the SA Navy. The DoD addressed this in the Arms Deal by purchasing the four MEKO A200S "patrol corvettes" which are indeed frigates, albeit with very modest combat capability. But these patrol corvettes are not to replace the Warrior-class strike craft which will be obsolete in about 2010, but the President-class (Type 12) frigates, the last of which the SA Navy lost in a mid-sea collision on 18 February1982. The "mass obsolescence" of these frigates hasn't seemed to have been an overwhelming concern of the SA government in the intervening 20 years. In fact, when the SA Navy finally got its act together to decide what it wanted from a frigate after about six aborted attempts, it finally chose four Spanish vessels at a price of R2,4 billion in 1995 (c.f. R6,9 billion price of the four MEKOs in 1999 Rands); this after a two year tendering process and only to have this tender cancelled by the government in 1995. So we wait another few more years for the MEKOs to become operational in 2006.

Regarding the other equipment, the most expensive of which is the advanced light fighter aircraft (ALFA), the SA Air Force had taken in service 38 Cheetah Cs in 1997. These will only become obsolete in 2012 at the earliest, but had a pre-planned ten to twenty year life extension.

Even the SAAF was not supportive of the R11 billion Gripen acquisition. But the Gripen acquisition also spawned another "requirement" for the DoD, a lead-in jet trainer ostensibly compatible with training for the Gripens.

So Modise et al added R5 billion of Hawk trainers to the DoD shopping basket. Meanwhile the SAAF wanted the far less expensive Aermacchi MB339 which is an evolution of the SAAF's existing Aermacchi MB326 or Impala. Even Denel Aviation (ex Atlas Aircraft) had been specifically set up at taxpayers' expense to support the 240 Impalas the SAAF has owned.

So it is easy to imagine why the overseas suppliers were particularly pleased with their agent's successes in selling to the DoD jets the SAAF didn't really want or need and the country can't really afford.

Even the DoD's director of weapon systems testified under oath at the Arms Deal public hearings that " they (the SDPs) were government-initiated things that we were not used to; that we normally start a process on our own, start a need on our own, drive the thing from our position, not having something driven from another position" as well as that the DoD's acquisition policy was "was not structured to deal with multi-project environments, in other words dealing with more than one project at the same time".

The DoD's Chief of Acquisitions also stated at an industry briefing in November 1998, just after the cabinet had authorised the Arms Deal in principle, that "he - and the government did - not care if the ships arrived at Simon's Town without engines". In fact he said that if the corvettes could actually put to sea and fight, that this would be the "cherry on the top".

So the government's rationale became a "strategic" one, partner with major European nations and their weapons manufacturers in the quest for offset and international market share for Denel and other. So British Aerospace got the nod on R16 billion worth of aircraft so that they would become Denel's partner.

But as recently as two months ago, after the UK-supported Iraq war, in a fit of pique the government broke off negotiations with British Aerospace. Watch this space for who will succeed as Denel's bride, or is it groom?

But curing the SANDF's equipment obsolescence, whether mass or block, was surely not the government's prime objective in these strategic defence packages.

Richard Young PrEng, PhD